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Future projections show that by 2025, the demand for dairy products in developing countries 
will increase by 25 percent due to population growth, urbanization and increased incomes. 
This increase in demand offers a unique opportunity for smallholder dairy farmers, who may 
achieve higher levels of income and well-being if they are able to increase their milk 
production. Currently, smallholder dairy producers in developing countries face severe 
constraints caused by low productivity, lack of market access and high transaction costs. 
Hence, investments in dairy production that aim to overcome these constraints can serve as a 
powerful tool for poverty reduction and rural development. Many donors have already 
invested in reducing poverty by stimulating growth of dairy sector, but the success of such 
development projects has been variable and largely dependent on local circumstances. India is 
a good example of the challenges faced by the promotion of dairy development. Remarkable 
growth in the dairy sector has been achieved by “Operation Flood”, a large-scale government-
funded program to promote smallholder dairy production and market integration. However, 
growth in the dairy sector was not equally distributed among the different regions of India. 
Moreover, depending on the region, marginalized farmers, including female farmers, still face 
barriers to access technological innovations (e.g., breed improvement and better feeding 
practices) as well as access to institutions (e.g., credit and markets).  Therefore, India presents 
a good case for a comparative study that aims to identify what types of institutional 
arrangements are most suitable to promote inclusive growth of the dairy sector, depending on 
local circumstances.  
Against this background, it is the main objective of this thesis to analyze institutional 
arrangements for inclusive dairy sector development and to explore the factors that influence 
or hinder inclusive growth, using India as a case study country. The focus is placed on 
institutional arrangements that have the potential to address governance challenges and 
gender inequality in dairy development. Data for this thesis was collected in three Indian 
states that differ with regard to the overall governance conditions: Telangana, which enjoys 
favorable governance conditions, Bihar, which can be classified as intermediate, and 
Uttarakhand, a state with rather unfavorable governance conditions.  
The thesis is composed of five chapters. Following an introductory chapter, Chapter 2 
explores the governance challenges that different institutional arrangements of dairy 
marketing pose for inclusive growth. Chapter 3 focuses on the barriers faced by women to 
participate in institutional arrangements for dairy marketing and to access and control the 
income derived from dairy production. Chapter 4 presents a case study of the MilkIT project, 
an internationally funded project that used the institutional arrangement of the “Innovation 
Platform” to promote dairy development. Chapter 5 discusses the overall findings of the thesis 
in a comparative perspective and identifies the success factors, which influence inclusive 
growth of the dairy sector. The final chapter also presents policy recommendations for 
inclusive dairy development.  
The institutional arrangements for dairy marketing that were examined in Bihar and 
Telangana include different types of dairy cooperatives (with mixed membership and women-
only membership), a private dairy company and informal marketing arrangements. A 
qualitative research approach using Grounded Theory was applied to identify the factors that 
influence participation of women and marginalized groups in different institutional 
arrangements. The researcher stayed for two weeks in each of the selected villages and 
collected data using participant observation as well as other research tools: semi-structured 





In Uttarakhand, data from a baseline household survey and focus group discussions conducted 
for the MilkIT project were compared with a post-intervention household survey to assess the 
impact of Innovation Platforms on institutional and technological innovations. Furthermore, 
the documentation of meetings held in the context of the Innovation Platforms was analyzed. 
The findings of the study underline that gender inequality and governance challenges are 
major constraints to achieving inclusive growth, which require context-specific interventions. 
In Telangana, dairy cooperatives that have only women as members proved to be an 
appropriate institutional arrangement for inclusive dairy development. These women-only 
cooperatives performed better than cooperatives with mixed membership. The study showed 
that women and lower caste producers were often not able to participate in cooperatives with 
mixed membership, and those who participated had limited access to leadership roles and 
training opportunities. The results for Bihar were rather different, which underlines the need 
for a context-specific approach. Women-only cooperatives allowed females and low-caste 
members to participate, but all leadership roles were occupied by men who dominated the 
management of those cooperatives. As in Telangana, the mixed dairy cooperative in Bihar 
were not fully inclusive, but those women and low caste members who were able to join 
benefitted relatively more from access to inputs and training as was the case in Telangana. 
Exclusion of women and marginalized groups was particularly evident in the case of a private 
dairy company in Telangana, which mainly focused on marketing of milk and did not engage 
in services for productivity enhancement. Informal dairy market arrangements were found to 
be easily accessible for women and marginalized groups, but they did not facilitate access to 
inputs and services either. The Innovation Platform approach was found to be effective in 
facilitating market access and promoting technical innovations. By design and in practice, 
women were given a chance to participate in this approach not only by attending meetings but 
also by participating in decision-making.  
The study demonstrates that both the institutional set-up and the prevailing governance 
processes are key aspects of institutional arrangements for inclusive dairy development. 
Success factors include decentralized governance structures; low state interference; 
participation of women not only at the village level, but also higher levels of the cooperative 
arrangement (union or federation level); democratic practices, especially transparency, in the 
election of leaders; and involvement of all types of members in decision making. 
Effectiveness and inclusiveness in the provision of economic services also mattered, most 
notably with regard to input supply and support services to all members. The type of 
institutional arrangements required to realize these success factors may differ across regions, 
as the comparison of Telangana and Bihar shows.  
Overall, the study suggests that performing a context-specific social and gender analysis is 
essential for the design of formal institutional arrangements for dairy markets, a finding that 
likely applies to all agricultural markets. The study clearly shows that creating organizations 
with women-only membership is not a sufficient condition to promote inclusive agricultural 
development. What matters is women’s participation in leadership position of agricultural 
marketing organizations (which may require quotas), capacity building, networking through 
self-help groups and extension services that are accessible to women. The study also shows 
that innovative institutional arrangements, such as Innovation Platforms, also have a 





Prognosen für die nähere Zukunft sagen voraus, dass bis zum Jahr 2025 die Nachfrage nach 
Milchprodukten in Entwicklungsländern aufgrund von Bevölkerungswachstum, Verstädte-
rung und wachsendem Einkommen um 25 Prozent steigen wird. Dieser Nachfrageanstieg bie-
tet eine einzigartige Chance für kleinbäuerliche Milchbauern, höhere Einkommen und mehr 
Wohlstand durch die Steigerung der Milchproduktion zu erlangen. Gegenwärtig sehen sich 
kleinbäuerliche Milcherzeuger in Entwicklungsländern durch niedrige Produktivität, man-
gelnden Marktzugang und hohe Transaktionskosten erheblichen Einschränkungen ausgesetzt. 
Investitionen in die Milcherzeugung, die darauf abzielen, diese Beschränkungen zu überwin-
den, können ein wirksames Instrument zur Armutsbekämpfung und zur Entwicklung des länd-
lichen Raums sein. Viele Entwicklungsorganisationen haben bereits in die Verringerung der 
Armut investiert, indem sie das Wachstum des Milchsektors gefördert haben. Der Erfolg sol-
cher Entwicklungsprojekte war unterschiedlich und hängt weitgehend von den lokalen Gege-
benheiten ab. Indien ist ein gutes Beispiel für die Herausforderungen, die bei der Förderung 
der Entwicklung des Milchsektors überwunden werden müssen. So wurde ein beachtliches 
Wachstum von Milchproduktion und -vermarktung durch "Operation Flood" erreicht, ein 
großangelegtes staatlich finanziertes Programm zur Förderung der kleinbäuerlichen Milch-
produktion und -vermarktung. Das erzielte Wachstum im Milchsektor war jedoch nicht 
gleichmäßig auf die verschiedenen Regionen Indiens verteilt. Darüber hinaus sind marginali-
sierte Landwirtinnen und Landwirte, abhängig von der Region, weiterhin Hindernissen beim 
Zugang zu technologischen Innovationen (z. B. Verbesserung des genetischen Potentials und 
bessere Fütterungspraktiken) und zu Institutionen (z. B. Kredite und Märkte) ausgesetzt. Indi-
en ist somit ein geeignetes Land für eine Vergleichsstudie, die darauf abzielt zu ermitteln, 
welche Formen institutioneller Rahmenbedingungen und Strukturen am besten geeignet sind, 
ein integratives Wachstum des Milchsektors zu fördern, abhängig von den örtlichen Gege-
benheiten. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es das Hauptziel dieser Arbeit, institutionelle Strukturen und 
Vereinbarungen für eine integrative Entwicklung des Milchsektors zu analysieren und die 
Faktoren zu untersuchen, die das inklusive Wachstum des Sektors in Indien positive oder 
negativ beeinflussen. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf institutionellen Strukturen und 
Vereinbarungen, die das Potenzial haben, Governance-Probleme und Ungleichheiten 
zwischen den Geschlechtern bei der Entwicklung des Milchsektors zu beheben. Die Daten für 
diese Arbeit wurden in drei indischen Bundesstaaten erhoben, die sich hinsichtlich der 
allgemeinen Governance-Bedingungen unterscheiden: Telangana, das günstige 
Rahmenbedingungen hinsichtlich Governance genießt; Bihar, das als intermediär eingestuft 
werden kann; und Uttarakhand, ein Staat mit eher ungünstigen Bedingungen. 
Die Arbeit besteht aus fünf Kapiteln. Nach einem einleitenden Kapitel untersucht Kapitel 2 
die Governance-Herausforderungen, die sich aus unterschiedlichen institutionellen Strukturen 
und Vereinbarungen im Milchsektor für inklusives Wachstum ergeben. Kapitel 3 konzentriert 
sich auf die Barrieren, die Frauen überwinden müssen, um sich unter verschiedenen 
institutionellen Bedingungen an der Milchvermarktung zu beteiligen und Zugang und 
Kontrolle über das Einkommen aus der Milchproduktion zu erhalten. Kapitel 4 präsentiert 
eine Fallstudie zum MilkIT Projekt, einem international finanzierten Projekt, das das 
institutionelle Instrument der Innovationsplattform zur Förderung der Milchproduktion und -
vermarktung nutzte. Kapitel 5 vergleicht und diskutiert die Gesamtergebnisse der Arbeit und 
identifiziert die Erfolgsfaktoren, die integratives Wachstum im Milchsektor unterstützen. Das 
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letzte Kapitel enthält schließlich politische Empfehlungen für die integrative Entwicklung des 
Milchsektors. 
Die institutionelle Struktur der Milchvermarktung, die in Bihar und Telangana untersucht 
wurden, umfasst verschiedene Arten von Molkereigenossenschaften (mit gemischter 
Mitgliedschaft und mit ausschließlich weiblicher Mitgliedschaft), eine private 
Molkereigesellschaft und informelle Vermarktungsvereinbarungen. Ein qualitativer 
Forschungsansatz unter Verwendung der Grounded Theory wurde angewendet, um die 
Faktoren zu identifizieren, die die Partizipation von Frauen und marginalisierten Gruppen in 
verschiedenen Institutionen beeinflussen. Ein Forschungsaufenthalt von jeweils zwei Wochen 
in jedem der ausgewählten Dörfer wurde genutzt, um Daten mit Hilfe von 
Teilnehmerbeobachtungen und anderen Rechercheinstrumenten (semistrukturierte Interviews, 
Fokusgruppendiskussionen und die Anwendung von Net-Map, einer partizipativen 
Kartierungstechnik) zu sammeln. 
In Uttarakhand wurden Daten aus einer Haushaltsgrunderhebung und von 
Fokusgruppendiskussionen für das MilkIT-Projekt mit einer Haushaltsumfrage nach der 
Intervention verglichen, um die Auswirkungen von Innovationsplattformen auf institutionelle 
und technologische Innovationen zu bewerten. Darüber hinaus wurde die Dokumentation von 
Treffen im Rahmen der Innovationsplattform analysiert. 
Die Ergebnisse der Studie unterstreichen, dass geschlechtsspezifische Ungleichheit und 
Governance-Herausforderungen wesentliche Hindernisse für integratives Wachstum 
darstellen, die kontextspezifische Interventionen erfordern. In Telangana erwiesen sich 
Molkereigenossenschaften, die nur Frauen als Mitglieder haben, als ein geeignetes 
institutionelles Format für die integrative Entwicklung des Milchsektors. Die 
Genossenschaften mit weiblicher Mitgliedschaft zeigten bessere Ergebnisse als 
Genossenschaften mit gemischter Mitgliedschaft. Die Studie zeigte, dass Frauen und 
Produzenten von niedrigeren Kasten oft nicht in der Lage waren, sich aktiv an 
Genossenschaften mit gemischter Mitgliedschaft zu beteiligen; solche Mitglieder hatten nur 
begrenzten Zugang zu Führungsrollen und Ausbildungsmöglichkeiten. Die Ergebnisse aus 
Bihar waren nicht so eindeutig, was die Notwendigkeit eines kontextspezifischen Ansatzes 
nochmals unterstreicht. Genossenschaften, die nur Frauen vorbehalten waren, erlaubten auch 
unteren Kasten sich zu beteiligen. Trotzdem wurden alle Führungsrollen von Männern 
besetzt, die das Management dieser Genossenschaften beherrschten. Wie in Telangana war 
die gemischte Molkereigenossenschaft in Bihar nicht vollständig inklusiv. Allerdings 
profitieren Frauen und Mitglieder der niedrigen Kaste, die in der Lage waren beizutreten, 
relativ stärker vom Zugang zu Ausstattung und Ausbildung, als es in Telangana der Fall war. 
Der Ausschluss von Frauen und marginalisierten Gruppen wurde besonders deutlich bei 
einem privaten Molkereiunternehmen in Telangana, das sich hauptsächlich auf die 
Vermarktung von Milch konzentrierte und keine Dienstleistungen zur 
Produktivitätssteigerung der Produzenten anbot. Andererseits zeigte es sich, dass informelle 
Strukturen in der Milchvermarktung für Frauen und Randgruppen leicht zugänglich waren, 
allerdings ohne den Zugang zu Betriebsmitteln und Dienstleistungen zu erleichtern. Es wurde 
festgestellt, dass der Ansatz der Innovationsplattform den Marktzugang erleichtert und die 
Verbreitung von technischen Innovationen fördert. In der Praxis erhielten Frauen hier die 
Chance, sich aktiv zu beteiligen, und zwar nicht nur durch die Teilnahme an Sitzungen, 
sondern auch durch ihre Beiträge zu Entscheidungsprozessen. 
Die Studie zeigt, dass sowohl institutionelle Strukturen als auch die vorherrschenden 
Governance-Prozesse Schlüsselaspekte institutioneller Bestimmungen für die integrative 
Milchentwicklung sind. Erfolgsfaktoren sind dezentrale Governance-Strukturen; geringe 
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staatliche Einmischung; Beteiligung von Frauen nicht nur auf dörflicher Ebene, sondern auch 
auf höheren Ebenen der genossenschaftlichen Organisation (Gewerkschafts- oder 
Verbandsebene); demokratische Praktiken, insbesondere Transparenz bei der Besetzung von 
Führungspositionen; und Einbeziehung aller Arten von Mitgliedern in die 
Entscheidungsfindung. Auch bei der Bereitstellung wirtschaftlicher Dienstleistungen spielten 
Effizienz und Inklusivität eine wichtige Rolle, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die 
Betriebsmittelbereitstellung und Dienstleistungen für alle Mitglieder. Die Art der 
institutionellen Strukturen, die zur Realisierung dieser Erfolgsfaktoren erforderlich ist, kann 
regional unterschiedlich sein, wie der Vergleich von Telangana und Bihar zeigt. 
Insgesamt legt die Studie nahe, dass die Durchführung einer kontextspezifischen Analyse der 
sozialen und geschlechtsspezifischen Aspekte bei die Gestaltung formeller institutioneller 
Strukturen für die inklusive Entwicklung des Milchsektors von wesentlicher Bedeutung ist, 
was wahrscheinlich auch für andere Agrarsektoren gilt. Die Studie zeigt deutlich, dass die 
Schaffung von Organisationen, die ausschließlich Frauen aufnimmt, keine hinreichende 
Voraussetzung für die Förderung einer integrativen Entwicklung ist. Was zählt, ist die 
hinreichende Repräsentation von Frauen in Führungspositionen von 
Vermarktungsorganisationen (wozu Quoten erforderlich sein könnten), die Stärkung von 
sozialen und technischen Fähigkeiten und eine Vernetzung von Produzenten durch 
Selbsthilfegruppen und Beratungsdienste, die für Frauen zugänglich sind. Die Studie zeigt 
auch, dass innovative institutionelle Formate wie Innovationsplattformen ein 
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1.1 Problem statement  
Smallholder dairy production is dominant in many parts of the developing world because it is 
an important source of animal protein and livelihood to millions of the world’s poorest 
people.  In the dairy sector, milk and milk based products are important sources of dietary 
energy, protein and fat. It helps to combat malnutrition in developing countries where the 
poorest lack diversity in their diet and depend largely on cereals (FAO 2013). Future 
projections show that by 2025, demand for animal sourced foods especially dairy products 
will increase by 25 percent in developing countries due to fast urbanization, increased income 
and population growth (IFCN 2016).  
Globally, in the last 10 years, demand for milk has increased by 26% or annually by 2.4% 
(IFCN 2016). According to the FAO and IFCN estimations, almost 120 million farm 
households in the whole world are involved in dairy production.  Milk production is 
increasing due to high demand in developing countries where annual growth rates in milk 
consumption averaged 3.5 to 4.0 percent (Hemme and Otte 2010; IFCN 2016). This 
consumption trend for milk and milk products is double the growth rates of major cereal 
foods. This increasing consumption trend for milk indicate that investment in dairy sector 
growth could serve as a powerful strategy for reducing poverty if properly implemented. As 
women are playing a key role in dairy production, the benefits will support women’s 
empowerment and household welfare in the long run.  
The increasing demand of milk products is a good opportunity for the poorest sections of 
communities from developing countries to reap benefits. These smallholders have an 
advantage comparatively over developed countries due to low production costs, as they use 
family labour and farm crop residues for feeding the dairy animals. Furthermore, there are 
also additional environmental benefits because animal manure is used as the main source of 
nutrients instead of chemical fertilizers. However, smallholder dairy producers in developing 
countries face severe constraints such as poor productivity, a lack of markets and high 
transaction costs due to poor economies of scale. Milk is highly perishable in nature, and 
therefore needs an immediate market to sell the products, or processing which connects 
producers to consumers. 
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Market development is an important engine for pro-poor development and poverty alleviation 
(Dorward 2006).  Smallholders in developing countries face severe constraints to reach the 
market due to lack of information and high transaction costs. “Making institutions right” was 
the aim of development actors in 1990s to address poverty issues in developing countries. 
Collective action through cooperatives is one of the many ways for these smallholders to 
reduce the transaction costs and enable them to access the market and urban consumers. But 
there are mixed results in different countries for dairy production growth. For example, EU-
25 (mainly Germany and France) and South Asia (mainly India, Pakistan) are the major 
regions for global dairy production, which accounts for 44% of milk production (Hemme and 
Otte 2010). Despite the fact that 10% of the global cattle population is in Africa, its 
contribution to global milk production is only 3%, and this region is highly dependent on the 
import of milk from the EU region. It is important to explore the institutional arrangements 
for market development to find out the factors which influence or hinder the growth.   
1.2 India as a case study  
India serves as an example as the biggest dairy development programme through a dairy 
cooperative movement. Dairy cooperatives have emerged as the largest rural development 
scheme in India in the 1970s to 1990s along with investment from many donors as well as 
policy support which are given in following Table 1-1. These supportive policies and 
investments enabled the modernization of the dairy sector to a level from where it can take off 
to meet not only the country’s demand for milk and milk products but can also exploit global 
market opportunities (Rajendran and Mohanty 2004). Milk and dairy products in India 
contribute to 9 and 13 percent of dietary nutrition for rural and for urban populations 
respectively (Ohlan 2012a, 2012b). In India, almost one third of Indians, especially from 
northern states, follow lacto-vegetarianism, where milk and milk products are an important 
source of dietary protein (Devi et al. 2014).  
India continues to be the largest producer of milk, with a growth rate of 4.2% for the last two 
decades (USDA 2017). Several institutional innovations have been initiated by the 
government of India to increase the productivity of dairy animals, to improve processing 
infrastructure and to encourage the private investments for processing and productivity 
through organized marketing channels. The above initiatives have greatly increased milk 
production from 55 million tons in 1990 to 165 million tons in 2016-17, and per capita 
availability of 178 grams/day in 1990 to 355 grams/day in 2016 (Figure 1-1) (NDDB 2016). 
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Some of the key institutional innovations and policy measures from the 1950s are listed in the 
following Table 1-1.  
Table 1-1 Institutional and policy innovations in India for dairy development 
Year Details of institutional innovation/policies Key features/functions 
1950 Milk sub-committee of the policy committee 
on Agriculture 
City milk scheme originated to promote peri-urban 
dairy farms and city milk control board 
1948 Kaira District Cooperative Milk producers 
union (Anand Milk Union Limited-AMUL) 
Farmers organized themselves as a dairy cooperative 
and supplied milk in Bombay 
1965 National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) Apex body to promote, finance and support producer 
owned dairy organizations Launched Operation Flood 
programme to scale up AMUL model of dairy 
cooperatives 
1970 National Cooperative Dairy Federation of 
India 
To promote the dairy and oilseed industries as well as 
cooperative lines  
1970-80 Operation Flood-I Aimed at organizing dairy cooperatives at the village 
level, infrastructure development for processing and 
marketing and production enhancement services at 
village and union level. Establishedd city diaries in ten 
states 
1981-85 Operation Flood-II Concentrated mainly in Karnataka, Rajasthan and 
Madhya Pradesh to establish necessary infrastructure to 
support the dairy industry 
1985-96 Operation Flood-III Enhance productivity and strengthen the institutional 
base for cooperative efficiency with long term 
sustainability 
1990s Women only dairy cooperative society Women only dairy cooperatives were implemented in a 
few villages to encourage more women to become 
members 
1992 Milk and Milk Products Order (MMPO) No license is required to establish a dairy processing 
plant in India up to 10000 litres per day, only 
memorandum to be submitted to industry approval. 
Certification of registration required 
1995 Andhra Pradesh Mutually Aided Cooperative 
Societies Act (APMAS Act) 
The act facilitates the formation of voluntary dairy 
cooperatives by producers with no interference from the 
government  
2003 Producer Company Act (New Generation 
Cooperatives) 
Amendment in company act 1956 to promote hybrid 
form between private dairy company and dairy 
cooperative. This is promoted by NGOs with minimum 
10 members 
2009 Milk and Milk Products Amendments 
Regulations (MMPR-09) 
Any person/dairy plant handling more than 10,000 litres 
per day of milk needs to be registered with the 
Registering Authority appointed by the Central 
Government 
2015 White Revolution II National Dairy Plan-
NDP (Mission Milk) 
This world bank funded project aimed to double milk 
production by 2022 
Source: compiled by researcher from different documents and reports 
Dairy cooperative movements through Operation Flood from 1970-1996 were key 
institutional measures for fast dairy growth. MMPO Act 1996 and MMPR-09 relaxed rules 
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and regulations which encouraged private sector investment in dairy development. Some 
more institutional innovations within cooperatives like mutually aided cooperatives and 
producer company encouraged producers to obtain autonomy from public interference (Figure 
1-1). The value of milk output from the overall livestock sector is INR 549587 crores, which is 
801.5 billion US dollars (NDDB 2016).  
 
Figure 1-1 Production and Per Capita availability of milk India (1991-2017) 
Source: Department of animal husbandry, dairying and fisheries, Government of India, 2016-17. Accessed from 
http://dahd.nic.in/reports/annual-report-2016-17 
1.3 Who owns dairy animals in India? 
Dairy cooperative movements were not aimed initially for poverty reduction but aimed to 
increase the growth of the sector (Candler and Kumar 1998). However, this programme had 
great impact for the marginalized and women. India is predominantly characterized by mixed 
crop-livestock economy where landless and poor farmers use a combination of family labour, 
crop residues from their land and free grazing to rear their animals (Deshingkar et al. 2008). 
Dairying is the major source of rural employment. The income from dairying has an 
equalizing effect on the income distribution to all categories of producers compared to the 
distribution of income arising from crop production (Birthal, Taneja, and Thorpe 2006; 
Mandal, Datta, and Lama 2010). Even though dairy animals are owned by all wealth sections 
of the community, it acts as an important livelihood asset especially for poorest people. The 
following table indicates the livestock ownership in India by different land holding 
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households where 57.67% of bovines or milk animals in India are owned by marginal farmers 
(Table 1-2). 
Table 1-2 Percentage distribution of different livestock species by different category of 
land holdings in India 
Category of operational holding 















Landless (<=0.002) 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 
Marginal (0.002-1.000) 59.76 53.54 57.67 46.06 69.66 62.92 66.06 
Small (1.000-2.000) 20.37 20.59 20.45 18.40 13.77 25.60 21.66 
Semi-medium (2.000-4.000) 12.04 16.01 13.38 7.46 8.65 9.88 9.76 
Medium (4.000-10.000) 6.39 8.27 7.02 26.76 7.11 1.43 2.40 
Large (>10.000) 1.42 1.55 1.46 1.30 0.79 0.10 0.09 
All sizes 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author 
Within households, women play a key role in dairy production and contribute approximately 
70% of labour, their roles are multi-faceted but are not valued and acknowledged (Basu 2009; 
Daftary 2015; Patel et al. 2016). Women are typically responsible for collection of fodder 
from fields, fetching water from distant places, frequent feeding and watering of animals, 
caring for calves and sick animals, cleaning sheds, making dung cakes etc. 
1.4 Does India follow inclusive dairy development? 
Even though there is fast growth in dairy production in India, this growth was not equally 
distributed across different regions and different sections of communities. There are huge 
differences in production and per capita availability of milk in different regions of India 
(Ohlan 2012a; Sharma 2004). The per capita availability of milk is low in the Eastern and 
Southern states whereas it is high in Northern states. The top five states with high milk 
production are Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh which are also 
characterized with high proportions of resource endowments and infrastructure.  
Several studies have been conducted in the last few decades to evaluate the impact of market 
interventions through the Operation Flood programme on economic growth and development 
(Bennett 1991; Candler and Kumar 1998; Parthasarathy 1991). These studies compare the 
households participating in dairy cooperatives with non-participant households. But there are 
many poor households and women who are reluctant to participate in dairy cooperatives due 
to various issues (e.g. social barriers, access to cooperatives) at different levels. One side of 
these reviews reveal positive results: that dairy cooperatives helped marginal farmers to 
participate in dairy cooperatives which in turn helped ensure the well-being of families  
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(Candler and Kumar 1998; Mitra, 990). In the same line of study conducted by the FAO, it 
was indicated that the income of people without land ownership has been doubled with the 
Operation Flood program (Cunningham 2009). On the other hand, a review by Parthasarathy 
concluded that landless, marginal and small farmers didn’t get much benefit from operation 
flood due to a fodder and credit barrier, and poor social status such as low caste 
(Parthasarathy 1991). A recent study has reported that growth in herd size and graded dairy 
cattle is polarized towards large farmers and high caste communities due to discrimination of 
dairy cooperatives towards marginalized and low caste communities (Squicciarini et al. 
2017). Apart from marginalized communities, women also face discrimination to access to the 
benefits from the dairy development.  
Even though many innovative policies emerged in India to benefit women during the 
cooperative movement, it has been observed that this movement has a negative impact on 
women’s livelihood. For example, literature shows that their contribution as labour increased 
whereas access to income decreased compared to the pre-cooperative setting (Bennett 1991). 
This is due to a lack of participation by women in dairy cooperatives. Women have less 
access to cooperative membership when it is a mixed membership, because membership is 
given to the household head which in most cases in India are men (Kaur 2009). Only 18% of 
women are registered as members in dairy cooperatives in India (Gupta 2000). Women often 
face greater barriers than men to gain access to inputs and services to improve productivity, 
which limit their ability to move from subsistence production to commercial production 
(World Bank; FAO; IFAD 2009; World Bank 2011). Another issue in dairy cooperative 
movements in India is that women are often under-represented in management and leadership 
roles. For example, only 3 percent of women were represented in a board (Bennett 1991; 
Cunningham 2009; Gupta 2000). 
There is a dearth of empirically grounded research, which explores the dynamics of issues 
faced by women and the poorest of the population in gaining access to these dairy market 
channel arrangements. The overall aim of this thesis is to understand and explore the problem 
of governance challenges and gender inequality in the participation of the poor and women in 
different institutional arrangements for dairy market development.  
1.5 Knowledge gap 
From the above literature a knowledge gap exists regarding dairy development and inclusive 
growth in India, especially in the case of the marginalized and women. Most of the work 
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described in the above section about the impacts of operation flood and dairy cooperative 
movements was conducted in the 1980s and 1990s. There were many institutional innovations 
that emerged later in the 2000s to encourage women’s participation. However, there is a lack 
of information on the influence of institutional arrangements and governance processes on 
women and marginalized communities to benefit from dairy development and reduce poverty.  
There is a lack of knowledge on how to increase representation of women and the 
marginalized in market participation. No empirical evidence to compare different institutional 
arrangements is available. There are no peer reviewed articles available to evaluate the impact 
of institutional arrangements for inclusive dairy market development.  
This thesis derives its motivation from the above mentioned gaps in knowledge and 
contributes to overall inclusive market development through in-depth analysis of three 
elements: 1) Governance challenges in institutional arrangements for dairy market 
development; 2) Gender issues restraining women’s participation in market channels; 3) Role 
of an innovation platform for participation and market institutional development.  
1.6 Objectives of the thesis 
The thesis has three main objectives 
1. To evaluate and compare the different dairy market institutional arrangements for 
governance challenges and their impact on dairy income 
2. To explore the factors that determine women’s participation in dairy cooperative 
membership and control over dairy income 
3. To assess the impact of an innovation platform approach for increasing dairy productivity 
and market innovations 
1.7 Conceptual framework: Institutional arrangements for inclusive dairy market 
growth  
1.7.1 Inclusive market growth 
Growth is inclusive when the institutional arrangements allow all individuals of a society to 
participate and contribute to the growth processes on an equal basis regardless of their 
individual socio-economic status (Ali and Zhuang 2007). In this study, inclusive growth 
considers inclusion of the marginalized and women for achieving equitable development. As 
shown in Figure 1-2 inclusive growth is the final outcome of the analysis. Poverty, inequality 
and growth are interlinked with each other and cause direct and indirect effects (Naschold 
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2002). Fast economic growth without including all sections of the society could result in a 
huge gap between the rich and poor and, create conflicts and civil war which increases the 
poverty level. Knee jerk reactions just to eliminate inequalities may slow growth process (Ali 
2007).  
1.7.2 Outcome of institutional arrangement: productivity increase and market 
integration 
The analysis framework (Figure 1-2) has taken two outcome aspects from institutional 
arrangements for inclusive dairy market development, which include productivity increase 
and market integration. These outcomes of market integration and productivity enhancement 
from cooperatives are aligned with the concepts of Poole and Frece for economic and social 
inclusion (Poole and Frece 2010). Market engagement and performance are considered as 
economic inclusion and empowerment, participation, capacity development and democratic 
governance are considered as social inclusion. Countries differ in productivity achievement. 
For example, developed countries have high productivity in agriculture and livestock 
production. Productivity enhancement is the main driver in developing countries for 
increasing income and economic growth (Hall and Jones 1999). There are differences in the 
performance of households for increasing agricultural productivity, which is based on the 
social infrastructure (institutions and policies) where they live.  
In the last few decades, market integration is getting attention in developing countries. 
However, the opportunity for smallholder farmers to increase their income from agriculture 
production and rural enterprises depends upon market participation to sell their products and 
gain access to inputs and services. Access to urban markets by smallholders to sell their 
products will increase their profits. However, smallholders face severe challenges to 
participate in these high value markets. These challenges include market imperfection, lack of 
information on prices and technologies, lack of credit facility and high transaction costs. 
Institutional arrangements are important aspect to solve these constraints. Collective action 
through cooperatives in developing countries helps to decrease the transaction cost and 
increase access to markets for agriculture production and natural resource management 
(Markelova et al. 2009).  Sometimes market institutions favor the large farmers due to 
economies of scale leaving small farmers in subsistence farming. Market integration and 
productivity increase are interlinked with each other. When there is incentive to increase 
productivity through a better market, farmers invest in inputs and services to increase 
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productivity (Ravichandran, Teufel, and Duncan 2016). This is the other way around when 
there are surpluses productive farmers will find a better market to better increase their income.  
1.7.3 Type of institutional arrangements 
Institutions are defined as the ‘rules of the game’ which facilitate human interactions (North 
1990). According to North, Institutions comprise of formal (laws, contracts, markets) and 
informal (norms, traditions, customs, value systems, sociological trends) rules to conduct and 
facilitate transactions between, or govern economic decisions within, organizations. In this 
study different types of institutional arrangements for example informal organizations 
(traders, neighbours) and formal organizations (cooperatives, producer company, private 
company) are included for analysis to see their impact in inclusive growth. Institutions matter 
for growth and poverty reduction but should be supported by economic, social and political 
institutions (Leftwich and Sen 2011). Institutional structures and governance processes 
followed in these institutional arrangements will greatly influence inclusive growth. The 
conceptual framework (Figure 1-2) argues that sound institutional arrangements and good 
governance have direct impacts on inclusive growth and performance (Chibanda et al., 2009). 














































Innovation platforms as a catalyst for growth: The majority of smallholders are facing 
struggles to transform from subsistence production to commercial production due to high 
transaction costs, lack of access to inputs and services and a lack of participation in high value 
markets (Poulton, Kydd, and Dorward 2006). Many development actors and donors are 
facilitating the rise of collective action which facilitates the participation of small holders in 
the market (Markelova et al. 2009; Poulton, Dorward, and Kydd 2010). However, these 
efforts are not delivering positive results in some regions due to intrinsic social and political 
issues which require innovative approaches. Apart from this collective action there is a need 
for networking and linkage of producers with non-producers (development and private actors) 
to solve market imperfections and productivity issues which otherwise hinder growth. An 
innovation platform (IP) is a virtual or physical space for learning and change where different 
stakeholders including farmers, private players, government officials and extension agents 
connect together to diagnose and address common issues and bring innovations in technology, 
institutions and capacity building (Homann-Kee Tui et al. 2013). This part of innovation has 
also been included in this framework to test how the innovation platforms at local levels are 
supporting inclusive market developments and productivity increases for smallholders.  
1.7.4 Governance: Institutional set-up and governance process 
Good governance is defined by the United Nations Development Programme, which 
advocates integration of the poorest and marginalized people in making decisions about 
allocating development resources (World Bank; FAO; IFAD 2009). A growing literature 
defines governance as the process whereby societies or organizations determine how power is 
exercised, whom they involve in decision making and how they render accountability within 
the organizations (Graham, Amos, and Plumptre 2003; Saner and Wilson 2003). Governance 
processes are important for achieving inclusive growth. In this study, governance is examined 
in two aspects: one is governance structures or institutional set ups and the other is 
governance process within institutional arrangements for decision making processes and 
implementation. Governance processes in this study are measured by how institutional 
arrangements are following democratic practices, transparency, accountability, standards of 
management and services to members, which facilitate all sections of society to participate 
equally. Strong institutional arrangements and good governance promotes an organization’s 
performance (North 1990), which reach to all sections of society. This study explores the 
practices which encourage women’s participation to achieve gender equity. Two aspects of 
institutional set ups for formal market arrangements were examined in this study, which 
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include women only membership and mixed membership set ups. Most of the institutional 
arrangements in developing countries are linked with poor governance, which lead to 
increased inequality due to elite capture and political lobbying (Birner 2010). Poor 
governance in developing countries is a predetermining factor for the lack of inclusive 
growth, which subsequently reduces farm income and increases poverty (Bernard and 
Spielman 2009; Singh 2015). Governance is one element in policy implementation. In some 
cases, the introduction of good policies fails to achieve inclusive growth if there is poor 
governance in the implementation of policies. Sometimes safety nets (social protection 
policies or measures) are needed to include the disadvantaged in order to ensure benefits from 
development.  
1.8 Research design and components 
1.8.1 Grounded theory approach 
This study was focused on developing theories and concepts around factors which facilitate, 
influence or hinder the participation of marginalized communities and women in different 
dairy market channels. The study has adopted qualitative methods using the grounded theory 
approach (Glaser and Strauss 2009) as there was a dearth of information about the issue of 
market participation. There was a need for deeper insights regarding the participation of male 
and female dairy producers to develop concepts and theories about the difficulties they face in 
institutional arrangements for the enhancement of dairy production and gender issues they 
face for the participation and access to benefits. In this approach, theories were generated 
from the data, which was collected based on preconceived hypotheses or open questions. The 
data were categorized coded to develop theories from these concepts. Theoretical sampling 
was followed until information saturation was reached. The data were coded after each 
interview or observation and the researcher continued the data collection till no new 
information was captured. Here the study primarily concerns how institutional arrangements 
are functioning to represent women and marginalized communities. A series of case studies 
were set-up to explore, explain, describe and illustrate the reasons for the behaviour of 
individuals (Yin, 2003). The factors of participation in the dairy market channels and their 
effects in the household and community level were collected through these case studies.  
1.8.2 Net-maps 
Net-maps help the researcher to understand who are the stakeholders, how they are connected 
and how they influence the participant through visual presentation (Schiffer 2007). The 
13 
 
researcher used two types of Net-maps: one is a Process Net-map, which explains the steps in 
implementation mechanisms of different dairy market channels, characteristics of actors and 
any possible leakage points in implementation; the second is an Influence Net-map, which 
visualizes dairy market channels and their influence on the participant’s dairy income and 
livelihood. This tool allows the researcher to explore the different perspectives of any 
observed issue and discover major barriers of entry for participant in dairy market channels.  
1.8.3 Ethnographic survey 
This study has the objective to understand the participant’s behaviour in detail as sometimes 
participants do not report themselves fully. The researcher stayed in selected villages where 
different dairy market channels are present. Ethnography explores social interactions, 
behaviour and opinions within team, groups, organizations and communities (Reeves, Kuper, 
and Hodges 2008). The researcher used both semi-structured interviews and observations for 
collecting rich, holistic insights into opinions and actions of people as well as enabling an 
environment in which they can explain their behaviour. After the semi-structured interviews, 
the researcher observed the participants and their environments to explore possible reasons for 
a particular behaviour if participants didn’t explain themselves. The researcher stayed for two 
weeks in each dairy market channel selected for this study. The researcher participated in 
meetings or events in the village during the stay to explore details about social norms 
associated with the action or behaviour.    
1.8.4 Study sites 
The study has selected two states Telangana and Bihar in India. This is because both states 
have variation in dairy market development. Telangana is considered as a leading state with 
the highest market innovations for dairy development. These market innovations include dairy 
cooperatives, mutually aided cooperatives, women only dairy cooperatives and a producer 
company model etc. The state facilitates private investors by providing an environment that 
enables one to invest in dairy processing and market support. On the other hand, Bihar is an 
experienced state and dominant player in dairy cooperative intervention and control. There are 
only few private players for dairy processing as there are restrictive policies for private 
investment. Both states have different socio-economic characteristics for capturing the 
variations that may explain the behaviour of a participant. MilkIT project was implemented in 
Uttarakhand where dairy development is in a rudimentary stage and reported a failure of state 
dairy cooperatives and a lower dairy productivity than national average.  
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1.9 Thesis layout 
The thesis is arranged into five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 
explores the governance challenges in different institutional arrangements for inclusive dairy 
market growth.  Chapter 3 explores the gender issues especially barriers faced by women to 
participate in dairy cooperatives and control of dairy income and evaluates the 
benefits/impacts of their participation.  Chapter 4 is a case study of MilkIT project, which 
demonstrates how this local Innovation Platform supports dairy market institutional 
development and addresses gender issues. The final chapter of this thesis, chapter 5 discusses 
the overall findings of all three chapters and concludes on the success factors, which influence 
inclusive growth. The final chapter also draw policy recommendations for inclusive dairy 
development through market channels.   
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2 Comparison of institutional arrangements for dairy 
governance in Telangana and Bihar 
2.1 Abstract 
Many policies in India that focus on empowering women economically encourage them to 
participate in dairy market channels. But there is poor governance in dairy market institutions 
and women are under-represented in the membership and management of these institutions. 
This study identified and defined together with 117 women and 87 men the governance 
challenges of different dairy market channels in India (2 cooperatives with women members 
only and two with mixed membership; one private dairy company with no membership; and 
the informal dairy market sector) and options for overcoming them. A qualitative case study 
approach with help of Net-Maps and semi-structured interviews were followed. Interviews 
were conducted during an ethnographic stay in villages of Bihar and Telangana. Results 
showed that in the dairy cooperatives, women-only member dairy cooperatives in Telangana 
performed better than mixed-member dairy cooperatives in terms of good governance. 
Women’s participation in the vertical organization structure from membership to management 
and good leadership were the main reasons for better governance there. In Bihar, on the 
contrary, women-only membership dairy cooperatives had poor governance compared to 
mixed-membership dairy cooperatives. Respondents argued that the informal dairy market 
sector was found to be a good market channel for women and the poorest near the urban 
areas; however, there is a lack of public investment in inputs and service provision. The 
private dairy company was found to focus on maximizing profit, to exploit the poor through 
credit services and to exclude women. 




In India, government and civil society organizations have emphasized promoting women in 
collective action through various forms of self-help groups or women-only memberships to 
facilitate women’s economic and social improvement (Lahiri-Dutt and Samanta, 2006). These 
self-help groups and membership organizations serve as an important ground for women to 
build their leadership skills (Horowitz 2009). The promotion of women is also evident 
through their participation in village panchayat raj institutions (Birner 2010), self-help groups 
for poverty alleviation (Husain, Mukerjee, and Dutta 2014) and in the microfinance sector 
(Kalpana 2017). However, there is less attention paid by development actors to recognizing 
the role of women in the market sector.  One such important market sector, which has high 
women participation, is livestock production and especially the dairy industry.  
The livestock sector is a key feature of the Indian economy contributing approximately 4.4% 
of GDP and dairy sector is contributing 65% of its total value (Government of India 2016) 
and dairy products are important diet components for a substantive vegetarian population 
(Cunningham 2009). Women play a major role in dairy production, which is considered an 
integral part of the smallholder farming system. Women in rural areas contribute 75% of the 
labour in animal husbandry operations such as feeding, cleaning sheds, milking and selling 
milk (Upadhyay and Desai 2011). Many of these women are in smallholder farm households 
which are home to 70% of India’s cattle (Datta, Shrestha, and Chokkalingam 2015) and are 
characterized by low livestock productivity.  
According to report from USDA 2017, In India, formal market channels such as cooperatives 
and private companies occupy only 16% of the milk market and most of the milk is marketed 
through informal channels (36%) such as small-scale vendors. The remaining 48% of milk is 
consumed within households (USDA 2017). Since milk is highly perishable, the long-term 
marketing and preservation of high-quality milk requires formal market channels with milk 
processing facilities. Dairy cooperatives also, link livestock producers to market, which is 
important for generating income. In addition, these organizations promote investments in 
innovative technology, which subsequently leads to increased productivity in the sector 
(Ravichandran et al. 2016; Sauer and Latacz-Lohmann 2015).  
The country’s National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) which was established in 
the1960s has promoted the dairy cooperative movement through the Operation Flood 
programs which has supported dairy producers to develop a direct link with urban consumers. 
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However, it is evident that dairy cooperatives and livelihood improvement programs have 
excluded women and the poor from increasing their income (Candler and Kumar 1998) and 
also increased women’s labour as compared to pre-cooperative settings (Bennett 1991; 
Quisumbing, Rubin, et al. 2014). A study conducted in Bangladesh found that gender 
inequalities within households hinder women’s control over dairy income in cooperatives 
(Fischer and Qaim 2012a). At the same time, many governance challenges such as high 
political interference (Rajendran and Mohanty 2004) and low women participation in the 
membership and governance structures (Cunningham 2009) of cooperatives also limit benefits 
for women. However, cooperatives can help women to contest social norms and improve their 
economic benefits (Agarwal 1997).  
To encourage women participation in membership and board structures, under the Operation 
Flood program, 30% of dairy cooperative at village level were reserved exclusively for 
women1. However, due to forced membership women-only dairy cooperatives were less 
beneficial to women in economic terms than informal milk markets (Dohmwirth and Hanisch 
2017).  
This qualitative study aimed to evaluate and compare together with 117 women and 87 men 
the governance challenges experienced by selected women involved in two women only 
coops, two mixed coops, one private dairy company with no membership, and the informal 
milk market. It discussed with the respondents the possible alternate options to overcome 
these challenges. The study particularly focused on gender in order to understand the 
difference in participation between men and women in the governance system of dairy market 
channels.  
The study finds that inclusion of women in dairy market cooperatives from membership at 
village level to leadership and managerial roles in management level resulted in good 





2.3 Conceptual Framework and Literature Review 
2.3.1 Cooperatives and governance challenges 
There are many studies that assess the performance of dairy cooperatives in the developed 
world and their production function (Porter and Scully 1987), economic efficiency (Boyle 
2004), technical efficiency (Doucouliagos and Hone 2000), internationalization and financial 
performance (Ebneth and Theuvsen 2005), leverage ratio, and asset turnover (Chen, Babb, 
and Schrader 1985; Schrader et al. 1985). But cooperatives in developing countries face other 
issues such as lack of good governance which in turn affect their performance and increase 
inequality among members (Pritchard 2013; Trewin 2004). The following concepts of good 
governance were included in this study to measure the performance of different market 
channels on dairy income. Good governance follow the principle of inclusion of the poorest 
and vulnerable community in making decisions (World Bank; FAO; IFAD 2009).  
Democracy: It is defined as control of organization by its members. Democratization gives 
rural women and the rural poor a chance to voice their opinions on issues that affect them 
(Birner 2010). The principle of democracy is the core element of the business cooperatives 
(Österberg, Hakelius, and Nilsson 2009) and it facilitates good governance. However, there 
are problems of member democracy in heterogeneous and big cooperatives (Fulton and 
Giannakas 2001). Representative democracy is followed in cooperatives where members and 
elected directors participate in governance (Bijman et al. 2013; Chaddad and Iliopoulos 
2013). However, when the cooperatives are becoming bigger, the communicative distance 
between the members and director becomes wider. In order to decrease this distance, 
cooperatives introduce intermediary representative functions such as councils or committee 
members meetings at village level (Hakelius and Hansson 2016). The increased distance 
between directors and members leads to governance problems related to decision-making and 
follow up where directors are unable to fulfil the need of members and members are unable to 
monitor the performance of directors which results in decreased loyalty between members and 
their elected representatives (Richards, Klein, and Walburger 1998).  
Inclusiveness: This is defined as the quality of including all sections of the society in the 
organization. Poor governance in developing countries has refocused the attention towards 
inclusive growth and strong institutions to improve farm income and reduce poverty (Bernard 
and Spielman 2009; Singh 2015). In developing countries, access to cooperative membership 
have positive impact in the farm income (Verhofstadt and Maertens 2015). The concept of 
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inclusiveness in cooperative organizations can be measured by various indicators (Bernard 
and Spielman 2009) such as whether all producers can become members, if there are 
restrictions for membership, whether the membership includes poor, and all classes and 
ethnicities etc. When the cooperatives are exclusive, inequalities in rural communities 
increase as has been found in Rwanda (Ansoms 2009; Pritchard 2013). Inclusiveness does not 
end with membership but also extends to whether benefits are accessed by all members 
irrespective of their economic status, political capital or caste. Inclusiveness can also be 
reflected in decision-making in terms of whether decisions are participatory and if they 
involve diverse members. Mostly, the decision-making in developing-country agriculture 
market cooperatives are dominated by men even though most of the agriculture activities are 
done by women (Woldu, Tadesse, and Waller 2013).  
Transparency and accountability: In leadership roles of cooperatives, accountability is 
defined as the acknowledgement and assumption of responsibility for actions, products, 
decisions and policies (Williams 2006). Transparency and accountability of information 
facilitate good governance in collective-based economic organizations such as cooperatives 
(Kosack and Fung 2014). Accountable leadership at village and management level and 
persistent efforts to ensure the transparency and fairness improve the governance of 
cooperatives (Mccay et al. 2013).  
Standards of management and services: Good governance in the cooperatives depend on 
performance of the leadership and management team. Cost of managerial opportunism is nil 
when the leaders are efficient and not opportunistic, and low cost to medium if the directors 
are effective with clearly defined performance measures (Chaddad and Iliopoulos 2013). Most 
of the dairy market cooperatives in India follow the traditional cooperative model where 
board of directors and members committees perform all decision-making duties (Chaddad and 
Iliopoulos 2013). Governance can be improved if the leadership team has the ability to 
monitor the performance of management team. The cooperatives have two objectives such as 
increasing performance for organization and facilitate members to achieve their goal (Soboh 
et al. 2009). Organizational performance can be achieved through increasing market share, 
and using advanced processing and technologies which raised the price paid to farmers. 
Members believe that cooperative management performance is reflected in the economic 
benefit they receive (Fulton and Giannakas 2001).  
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2.4 Research Design and Data Collection 
In this study, a qualitative case study approach (Yin 2003) was used, which aimed to 
contribute to a better understanding of five dairy market channels such as mixed member 
dairy cooperatives, women only dairy cooperatives, producer company, private dairy 
company and informal dairy market in their implementation process and governance 
challenges in the village and management levels. Based of the above conceptual framework, 
elements of good governance and their indicators of measurement were compiled and were 
used as guide for ethnographic interview and focus group discussion (Table 2-1) to collect in-
depth information on the experience of NN women involved in these market channels.  
The attributes towards extend of democracy are measured in this study based on the 
perception of members’ knowledge of how the committee members in village and board of 
directors in management level are elected, which classes of members are given a chance to 
raise their voice or speak out on issue, the bargaining power of all classes of members, trust 
between members, the committee and board of director’s rights and responsibilities. 
Inclusiveness is measured based on caste and class in membership, participation in meetings 
and training, access to benefits, inputs and services.  
The study measured the transparency and accountability of dairy market channels through 
indicators such as whether members know how the milk price is determined, how much bonus 
they were eligible, whether all procedures of elections are known to members and how 
people’s compliance are recorded and addressed.  
To measure the standards of management, few indicators were included in this study such as 
staff capacity, how business is expanded with diversity of products, the relationship between 
members and management, and collaboration efforts with other dairy development actors. 
Table 2-1 Indicators to measure governance challenges of dairy market channel 
Governance 
challenges 
Means of measurement  
Democracy Election of chairperson, secretary and committee members at village level 
and board of directors and chairman at management level, voice of 
members in meetings and decision-making, bargaining power of members, 
members ‘trust of elected persons in the village and management level, 
ownership of organizations, representing collective action 
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Inclusiveness Whether all economic classes, gender and ethnicity are included for 
membership, participation in training and meetings, access to benefits, 




Knowledge by producers of information such as how milk price is fixed, 
bonus calculation, distribution of benefits, inputs and services, election 




Education and skills of staff in village and management levels, diversity of 
products, operational expansion, support for members in inputs and 
services, networking and collaboration of management 
Source: Author 
Two main methods of data collection were used for this study, a participatory mapping 
method called ‘Net-Map’(Schiffer and Hauck 2010) and semi-structured interviews with 
producers and other stakeholders through ethnographic stays in the villages. Net-maps help to 
understand the functioning of market channels and their influence on dairy income. 
Furthermore, they also highlight the relevant governance challenges. Ethnographic semi-
structured interview helped to explore the opinion and reflection of members on governance 
challenges on various indicators mentioned in the above framework.   
2.4.1 Net-maps 
Two types of Net-Maps were used in this study. To capture the information on the process 
and implementation of dairy market channels, the “Process Net-Map” tool was used. This is a 
participatory mapping tool, which allows researcher to identify (1) the steps involved in 
implementation of dairy market channels, (2) the actors who are formally or informally 
involved in implementation, and (3) the possible entry points for governance challenges such 
as elite capture and corruption. To know the influence of the dairy market channels and other 
dairy development actors on livelihoods, the ‘Influence Net-Map’2 tool was used to map all 
the dairy development actors who support dairy farmers’ livelihoods and their level of 
influence on dairy income.  
In the process Net-Map, two steps were followed (Schiffer and Hauck 2010). In the first step, 
the researcher probed the respondents to outline the implementation process of the dairy 
market channel from milk producers to consumers. The name of actors was written on piece 
of paper and placed on a large sheet of paper. The sex difference of service providers and 





were drawn as arrows between the actors. In the second step, the respondents were asked to 
categorize the possible problems in the implementation process. Since these are sensitive 
issues, the researcher informed that the goal was not to pinpoint the issue in the study 
location, but rather to identify issues related to implementation mechanisms.  
On the Influence Net-Map, two steps were followed. In the first step, the respondents were 
asked to map all the actors who support their livelihood for dairy development and their 
possible linkages were marked using arrows. Respondents were then asked to rate the 
influence of different actors on the outcome of dairy income and livelihood improvement 
(Schiffer and Hauck 2010). The rating was done on a scale from 0 to 6, with 0 indicating ‘no 
influence’ and 6 ‘highly influenced’. The rating was visualized using checker and chess 
pieces. The checker pieces were used to build the ‘tower’ which indicates the influence level 
of dairy development actors on the income of dairy farmers. While performing this exercise, 
the respondents were also asked to identify why different actors had the influence level and 
what was ascribed to them. This information was used to describe the attributes of the market 
institution and related actors and their quality of service and influence.  
2.4.2 Ethnographic stay for data collection 
Ethnography is the scientific approach to discover and investigate the social and cultural 
practices in the community, institutions and other social settings (Atkinson and Hammersley 
1998; Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte 1999). Here, we used institutional ethnography (D 
E Smith 2005) to understand the women and men standpoint in the dairy market channels and 
to develop a deep understanding on problems or constraints associated with the institutional 
process in their day-to-day life and how these are embedded in the social relations. 
Ethnographers discover what people do before assigning meaning to their behaviour and 
beliefs. This helps to generate the theory based on local contexts. The initial idea or concept, 
otherwise called formative theory developed in the Process Net-Map, were further 
investigated through the semi-structured interview while staying in the villages.  
The researcher stayed in three villages in Telangana and three villages in Bihar to represent 
three dairy market channels. The researcher stayed two weeks in each village until sufficient 
information or knowledge was collected. Semi-structured interviews with open-ended 
questions were used to collect data around the facts and information related to governance 
challenges. The participants were also observed for their activities and gender roles around 
dairy enterprise.  
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2.4.3 Sampling strategy 
The field research was conducted in Bihar and Telangana states of India; both have a varying 
degree of dairy market channels. One district was selected in each state to include diversity of 
dairy market channels. To ensure the secrecy of the respondents, the district names are not 
mentioned. The study included different membership dairy market channels which includes 
women only membership, mixed membership and no membership. This study assessed three 
dairy market channels in Telangana: 1) Telangana Dairy Cooperative Women (T–Co-op 
Women) in which membership is limited to women: 2) Telangana Dairy Cooperative Mixed 
Cooperative Mixed (T–Co-op Mixed) in which membership is mixed and: 3) Telangana 
Private Dairy Company (T–Private) which has no formal membership. In Bihar, three market 
channels were included which are: 1) Bihar Dairy Cooperative Mixed (B–Co-op Mixed) in 
which membership is mixed, 2) Bihar Dairy Cooperative woman (B–Co-op Women) in which 
membership is limited to women and Informal Milk Market (B–Informal) with no 
membership.  
The selection of villages was made based on the dominance of the dairy market channel, 
which was confirmed by dairy institutions staff based on their milk collection records. In each 
selected village, all producers sell their milk to only one dairy market channel and only 
villages with one dominant market channel were selected. Six villages were selected in 
Telangana and Bihar for the Net-Map exercise to represent the mentioned three market 
channels with two replications for each dairy market channel. The group composition for a 
focus group discussion for the Net-Map exercise included minimum of four women and four 
men. After the Net-Map exercise, three villages were selected in each state for ethnographic 
stay to represent each dairy market channel, details of sampling are explained in Table 2-2.  
Criteria for selection of households for ethnographic interviews were based on size of land 
(small, medium and large), size of livestock herds, quantity of milk sale, caste, and duration 
of membership or milk sale. Special cases were included like widows, women who can talk 
fearlessly, women who benefitted and women who have not benefitted from market 
participation, etc. Initially, 10% of households were selected based on the above criteria to get 
variation in data and sampling was stopped later when no new information was received. A 
total of 62 women and 61 men in Telangana and 49 women and 26 men in Bihar were 
interviewed (Table 2-2). The demographic profile of each village is given in Table 2-3. The 
researcher participated in the events or meetings during the stay to observe the procedures and 
discussions which helped to explain the beliefs and facts of respondents. 
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2.4.4 Data entry and analysis 
Process Net-Maps were drawn in Microsoft PowerPoint whereas Influence Net-Maps were 
drawn in the VisuaLizer 2.2, qualitative data analysis software (Medical Decisions Logic, 
Inc.) for visual presentation. Ethnographic interviews, minutes of meetings and observations 
entered into Excel sheet and Word file were grouped and transferred to ATLAS.ti (Scientific 
Software Development GmbH). These documents were coded initially with open coding. 
These open codes were further categorized based on similarities and differences. Important 
quotations from each household for the above categories were taken down in a Word file and 
reported in this study. The indicators of governance challenges for each dairy market channel 




Table 2-2 Overview of sampling for net-maps and semi-structured interviews  




Men Women No of 
villages 
Women Men Both 
Telangana 
 
Dairy cooperative women village 2 9 10 1 24 24 0 
Private dairy company village 2 15 6 1 18 18 0 
Dairy producer company village 2 12 7 1 20 19 0 
Bihar Bihar dairy cooperative mixed 
village 
2 15 18 1 15 15 3 
Bihar dairy cooperative women 
village 
2 12 10 1 24 6 7 
Informal milk market village 2 12 8 1 10 5 5 
Table 2-3 Demographic profile of research villages  
Demographic profile Telangana Bihar 










Background village and institutional arrangement 
Total households 500 3000 500 700 1000 200 
Distance to town 12 5 18 8 10 2 
Year of establishment <15 years >30 years <10 years >30 years <15 years <20 years 
Milk collection Litres/day 1200 1000 150 1500 2000 300 
% HH sell milk 20 18 53 20 35 13 
Milk price (fat 6% SNF 
8.5%) Apr 16 
34 31 34 31 31 40 
Membership details 
Membership men % 0 100 100 0 95 5 
Membership women % 100 0 0 100 5 95 
Forward caste % 40 70 10 30 20 20 
Backward caste % 20 20 55 50 50 80 
Scheduled 
caste/scheduled tribes % 
40 10 35 20 30 0 
Dairy animal population 
Total cows 400 220 10 500 1000 50 
Crossbred cows 100 150 2 250 300 15 
Total buffaloes 500 180 300 200 300 150 
Average herd 
size/household 
3.3 2.5 1.5 1.7 2.3 2 
Average milk yield/ 
animal 
4.4 3.8 2.8 4.6 2.5 3.1 





2.5.1 Overview of institutional structures and their implementation mechanisms 
This following section describes the governance structures and implementation process for 
addressing governance challenges in the dairy market channels.  
Governance structure 
The T–Co-op Women follows a two-tier governance structure which is explained in Figure 2-
1. All the members at the village level are women except one male veterinary assistant. Ten to 
15 villages are clustered together for easy transport of milk and supply of inputs and services. 
One inseminator, auditor and supervisor are appointed at cluster level. The second level of the 
governance structure is located at head office or chilling plant which is headed by a managing 
director (MD) and chairman. From each cluster, one member is represented in the board of 
directors and they elect their chairman. The finance, quality control and marketing teams 
work under the managing director (Figure 2-1) and they are well-qualified for their 
responsibilities. Most of the employees in dairy cooperative are women except the MD, 
marketing team, and inseminator, which is marked in Figure 2-1 with gender signs.  
The T–Co-op Mixed has a two-tier governing structure similar to T–Co-op Women. This 
cooperative was operated by government for 30 years and recently converted to a producer 
company where government don’t have any role. As the operational area is bigger than that of 
T–Co-op Women, they have chilling plants in the Mandal3, which are run by a team of staff 
who process the milk and send it to the district level. The inseminator, auditor, and supervisor 
placed at the Mandal level support and supervise the process. The MD is a retired animal 
husbandry professional while the chairperson is a politically influential person who leads the 
head office at district level. The board of directors (BOD) from the cluster level are politically 
influential people. Most of the employees and members are men as shown in Figure 2-2.  
As indicated in Figure 2-3, T–Private has a two-tier governance structure, one at village level 
with the agent/secretary, and the second at head office level, which is headed an MD (Figure 
2-3). Any issues within the village are handled by the agent with no interference from the 
management. There is no membership followed in this dairy company so that any producer 
can sell milk. Most of the producers were men as was the secretary.  
 
3 Mandal is referred as Tehsil which is a small administrative unit like sub-district  
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As shown in Figure 4, the two Bihar dairy cooperatives (B–Co-op Mixed and B–Co-op 
Women) have three-tier governance systems (Figure 2-4). The first tier is at the village level 
with members, secretary and a chairperson. The cluster level is formed with 10-15 villages 
which share one bulk milk cooler. A milk union is formed by 2-6 districts and a head office is 
located in one of the districts. An MD leads the head office and is assisted by technical and 
financial managers. All these milk unions are federated at the state level with the overall head 
office located in Patna. The federation office is headed by an MD, chairperson and general 
manager (GM), who are all higher cadre officials of government from organizations such as 
the Indian Administrative Services (IAS), and is indicated in Figure 2-4. The BOD at union 
level is made up of representatives of members and the BOD at the federation level is made 
up of high cadre officials from different departments such as cooperative societies, banks, 
state finance, NDDB, and representatives from district unions.  
The informal market channel in Bihar operates with a simple system of buyer and producer 
either via direct relationship or through traders. They have a long-term relationship and the 
price is decided by the seller but is collectively set by all the women based on the market 
price set by the cooperatives.  
2.5.2 Type of governance challenges in the implementation process 
This section describes the implementation process of selected dairy market channels and 
identifies the potential points of governance challenges which is indicated by dotted circles in 
Figures 2-1 to 2-4. In T–Co-op Women, a cluster-based approach is followed. The milk is 
collected from producers by the secretary and transported to a chilling station where it is also 
tested for its quality and packed for marketing (Figure 2-1). The milk is sold in two to four 
districts through shops and dealers under a specific brand name. The payment to dairy 
producers is made through the secretary every 15 days. The inputs and services are distributed 
to the dairy producers through the technical officers. In this process map, a few farmers from 
the lower caste reported that fodder seeds were given to elite farmers who have more land 
resources.   
The T–Co-op Mixed operational area is more than 100 sq. km, the milk collection and flow 
are indicated by arrows 1 to 7 in Figure 2-2. Milk processing is done in two stages, one at 
Mandal level and the other at district level. The payment system involves depositing of 
money in the bank account at the Mandal level for all village cooperatives. The secretary has 
the authority to draw the money upon approval from the chairperson and supervisor and he 
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distributes the inputs. Members reported that the payments for milk price and the bonus were 
not transparent. In addition, some producers reported that the benefits or inputs come from the 
head office to the secretary via the supervisor (indicated by arrow 14) and are diverted to only 
a few farmers who are rich and politically influential (Figure 2-2). Monitoring is done in a 
hierarchical way and hence there is no direct support from head office to members at the 
village level.  
Figure 2-3 explains the implementation procedure of the Private Dairy Company in which no 
membership exists. Here milk is collected by agent and transported to a chilling plant. There 
is no input support except concentrate feed supply which is sold at a higher price than by 
other suppliers. The main aspect of T–Private is the credit system for the purchase of dairy 
animals, the interest rate is higher than in the nationalized banks i.e. 18–20%. There is no 
monitoring system for the agent; farmers reported lower price for the milk and received no 
benefits. The target farmers are found to belong to low caste communities who are in need of 
finance for purchase of animals. Here, the producers do not speak up to raise any issues and 
there is no proper recording system in place. 
In the case of Bihar dairy cooperatives (B–Co-op Mixed and B–Co-op Women), the 
difference from other channels is that here milk is sold in the district as well as state levels 
(Figure 2-4). The state fixes the price of milk rather than the union. Here, the secretary is 
responsible for payment and distribution of inputs with approval from the chairperson and 
supervisor. A top-down approach is being followed in monitoring and supervision. Producers 
reported that there is no transparency in the payments for milk as the milk testing is not done 
regularly. Corruption, elite capture and bribery have been reported between the secretary, 
chairperson and supervisor in payment for milk, bonus allocation and input distribution.   
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In the Bihar informal market channel, the producers sell milk directly to consumers or 
through traders. They set the price which is 5% less than the market price offered by dairy 
cooperatives. In 90% of households, milk is delivered to the doorstep by women. These 
households access veterinary, feed and breeding services from private service providers in 
nearby towns. The producers associated with informal milk marketing in Bihar did not report 
any governance issues and the producers reported that the payment for milk is timely and that 
they also receive monetary advances in times of emergency. Details and insights of the 





















Figure 2-4 Implementation process in the Bihar Woman and Mixed Dairy cooperative  
 
2.5.3 Assessing the influence of dairy development actors on dairy income through a 
governance lens  
The influence Net-Map exercise compared the different market channel organizations with 
other dairy development actors in terms of their influence level on the dairy income of 
producers as explained in the section. This influence Net-Map present details of the links 
between the actors, their support services, ranking of these actors based on dairy income and 
their influencing governance factors.  
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Influence Net-Map of dairy development actors in Telangana 
Villages under the Telangana Dairy Cooperative Women were ranked first with 6 points4 
which means highest influence on dairy income, while villages using the T–Co-op Mixed and 
then the Private Dairy Company scored 4 and 2 points respectively (Figure 2-5). The farmers 
ranked their influence based on the inputs, service and profit for dairy development (Table 2-4). 
T-Co-op women and T–Co-op Mixed have provide near similar services because they not 
only collect milk, but also provide many inputs and services such as breeding, veterinary care 
support, subsidized feed, etc. to members. A higher score was given to T–Co-op Women 
(Figure 2-5) due to its good governance through a transparent system in the payment of milk 
price and biannual incentives as bonuses and more inclusive approach targeting women, the 
poor and all castes.  
Table 2-4 Details of the influence links between the dairy development actors in 
Telangana 
 
4 The rank scale is 1-6, 1 is lowest and 6 is highest score of influence 












Procure milk, feed and fodder seeds 
subsidy, animal treatment and 
vaccination, artificial insemination, 
animal insurance, member insurance, 
training and extension, ration balance 
program 






Procure milk, feed supply, credit for 
animal purchase 
4 High interest for 
credit, no bonus, no 









Procure milk, feed and fodder seeds 
subsidy, animal treatment and 
vaccination, artificial insemination, 
animal insurance, member insurance, 
women marriage support fund, training 
and extension 









Credit for purchase of animal from their 
savings through self-help groups and 
also cumulative interest paid to their 
savings 
4 Easy access to loan, 













Provide seeds for crops and fodder, 
subsidy for agriculture inputs 
4 Support for fodder 








 Provide Napier saplings for fodder 
cultivation 
2 Only fodder saplings 
Banks Dairy 
producers 
Credit for animal purchase, training for 
dairy management 
2 Need collateral for 
availing credit, 
complicated 




SRINIDHI Support this programme with 
cumulative interest for the savings 
NABARD Supports through a loan for the eligible 
dairy producers selected by NABARD 
Agriculture 
dept. 
Supports the farmers for crop loan 




Supports for selection of fodder crops 
for their farmers 
NABARD Dairy 
producers 
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Artificial insemination, treatment, 
vaccination and deworming, subsidy for 
calf rearing, credit and subsidy for 
animal purchase 
3 Absenteeism, elite 
capture for benefits, 
long distance 
Banks Support as subject matter specialist for 
dairy related trainings 
Farmer X 
village 
Helps for procurement of Napier seeds 








Participate in training programme for 




Source: compiled by the authors, based on influence net-maps in Telangana and Bihar (2015 and 2016) 
 
 
Figure 2-5 Net-Map of dairy farmers in Telangana 
 
The Private Dairy Company scored 2 points, as the producers reported that though it supports 
credit for purchase of animals, the company’s interest rate is higher than that of banks and 
informal borrowing. In addition, it is evident from the map that T–Co-op Women and T–Co-
op Mixed are working closely with other government actors such as the National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), state animal husbandry and agriculture 
departments and banks to offer breeding, veterinary care, feed and fodder, and credit services, 
while the private dairy company is not linked to any of these institutions.  
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helps healthy life 




Influence Net-Map of dairy development actors in Bihar 
In Bihar, the informal market channel has been ranked high with 6 points along with B–Co-op 
Mixed (Figure 2-6). Producers from the informal market channel village reported that they get 
the best price for their milk and payment of money which is received by women. On the other 
hand, B–Co-op Mixed is considered a great institution for producers in the remote villages 
because they are able to sell milk and earn income to meet household need and farming-
related expenses. The members associated with B–Co-op Women cooperative have given it 4 
points (Figure 2-6) and explained that women in the cooperative are merely members and have 
not actively participated in meetings and decision-making and leadership roles. Lack of 
transparency in the payment of milk, bonus and input distribution alongside poor governance 
were the factors reported for the score (Table 2-5). Less collaboration and coordination was 
observed between the B–Co-op Mixed/women cooperative with other dairy development 
actors.  
 
Table 2-5 Details of the influence links between the dairy development actors in Bihar 









Procure milk, feed and fodder seeds 
subsidy, animal treatment and 
vaccination, artificial insemination, 
credit for animal purchase, training and 
exposure visits 
6 Able to sell milk, 
monopoly, less price 
for milk, lack of 
transparency in bonus, 











Milk procured for home consumption 
and small shops, provision credit for 
emergency expenses as advance money 
6 Good milk price, easy 
process, guaranteed 
return, woman friendly  
Banks Dairy 
producers 
Credit for animal purchase, training for 
dairy management 
2 Poor and landless 
excluded, difficult to 
approach, elite capture, 
corruption and bribery 
NABARD Supports through loan for the eligible 
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World Bank funded project under rural 
development, SHGs for woman, credit 
and subsidy for dairy animal purchase, 
training and exposures, crop loan and 
training 
4 Woman friendly, good 
savings, easy access to 






Supports for starting the dairy milk 







Subsidy of interest for credit of animal 
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support for fodder production 
2 Benefits to elite and 
influenced people, 
corruption and bribery 
 Dist. Rural 
Devt. Agency 
(DRDA) 











Artificial insemination, treatment, 
vaccination and deworming, subsidy for 
calf rearing, credit and subsidy for 
animal purchase 
1 Absenteeism, lack of 
quality service, long 
distance 
JEEVIKA Technical support as subject matter 




Organize best animal competition and 




Feed seller Dairy 
producers 






SHG formation, credit for dairy animal 
purchase, subsidy farm inputs 
1 Lack of transparency, 
corruption and bribery 
Buffalo breeder Dairy 
producers 
Who has bull and provide breeding 
services for buffalo owned farmers 




Training for dairy management, 
treatment and vaccination camps 
2 Only training 
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Figure 2-6 Net-Map of dairy farmers in Bihar 
 
Source: compiled by the authors, based on influence Net-Maps in Telangana and Bihar (2015 and 2016) 
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subject matter specialist for training 
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2.5.4 Micro-level evidence of governance challenges in membership-based marketing 
channels (cooperatives) 
There were different governance challenges between the membership based cooperative 
channels. The following section describes the governance challenges faced by dairy producers 
in dairy cooperatives at the village level. The results of a comparison of the issues is 
presented in Table 2-6. This has been divided into two aspects: (1) Micro or village-level and 
(2) management-level in either districts or states. The results were presented according to the 
main indicators of governance challenges such as democracy, inclusiveness, transparency and 
standards of management and services. Each indicator has been discussed in detail for each 
dairy market channel with evidence from household interviews and focus group discussions 
based on indicators of governance challenges (Table 2-1). The indicators of governance 
challenges were marked as follows: ‘+++’ indicated excellent governance, ‘++’ good 
governance, ‘+’ medium governance and ‘–’ poor governance (Table 2-6 and Table 2-7). The 
results were presented for the village and management levels.  
Democracy at the micro level (village) 
Bihar Co-op Women  
B–Co-op Women village had a low score for democracy at village level due to lack of 
democracy in the selection of the chairperson, secretary and member committees, right to 
vote, bargaining power, ownership, collective action and speaking out on issues (Table 2-6). 
According to the Bihar dairy cooperatives rules, members, the secretary and chairperson 
should be women in women-only member cooperatives. The chairperson is elected every five 
years. But, in the studied village, the secretary and chairperson have been in their positions for 
more than five years. The secretary is a woman for recording purposes, but the actual work is 
done by her husband, who is a politically influential person belonging to a higher caste. While 
interacting with the supervisor and secretary’s husband, it was observed that the space for the 
dairy collection centre was given by secretary’s family and he is also related to the supervisor. 
The secretary’s husband is the one who handles milk collection, decision-making, price 
calculation and payments to producers. His wife, who is supposed to be the secretary, merely 
cleans the dairy containers and prepares food during meetings or training. Similarly, the 
chairman, a woman who was also selected by the secretary and the supervisor, is a neighbour 
to the secretary and her husband is also a politically influential person in the village from a 
higher caste. The chairperson is an illiterate woman and her husband, who is educated, makes 
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decisions together with the secretary’s husband. About 60% of the interviewed respondents 
reported that the cooperative had not conducted elections for many years. Expressions of a 
few women from lower caste regarding the right to vote and related issues, which are quoted 
below, indicate the depth of the issue:  
‘I don’t know that the chairperson is selected based on election, the position is 
for highly influential, rich and higher caste people’ (12, B–Co-op Women 
village). 
‘The chairperson’s husband and secretary’s husband are influential persons in 
this village, so they make many decisions for dairy cooperative. They asked me 
to vote once for a chairperson so I did. I can’t deny them as I have to sell milk 
to them’ (15, B–Co-op Women village). 
The members of the lower caste of B-Co-op women cooperative were also found to be weaker 
in demanding for any rights or raising any issues. It was observed that women dairy producers 
from the lower caste community face problems in interacting with the secretary’s husband 
and have also been threatened not to raise any issues against him, lest the milk procurement is 
stopped. When we asked about the secretary and her husband, the women lowered their 
voices and spoke softly so that others would not hear which might indicate the oppression 
they face. The following statements by some of the women indicate the depth of challenges 
associated with raising their voices:  
‘We are quiet because if we raise our voices, then we can’t sell our milk as we 
don’t have an alternate market channel’ (4, B–Co-op Women village).  
 ‘We are born in lower caste and are landless and we are depending on their 
land for our houses, so it is difficult for us to raise issues with them (upper 
caste), this is the politics of the secretary and village life in Bihar’ (30, B–Co-
op Women village). 
Bihar Co-op mixed  
The B–Co-op Mixed arrangement had a medium score for many indicators of democracy at 
the village level. The main reason for this is that there has been a democratic election of the 
secretary by dairy members. The secretary is a teacher in a private school in a nearby village 
who tutors students in this village and he played a key role in starting the dairy cooperative. 
One woman said,  
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‘We know him very well. He brought dairy cooperative in this village and he 
has much knowledge; so, we allow him to be the secretary and we agree to his 
selection of chairperson as they have to work together’ (8, B–Co-op Mixed 
village). 
The election of chairperson is not democratic (Table 2-6). Though the secretary was considered 
to be fair, some political influence cannot be avoided in Bihar: The chairperson, who is an 
influential woman from an upper caste, has been at the helm for 10 years and her house is 
located close to the dairy collection centre. The chairperson’s family had only one buffalo 
initially, they have received subsidies and loan for four cross-bred dairy animal purchases in 
the last 10 years due to political influence. The study found that subcontracts for supplying 
food during meetings was given to the chairperson due to her influence. Fodder seeds, which 
came from the dairy head office, have been distributed only to a few households who are 
upper caste in this village.  
Telangana Co-op Women  
Democratic processes are adhered to strictly in the system of T-Co-op women village in 
Telangana which had ‘excellent’ and ‘good’ scores for governance for many indicators of 
democracy. The secretary and chairperson are selected based on voting by the members (Table 
2-6). Furthermore, the secretary and chairperson come from a poor background. The 
chairperson has been changed twice in the last 10 years and was once elected from a lower 
caste community, which again indicates the democracy at the village level in this cooperative. 
All the members reported that they participate in voting. One woman said that, 
‘When there is an election, the dairy staff informs members, a secret ballot 
system is followed on election day for selection of the chairperson and once we 
had a chairperson from lower caste too’ (9, T-Co-op women village). 
When we observed the meeting records of this village, there was evidence of collective 
decision-making and members could speak out on any issue. Proceedings of one of the 
meetings attended by researcher were recorded. All the participating members signed the 
register of the meeting. The meeting register was not evident in any of the other three dairy 
market channels.  
Telangana Co-op Mixed  
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In T–Co-op Mixed village, the democratic indicators had a medium score, but this score was 
weaker compared to that of the T-Co-op Women village (Table 2-6). The lack of a voting 
system and the presence of the same secretary and chairperson for the last 20 years was 
highlighted. The absence of democracy was also reported in terms of participation in voting, 
with many dairy producers and other members saying they had not participated in an election 
at the cooperative. Even though the dairy cooperative has been converted into a producer 
company model, the members are not aware of this. One man said: 
‘The chairperson of Vijaya dairy (previous name when it was a government-
based dairy cooperative) is selected by their high officials; we have not 
participated in any voting process’ (20, T–Co-op Mixed village). 
Inclusiveness, transparency and accountability at the micro level 
Bihar Co-op Women 
In Bihar, B-Co-op women had moderate to poor scoring for inclusiveness and transparency. 
Even though the membership is reserved to women only, most of the decision-making and 
financial management is handled by men. For this reason, the respondents gave moderate 
score to gender inclusiveness (Table 2-6). Both mixed and women cooperatives of Bihar are 
less inclusive of the poor and all lower caste people. There is evidence from the household 
interview from the poorest and lower caste community of benefits received and the issues 
they have raised. However, many producers from the lower caste reported that they have 
never received any bonus money from the dairy cooperative. As per cooperative principles, a 
part of the annual profit should be given back to the members as a bonus, however, it is 
distributed to people in the higher castes with members in the lower castes receiving little. 
One woman from the scheduled caste said: 
‘Our milk cards with price details are not filled for many months, only the 
quantity of milk is recorded, and I have never received any bonus for many 
years’ (32, B–Co-op Women village). 
Furthermore, many members of the lower caste community expressed that they never 
attended any meeting or training. However, many dairy producers from upper castes have 
received bonus regularly though the bonus is not as per the standards.  
Decision-making at the village level should be decided through meeting with members. But 
only a few women from lower castes have attended these meetings. Overall, only 19 out of 37 
47 
 
interviewed women participated in meetings or training sessions within and outside the 
village, most of them belonging to upper castes except two from a lower caste. Selection of 
staff in this cooperative is not transparent. The secretary’s sister in-law was trained, 20 years 
ago, as an inseminator but her husband does the job as she got a job as primary health worker 
due to political influence of this family. The benefits from the dairy cooperative is captured 
by the political elites indicated below (Table 2-6). It was observed that higher caste members, 
the secretary and the chairperson, possess most of the crossbred dairy animals which were 
received through subsidy and credit from the cooperative, though these benefits are supposed 
to be limited to the lower caste community who are not aware of any such schemes.  
Bihar Co-op Mixed  
The B-Co-op mixed cooperative has similar scores to those of B Co-op women except in 
inclusiveness of women and poor households which was better (Table 2-6). The secretary, a 
man, has motivated many women to join the dairy cooperative and one woman said, ‘we get a 
high rate for milk in summer due to high fat content in milk’ (5, B–Co-op Mixed village) 
which indicates awareness of price. Many women and men who live near the dairy centre 
have received bonuses for the last 10 years. Further, 12 men and 7 women members said that 
they have participated in meetings and training sessions. Distance also plays a role in the 
asymmetrical propagation of information and distribution of benefits in this cooperative. 
Women and men from nearby settlements (0.5–2 km) of B–Co-op Mixed village have not 
received any bonus payments. One man said,  
‘We are far from the dairy, so they don’t call us and we are not aware when 
there will be meetings. If invited we would like to go for meeting and training’ 
(22, B–Co-op Mixed village). 
However, there is an inclusive staff recruitment and selection at the village level in B–Co-op 
Mixed. The secretary selected four assistants who are women and poor who carry out milk 
collection and recording. Every woman in this village calls him ‘Guruji’ which means 
‘teacher’. One of the woman dairy staff said: 
He has given me a life by giving me this job. When I came to this village after 
marriage, there was not much respect from my in-laws as I am from a poor 
background, though I am educated to secondary school level. After getting this 
job, my in-laws respect me (38, B-Co-op mixed village). 
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On the other hand, most of the input support from the cooperative is received by the political 
elites from upper castes because of pressure from the chairperson. One woman said:  
‘We never know that any credit or subsidy is given in the dairy for the 
purchase of dairy animals and most of the benefits are routed to politically 
strong people in the upper caste” (23, B-Co-op mixed village). 
Telangana Co-op Women 
The T-Co-op women cooperative follows the principles of inclusiveness strenuously, at all 
levels, for gender, status and class which was indicated by excellent scores for most of the 
indicators (Table 2-6). The dairy staff at the village levels are selected based on discussion with 
all members. Membership is open to all producers in the village. The secretary, a woman, was 
appointed by the chairperson and members. She has been working for the last eight years in 
collecting milk and recording data, she said: 
This gives me much confidence and I spend my salary in educating my son. 
This dairy is helping my livelihood so I follow all the procedures very 
transparently and there is a strict monitoring of records and payments every 
15 days from head office (Secretary, T-Co-op women village). 
All the members interviewed out of 40 households reported that they receive bonuses every 
six months. The members feel proud that milk collection has increased fourfold within a 
period of 12 years. The cooperative does not give credit for purchase of animals. But, they 
provide veterinary services and breeding services with a 50% subsidy for all the members 
equally, without elite capture. A few aspects such as seeds for fodder are given to top elite 
people who owns maximal land resources. Most of the members, except two, reported that 
they attended management meetings and training in better feeding practices at the village and 
the head office.  
Telangana Co-op Mixed 
The indicators for inclusiveness were scored from good to medium for governance. Though 
the membership is open to men and women, 15 out of 20 women interviewed in the T–Co-op 
Mixed village said 
‘The dairy cooperative belongs to men; the government allows only men to 
become members so my husband is a member of the dairy cooperative’. 
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However, the membership is open to all classes including the poor and lower-caste members. 
But the latter do not receive benefits equal to those of people in the higher castes, implying 
prominent elite capture. When there is any subsidy for animal purchase or scholarship for 
children’s education, most of it is captured by the rich and influential households of higher 
castes. A few producers from lower castes (two out of six) have attended the meeting and 
training sessions but have not actively participated in any decision-making within or outside 
the village.  
Democracy at macro level management and standards of management 
Bihar Co-op Women and Mixed  
The main indicators of democracy at management level, such as selection of the chairperson 
or directors received a poor score because the chairperson is elected by the government, and 
higher-level officers who are politically influential and associated with the current political 
party. Many producers and the chairperson of the village cooperatives reported that they are 
not aware of who the chairperson is at the union level. The position of chairperson and MD at 
the state level was occupied by the higher cadre of government officials from the Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS). Political lobbying for these positions is very high because those 
who fill them are the principal decision-makers and planners. There is no transparent 
mechanism followed for filling these positions as is noted with minus mark in Table 2-6. The 
researcher observed a change of chairperson at the state level within one year of data 
collection in Bihar due to changes in a political party. The service received by producers is 
substandard, especially in terms of veterinary and feeding support and breeding services. But 
the diversity of the dairy products produced by the Bihar dairy cooperative is higher with 26 
milk products available. Political dominance is very high with a top-down approach. 
Producers expressed ‘dairy Sarkar kha hai’, which means ‘dairy belongs to the Government’.  
Telangana Co-op Women 
The indicators of democracy at the management level and governance standards of staff had 
an ‘excellent’ or ‘good’ score. Interviews with the MD and chairperson of T-Co-op women 
revealed that they have held these positions since the start of the women dairy cooperative. 
These positions were given by the founder who was working as MD in a rural bank and had 
much political influence. One interesting finding is that each producer interviewed in T-Co-op 
women village knew the name of the MD and the chairperson of their dairy cooperative and 
they said that they were happy with the leadership and the profits the members make. The 
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process of selecting the chairperson is recorded and for the last three terms she has been 
selected as the chairperson by their members from the cluster level. The chairperson and BOD 
are happy with the MD of whom the chairperson said:  
‘He is highly educated, doing a good job, has expanded our cooperative from 
30 villages to 127 villages in a decade and the profit is high in the last few 
years. We have always contributed for his decision-making towards 
development of this dairy cooperative’  
Standards of management in this cooperative were found to be good (Table 2-6). The staff at 
the dairy office are well qualified for their positions and are selected based after interviews. 
Preference for position is given to local staff who understand the situation better. There is a 
strict system of attendance in meetings with biometric data (signature) recording, and 
monitoring and evaluation of staff is done regularly. The meetings are conducted every 15 
days without fail and reports are maintained properly. Producers reported that the support 
from management in providing input and services was satisfactory. This cooperative has good 
collaborations with NDDB and other organizations, but they act autonomously without any 
interference from government. Maintaining the compliance record was evident with the T-Co-
op women than in any other channel (Table 2-6).  
Telangana Co-op Mixed 
At the T–Co-op Mixed, the indicators of democracy in management and standards of staff had 
‘excellent’ to ‘good’ scores (Table 2-6). However, the dairy members do not know the name of 
their chairperson and many producers were not aware of the change of this cooperative into 
producer company. The present chairperson, with political influence, has held the position for 
the last 30 years and was involved in a court process that changed this cooperative from a 
government-based one to an independent producer company. Its board of directors is made up 
of individuals from the higher caste in that region. The dairy expanded its operation after it 
became a producer company its products are sold in other states. The staff at the head office 
were found to be technically qualified. The MD is a retired animal husbandry official. The 
technical support for breeding services, veterinary care, feed support and credit services are 
appreciated by the producers who said the company also gives non-technical support like 




Table 2-6 Governance challenges in dairy market channels with membership 
Governance challenges Telangana Bihar 
T-Co-op Mixed  T-Co-op women  B-co-op mixed B-co-op women 
Democracy at village level     
Election secretary is democratic ++ +++ + - 
Election chairman is democratic + ++ - - 
Selection committee members is transparent + +++ + - 
Raising voice in meeting + ++ + - 
Raising voice in decision-making + ++ + - 
Bargaining power of members is present ++ ++ + + 
Ownership is felt by members + +++ + + 
Trust between chairman and members is good + ++ + - 
Collective planning and action is present + +++ - - 
Inclusiveness: gender, poor, caste     
Inclusive membership-gender + +++ + ++ 
Inclusive membership- poor and class ++ +++ ++ ++ 
Inclusive participation in meeting + +++ + + 
Inclusive participation in training + +++ + + 
Access to benefits by all + ++ + + 
Access to resources and inputs by all + ++ + + 
Access to information by all ++ +++ - - 
Elite capture is absent - ++ + - 
Transparency and accountability     
Pricing milk is transparent ++ +++ ++ ++ 
Bonus distribution is transparent + +++ - - 
The election is transparent - ++ - - 
Well maintenance of records ++ +++ + + 
Compliance addressed + ++ - - 
Democracy management level     
The election of the chairman is democratic - ++ - - 
Selection of board of directors + ++ - - 
Selection of managing director (MD) + + - - 
Raising a voice in decision making is allowed - ++ - - 
Trust between chairman and MD is good ++ +++ ++ ++ 
Standards of management and services     
Staff capacity and skills are standard ++ +++ + + 
Good managerial skills of MD ++ +++ + + 
Diversity of products +++ ++ +++ +++ 
Expansion of operation ++ ++ +++ +++ 
Support for inputs (feed, AI, veterinary 
service, credit and extension service) 
+++ ++ + + 
Good relationship with members ++ +++ + + 
Collaboration with development organization  + +++ ++ ++ 
Government or politician dominance is absent ++ +++ - - 
+++ Strong agreement; ++Moderate agreement; +Less agreement; -No agreement 
Source: Compiled by the authors, based on net-maps, ethnographic interviews and observation in Telangana and 




2.5.5 Governance issues in models without membership 
While assessing the non-membership channel of Telangana-private and Bihar-informal, 
emphasis was given to find any governance issues. A few indicators were evident in these two 
models. The informal market channel in Bihar was found to involve especially women who 
can sell milk at doorsteps. The price for sale of milk was high and women were found to have 
high bargaining power. Whereas the private dairy company in Telangana was found to have a 
good price for milk, men dominated the list of beneficiaries. In both channels, there was no 
support for productivity enhancement through feed, breed improvement and veterinary 
services (Table 2-7).  
Table 2-7 Governance challenges in dairy market channels without membership  
Governance challenges T-private B-informal 
Bargaining power of members is present - ++ 
Ownership is felt by members - +++ 
Collective planning and action is present - ++ 
Inclusive sale of milk-gender - +++ 
Inclusive sale of milk: poor and class + + 
Pricing milk is transparent ++ +++ 
Well maintenance of records + + 
Compliance addressed - ++ 
Diversity of products ++ - 
Expansion of operation ++ + 
Support for inputs (feed, credit and extension 
service) 
+ - 
Good relationship dairy producers and client + ++ 
Collaboration with development organization is 
present 
- + 
+++ Strong agreement; ++Moderate agreement; +Less agreement; -No agreement 
Source: Compiled by the authors, based on Process Net-Maps, Influence Net-Maps, ethnographic interviews and 





2.6.1 Comparison of dairy cooperative’s governance between Telangana and Bihar  
Overall, the findings indicate that the dairy market channels especially dairy cooperatives of 
Telangana have better governance performance than the ones of Bihar state. The women-only 
dairy cooperative in Telangana was found to have the best governance compared to other 
market channels studied, but the same model in Bihar was found to have poor performance.  
Few core factors are responsible for the differences in governance performance between the 
cooperatives in the two states. One factor that contributes to the performance differences is 
the size of a cooperative. This study indicates that women only and mixed dairy cooperative 
in Telangana are operating in a defined small operational area of about 30 to 100 sq. km. 
Whereas the cooperatives in Bihar are federated at state level and their operational areas 
spread to around 500 sq. km across states with single policy even though they cover varying 
geographical areas. Our finding support the previous literature, as the number of members 
increases and activities grow in a cooperative, the democratic cost of collective decision-
making becomes high (Pozzobon and Zylbersztajn 2013). The communication and 
relationship within members and management which are critical for the efficiency of 
cooperatives (Bhuyan 2007) suffer as a result wider operations.  
Another important reason for the difference in governance between states is the political 
environment in which the cooperatives operate. Even though Telangana was separated from 
Andhra Pradesh (AP) in 2006, they follow the same dairy policy as AP which is now being 
reviewed. This government of AP was the first to support independent dairy cooperatives 
without government interferences through implementation of the Mutually Aided Cooperative 
Society and Producer Company Act which encouraged women to participate in dairy 
cooperatives. In the case of Bihar, the dairy cooperative policies were developed at state level, 
but implementation at the village level is meagre. Well-intended and thought out policies may 
not have an impact if they are not implemented properly at regional or village levels (Banerjee 
and Duflo 2011). Low-level democracy is perpetuated from the state level to local governance 
level through bad political institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) which is evident in 
Bihar. A cooperative will fail if its concentration is not towards business but rather in serving 
political interests, such as lobbying (Goddard, Boxall, and Lerohl 2002).  
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Another indirect factor which is responsible for this difference in governance and 
performance is the level of education of key members in cooperatives. Education of the 
leadership role members was a key determinant for good governance. Low literacy levels are 
a barrier in decision-making and ensuring transparent governance which is evident in Bihar 
especially in women cooperative where chairman and secretary were illiterate. According to a 
United Nations International Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF) census in 2011, the 
literacy rate is higher in Telangana (66%) than Bihar (54%) and the gender gap is lower in 
Telangana (17%) than in Bihar (27%). These factors indirectly affect the performance of 
cooperatives in the two states. Educated members and leaders can facilitate and maintain 
fairness and transparency through record keeping. A previous study on the village panchayat 
system in Bihar showed that selection of beneficiaries was biased due to the illiteracy of the 
Panchayat president, who was a woman (Birner 2010). A study on rural panchayats in 
Maharashtra also found that members with low literacy levels found it difficult to participate 
in decision-making processes which demanded written work and legal knowledge of agendas, 
minutes and schedules (Datta 1998).  
2.6.2 Are gender-based membership arrangements the key to good governance? 
In Telangana, women-only membership cooperatives performed better in good governance in 
terms of democracy, transparency, inclusiveness and standards of management compared to 
the mixed dairy cooperative. There is an argument in the literature that there is a need to 
include women as key stakeholders in decision making rather than see them as doing 
subordinate dairy activities (George 1991). In a similar fashion, the women-only membership 
cooperative in Telangana was established based on a bottom-up approach with the aim of 
empowering women by promoting them at all levels, starting from village-level membership, 
and leadership to higher level management (Figure 2-1). This approach paves the way for 
women’s decision-making and they do not hesitate to interact with members at all levels. This 
approach has enabled the cooperative’s management to interact easily with members. This is 
complemented by straight-forward communication mechanisms between the women staff in 
management to village members. This structure facilitates better planning and monitoring and 
has reduced governance challenges. This finding supports the previous argument of including 
women just as members in cooperative does not help for their development, women should be 
included in higher level such as planning and implementation of cooperative governance 
(Cunningham 2009; Rajendran and Mohanty 2004).  
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However, the results from Bihar showed that mixed-membership cooperatives had better 
governance compared to women-only membership cooperatives in terms of women’s 
participation, democracy and transparency. One important consideration is that the Bihar 
dairy cooperatives follow a top-down approach. The management at the state level decided 
that some cooperatives (30%) would have women-only membership. The bargaining power of 
women increases when they are involved voluntarily. Similar results were found in Karnataka 
dairy cooperatives where less empowerment of women has been observed within women-only 
cooperatives compared to mixed-membership cooperatives due to voluntary selection 
(Dohmwirth and Hanisch 2017). Another argument is that women only membership 
cooperatives in Bihar follow the shadow women managers (Birner 2010) where their role is 
insignificant and their husbands are the main decision-makers which hinders other women 
from interacting or expressing their views. Yet another factor for the good performance of 
mixed membership cooperatives in Bihar is that an enabling environment for the participation 
of women, was achieved by the good leadership of the male secretary who encouraged 
women’s participation. This suggests that there is a need for good leadership structures that 
promote shared governance (Gardiner 2006) and that support democratic and transparent 
functioning of the cooperatives.  
Secondary data indicates that the performance of women-only membership dairy cooperatives 
in Telangana has grown fivefold in the last 10 years in quantity of milk sold while women-
only dairy cooperatives in Bihar have grown 1.5 times in last 10 years.  
2.6.3 Performance of the informal milk market and private dairy 
In the non-membership dairy market channels, it is worth noting that the informal milk 
market was found to be more women-inclusive, transparent, and to offer a better price and 
greater bargaining power for producers than private dairy company. Moreover, the income 
from the informal milk market is controlled by women, whereas the private dairy company in 
Telangana was found to lack inclusiveness and transparency where participation and dairy 
income is controlled by men. In India 36% of milk is sold through informal market channels 
(Landes et al. 2017), the share will continue as consumers prefer fresh raw milk and this gives 
better price for producers (Thorpe et al. 2000). In the past, many criticisms of the informal 
milk market sector were not based on empirical evidence and organized milk market channels 
were prioritized in budget allocation and policy support. According to a recent study by the 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), the standards in the informal milk market 
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channels can be improved if the informal value chain actors such as milk traders are trained 
and certified to maintain the quality of milk (Johnson et al. 2015; Kumar 2010).  
Liberalized policies have encouraged the entry of private dairy firms in the India with the 
assumption that private players will be more cost-effective than cooperatives which will lead 
to more investment in technological improvements which will contribute to reducing the 
market price of milk (Singh et al. 2001). This study showed that the private dairy companies 
have not invested in technological improvements but rather are using the platform of milk 
marketing to promote credit businesses which exploit the poor. Public-private partnerships 
can help to avoid this exploitation.  
2.6.4 Reflection on the methodology 
The strength of this study lies in the ethnographic stay in villages which enabled participatory 
interaction with producers and other stakeholders. This interaction provided detailed insights 
of governance challenges faced by producers which were validated by the findings of focus 
group discussion using Net-Maps. Most of the indicators for governance challenges emerged 
from the ethnographic interview with the producers and net-mapping. The study, however, 
could not include the informal model in Telangana and the private model in Bihar, which 
would have given a better comparison of market channels within the two states. The 
researcher stayed only two weeks in the village for collection of data due to time limit and 
availability of resources which may not be deeper exploration of ethnographic survey 
however the researcher tried to collect diversified opinions. Future studies can be aimed for 
longer ethnographic stay to cover variations of households to see efficiency of market 





Based on this study, it can be concluded that more transparency can be achieved in the 
services and inputs at the bottom of the pyramid in the cooperatives when poorest and women 
are given priority. In the wider development context, it is important to increase women’s 
participation at all levels of cooperatives from membership to leadership and management 
levels to overcome the governance challenges in dairy cooperatives.  
Good leadership at village level without political interference is key for improving 
governance structure for collective action in cooperatives. The informal dairy marketing 
sector is helping women and poorest, but is lacking technical, service and management 
support. The future expansion of the sector will require the relevant policy support.  
Women-only membership arrangements alone do not necessarily lead to increased dairy 
income for women members. Future interventions should focus on moving from one-size-fits-
all to good-fit dairy institutional arrangements in which consideration is given to the local, 
social and political environment.  
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3 Determinants of women’s participation and control over dairy 
income from dairy cooperatives: Evidence from Bihar and 
Telangana villages, India 
3.1 Abstract 
Under-representation of women in producer organizations are very evident in developing 
countries. Women face more barriers to participate in market for sale of products and access 
to input and services. This study aimed to explore the factors which determine and influence 
women’s participation in dairy cooperative and evaluate the positive and negative outcome of 
participation. The data were collected from women only membership dairy cooperative and 
mixed membership dairy cooperative from Bihar and Telangana. The data were collected 
from 61 men, 81 women and 11 men and women together using semi-structured interviews 
while staying 2 weeks in each representative village. A descriptive analysis was carried out to 
calculate percentages and means for determinants of participation of women in dairy 
cooperatives.  High level of participation of women in membership, training, decision making 
meeting and leadership level and control over dairy income were observed when the 
cooperatives are reserved for women only set-up from village level to union or federation 
level. Education and knowledge through training and capacity building plays an important 
role for women within household which supports for bargaining power and decision making 
which influence participation of women in dairy cooperatives and control over dairy income. 
Social capital through participation in self-help groups supports women to contest social 
norms which influence mobility of women to participate outside the household economic 
activities like cooperatives. Participation of women in dairy cooperatives not only enhance 
economic condition of women but also influence household nutrition, education of children 





A large database from household surveys from 89 countries reveals that the extreme poor, 
living below $ 1.9 per day, are predominantly from rural areas and up to 64% of these poorest 
people are employed in agriculture (World Bank 2016). Contribution of smallholder 
agriculture to reduce poverty especially in developing counties is highly depending upon the 
sustainable access to markets (Wiggins and Keats 2013). Market participation is important for 
smallholders to access to inputs as well as to sell their products (IFAD, 2010). Market 
participation is defined as ability of an individual to participate in market effectively and 
efficiently to increase production (Poole 2017). Access to inputs will increase productivity 
whereas access to output markets will help rural farmers to connect with urban population to 
increase their income through reducing transaction costs (Bernard et al. 2010; Narrod et al. 
2009). In this study, participation covers individual involvement in dairy cooperatives and 
evaluation of the outcomes (positive/negative) of involvement.  
From 1970 to 1996 Operation Flood was the biggest poverty reduction programme in India, 
which has transformed the Indian dairy sector from a dairy products-importing country to an 
exporting country. This programme has followed dairy cooperative movement, which helped 
rural dairy producers to connect with urban consumers. However, participation in these dairy 
cooperatives and access to benefits were not uniform across different categories of members. 
Even though women play a vital role in the dairy sector of India with 71%  of the labour 
contribution in livestock sector (Singh, Avinashilingam, and Malik 2012), their representation 
in dairy cooperative membership and leadership are limited (Cunningham 2009; Rajendran 
and Mohanty 2004). Women’s roles in dairy production are multi-faceted but are not valued 
and acknowledged (Basu 2009; Daftary 2015; Patel et al. 2016). Only 18% of registered dairy 
cooperative members were women and only 3% of women were board members (Gupta 
2000).  
Women often face greater barriers than men in accessing agricultural markets to sell their 
produce and access to inputs and services to increase their productivity and income (Peterman 
et al. 2010; World Bank; FAO; IFAD 2009; World Bank 2011). There is vast literature on 
determinants of participation in cooperatives especially in African countries, which indicate 
that the poorest and women are often excluded from cooperative membership (Bernard and 
Spielman 2009; Fischer and Qaim 2012; Fischer and Qaim 2014). Development initiatives 
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through agricultural commercialization and market linkage have positive influence for 
household nutrition and welfare (von Braun 1995). As men, women and youth within 
household have different preferences for allocation of household income, market linkages will 
have different impact on household members depends upon their roles and responsibilities 
within household.  Women ‘s inability to participate in cooperatives will have negative effects 
on household nutrition as women often care for household food security (von Braun 1995). 
However, increased participation is not always translated to positive outcomes for women, the 
impact of participation depends on circumstances. For example, participation can raise the 
economic status and change household roles, which could add social pressure from in laws 
and end up violence by the intimate partner (Naved and Persson 2005; Tabbush 2010). On the 
other hand improvement in economic condition of women can decrease the intimate domestic 
violence which is reported in Bangladesh (Schuler et al. 2013) Furthermore, the other 
negative aspect of women participation is addition of high workloads especially if other 
household roles and chores don’t change (Kabeer 2005; Quisumbing, Meinzen-Dick, et al. 
2014).  
Despite the known fact that the gender is a key determinant of participation in cooperatives 
(Bernard and Spielman 2009; Fischer and Qaim 2014; Meier zu Selhausen 2015; Rani and 
Yadeta 2016), a thorough exploration of various factors which determine women’s 
participation in cooperatives is still missing. Furthermore, there is dearth of information in 
India whether policies focusing on allotment of women quota in dairy cooperatives have 
facilitated or supported women’s control over dairy income. There is dearth of information for 
the factors that determine women’s control over dairy income from dairy cooperatives. 
The above statement indicates that a knowledge gap exists with regard to socio-economic and 
socio-cultural factors and their influence on participation of women in cooperatives, control 
over income. Therefore, the aim of this study was to identify the socio-economic and socio-
cultural factors at household as well as community level, which influence the participation of 
women in dairy cooperatives and their control over dairy income in Bihar and Telangana, 
India. This study is guided by the following research questions.  
a. What are the factors that determine women’s participation in dairy cooperatives and 
control over dairy income in households? 
b. What are the barriers at household, community and organizational level affecting 
women’s participation in dairy cooperatives? 
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c. What are benefits for women participating in dairy cooperatives?    
3.3 Conceptual framework for determinants of women’s participation in cooperatives 
and their benefits 
Figure 3-1 presents a conceptual framework that hypothesized the factors which influence the 
levels of participation of women in cooperatives and their control over dairy income. The 
following section provides an overview of the literature, defining participation and different 
levels of participation, as well as the impact on control over dairy income. This will be 
followed by providing an overview how household, community and organizational level 
factors influence women’s participation and access to or control over income, and what are 
potential benefits of participation for women participating in cooperatives.    
3.3.1 Defining participation and their levels 
Participation has been categorized into various levels based on the involvement of an 
individual into group activities. For this study participation levels defined by (Agarwal 2001) 
in the context of community forestry in South Asia seems more appropriate. Agarwal, 2001 
has divided participation of individual in collective action into 5 levels: 1) nominal; 2) 
passive; 3) consultative; 4) activity specific; 5) interactive. These are defined by intensity of 
participation where nominal is least participation limited to membership, next level is passive 
where members are informed of decisions, consultative where members are asked for any 
opinion, activity specific means members are given some tasks and interactive participation is 
considered as the highest level of participation where members have voice and influence 
decisions. In dairy cooperatives, participation can be divided into nominal membership, 
attending meetings for decision making, trainings for capacity building and electing the 
leaders through voting and leadership roles. For this study membership is considered as 
nominal participation whereas participation in meeting, training, voting and leadership roles 
are considered as active participation (Fischer and Qaim 2014), which brings changes in 
decision making within households and community level. The benefit or impact of association 
with cooperatives are strongly depending upon the level of involvement or participation 
within cooperatives, for example nominal participation lead to lower benefits for individuals 
(Woldu et al. 2013).  
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3.3.2  Determinants of women participation in cooperatives and control over dairy 
income 
Recent dairy development policies in India have reserved quotas for women membership in 
village dairy cooperatives. However, it still has to be investigated whether participation of 
women in dairy cooperatives really translates into positive benefits within household such as 
control over dairy income. A recent study in women’s dairy cooperatives in Karnataka 
indicated that membership did not benefit women’s empowerment (Dohmwirth and Hanisch 
2017). Women’s empowerment is defined by World bank as the process of enhancing the 
capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into desired 
actions and outcomes5. Equal participation of men and women in cooperatives can lead to 
benefits not only to members, but also to their families. For example, a study in Nicaragua 
found that the percentage of children attending primary school was higher when their mothers 
participated and benefitted in fair trade coffee cooperatives (Bacon 2010). Many mixed (either 
men or women) membership cooperatives in developing countries allow only one member of 
the family to participate in cooperatives often women are excluded (Pionetti, Adenew, and 
Abadi 2011; World Bank, FAO, and IFAD 2008). When markets are formalized women are 
often excluded from formal markets due to having less rights to land, livestock and income 
from formalized markets (Carr and Chen 2004; Njuki et al. 2011). When women leave 
cooperatives, their control over dairy income is undermined (Kristjanson et al. 2014).  
Determinants of women’s participation in cooperatives and control over dairy income are 
presented below at household, community and organizational levels.  
3.3.3 Household level factors 
Access to resources: Bargaining power of the individual to participate in the market depends 
upon the basic resources such as land and livestock (Agarwal 1997). Land ownership 
positively influences individual participation in cooperatives because land is prerequisite to 
participate. It is also evident in agricultural cooperatives in Africa where male domination 
exists (Abebaw and Haile 2013; Bernard and Spielman 2009; Meier zu Selhausen 2015). For 
dairy cooperatives, livestock ownership also plays key role in circumstances where land is not 
directly influencing the participation. Generally, cooperative membership is given to 
household head because of land ownership (land title). There is clear distinction for the land 





is either followed through the inheritance or through purchase. There is a need to understand 
the local context of livestock ownership rather than identifying the livestock ownership. For 
this study, we used livestock ownership defined by (Galiè et al. 2015) into seven domains like 
benefitting from the livestock, how livestock was sourced, decision making, caring for the 
animals, knowledge of resources, having full authority over livestock and carrying the 
responsibility. In livestock ownership, control and decision making about these resources is of 
equal importance which subsequently affect the market participation.  
Education: Various studies found that lack of education and training opportunities influence 
women’s self-confidence which subsequently affect participation in cooperatives (Kaaria et 
al. 2016; Kebede 2011; Woldu et al. 2013). Education level is important to understand the 
level of discussion in meetings and discussions concerning the productivity enhancement. A 
study found that farmers with primary and secondary education are more likely to participate 
in farmer field schools than illiterate farmers in Kenya (Davis et al. 2010).  Coleman and 
Mwangi (2013) assessed women’s participation in forestry groups in Bolivia, Kenya, Mexico 
and Uganda and found that chances of women participating in groups increased with number 
of years in schooling. Uneducated women often hesitate to speak in public meetings due to 
lack of recognition and confidence (Agarwal 1997). However, one study found that education 
was not a factor to influence membership (Meier zu Selhausen 2015). Therefore, it is 
important to evaluate the role of education and knowledge in production and influence on 
participation and control over benefits.   
Previous experience to collective action: It is evident from the literature that women access 
to membership or actively participating in producer organizations often had previous 
experience working with economic or savings groups (Baden 2013; Kaaria et al. 2016). It 
indicates that the women having prior experience are more likely to participate. 
Household work burdens: Women contribute to household activities more than men (Doss 
2013, 2018). The multiplicity of roles of women in households in caring for children, elderly 
household members, as well as for animals, reduces their time to participate in meetings and 
trainings of cooperatives. It subsequently reduces their chances to become members and 
receive benefits in these cooperatives (Kaaria et al. 2016; Kebede 2011; Tanwir and Safdar 
2013). Women in developing countries work on average 16 hours per day (Carr and Hartl 
2010; Tanwir and Safdar 2013) and the opportunity cost to participate in producer 
organizations are higher than for men due to household work burden (Mayoux 1995). 
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Furthermore, childbearing and breastfeeding responsibilities of women hinders their 
participation in these group activities (Quisumbing and Pandolfelli 2010).  
Intra household power relations and decision making: Different members in the household 
have different preferences, interests and ability to achieve their interests. Access to resources 
like land and livestock does not automatically bring social and economic change (Calás, 
Smircich, and Bourne 2009), but it depends upon the ability of women to take decisions and 
to gain control over these resources, which is referred to as agency (Kabeer 1999) and 
bargaining power (Agarwal 1997). These are greatly influenced by education, local 
knowledge and experience. Lower participation of women in coffee cooperatives in Ethiopia 
is due to the lack of decision making power within households (Woldu et al. 2013). Becoming 
voluntary members in mixed cooperatives indicates the bargaining position of women and 
reflects women’s physical movement and freedom to participate. Women with high number 
of male children indicate reproductive bargaining power which is an early indicator for 
participation in cooperatives. Women’s decision making within household also depends upon 
the social norms and social capital (Agarwal 1997). Social capital is defined as networks 
together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or 
among groups6. A key principle for improving the decision making power of women is 
formation of self-help groups and building their confidence through skills training, helping 
them to join formal cooperatives for wider socio-economic impact (World Bank et al. 2008).  
3.3.4 Community level factors 
Social and gender norms: Social and cultural norms refer to sets of beliefs about men’s and 
women’s capabilities and skills, defining their access to public spaces and how they should 
behave in these spaces (Kaaria et al. 2016). The restrictions on women to access to public 
places affect their bargaining power within and beyond household level. Women are seen as 
being responsible for child care, house work such as preparing food and cleaning, collection 
of fuel, fodder and water, whereas men are responsible for production work and income 
generation (Agarwal 2001; Kaaria et al. 2016; Tanwir and Safdar 2013). In Asian and African 
countries, participation of married women in public sphere activities such as self-help groups 
or cooperatives is not allowed without their husband’s permission or support (Gotschi, Njuki, 
and Delve 2009). However, market participation will help to overcome these restrictions and 





Mobility: In developing countries, women are often not allowed to travel outside their home 
and village. Distance to main roads negatively correlated with participation of members in 
group activities in farmer field schools and cooperatives in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
(Davis et al. 2010; Fischer and Qaim 2012b). Increased participation of women members was 
reported when the cooperative members are from the same locality, as it is reported for coffee 
cooperatives of Ethiopia (Woldu et al. 2013). In Bangladesh, participation in dairy 
cooperatives increased the mobility of women outside their community (Quisumbing, Rubin, 
et al. 2014) 
Caste: Caste refers to a traditional Hindu model of social stratification, which defines people 
by ancestry and occupation (Berreman 1960).  It is defined as a system of ordered inequality 
both in status and access to goods and services. Among the different castes in India Brahman, 
Rajput are forward case (FC) which is considered as higher caste with high social status; Dalit 
or Scheduled Caste (SC), Adivasi or Scheduled Tribes (ST), Backward caste and Muslim are 
considered as lower castes with low level of jobs like daily wage laborers (Fatima Alvi 2016). 
Women from lower caste households have more opportunities to participate than women from 
higher caste households as they are already participating as laborers. However, women from 
Muslim communities have less chance to participate in economic activities (Fatima Alvi 
2016).  
3.3.5 Organizational factors 
Organizational environment: Two categories of organizational factors influence, motivate 
and enable participation of women and men in producer organizations. One category is 
organizational environment, which includes membership criteria, leadership, management, 
organizational structure and support for capacity development. At the organizational level, 
clear goals and proactive coordination towards transformation encourages women 
participation (Smith 1994). For example, in Bangladesh, community based organizations were 
found successful due to better governance structure and specific quota to encourage women to 
become leaders (Datta 2007). Strong leadership and reservation quota for women in 
membership and training encourages participation of women in the dairy cooperatives 
(Kumaraswamy et al. 2014). Women tend to be associated with cooperatives when there is 
satisfaction for increased control over technologies and input services (Woldu et al. 2013).  
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3.3.6 Political factors 
Policies and legislations, which address issues such as access to resources (land, income) 
without any discrimination against women, will encourage women’s participation in 
collective based organizations (Kaaria et al., 2016). In Uganda due to lack of legal 
implementations for women to access to land led to low participation in producer 
organizations (Najjingo, Sseguya, and Mangheni 2004). Another barrier to participation is the 
upper caste dominance, especially in South Asia. In countries like India  policies with regard 
to dairy development are influenced by the upper caste through political lobbying which 
hinders the participation of lower caste individuals in cooperatives (Basu and Chakraborty 
2008).  
3.3.7 Beneficial impact of women’s participation in cooperatives 
Review of good practice case studies of producer organizations by (Herbel et al. 2012) found 
that participation in producer organizations resulted in various benefits for members of these 
organizations, among others enhanced access to resources, information, inputs and output 
markets. This study analysed the benefits achieved by women through participating in 
cooperatives at two levels: 1) benefits at household level; 2) benefits at community level.   
3.3.7.1 Household level benefit:  
The major benefit at the household level is increased income from sale of products or 
increased productivity due to improved knowledge, access to networks, and opportunities. 
Nominal participation of women in dairy cooperatives will not result in empowerment of 
women, as empowerment largely depends on active participation (Dohmwirth and Hanisch 
2017). Some literature suggests that commercialization of market will give control over 
income to men if gender inequalities in participation are not addressed (Fischer and Qaim 
2012b). Women access and control over income from cooperatives not only empowers them 
but also helps to achieve food security and family welfare (Quisumbing, Rubin, et al. 2014). 
On the other hand, men tend to invest in productive assets and businesses (T Ravichandran, 
Teufel, and Duncan 2016). Other benefits of women participation in cooperatives are changes 
in decision making and improved negotiations skills within household, which are evident in 
households associated with these cooperatives in Uganda (Ferguson and Kepe 2011). Key 
change due to participation in cooperatives is asset ownership, which is reported in 
Bangladesh where joint asset ownership was found increasing due to participation of women 
in cooperatives (Quisumbing and Roy 2014).   
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3.3.7.2 Community level benefit:  
The most important changes at community level due to women’s participation in producer 
organizations are increased social capital. Some dairy groups in Bangladesh built social and 
human capital and changed society’s perception of women’s roles and capabilities 
(Quisumbing et al. 2015). It also led to increased mobility and communication (Quisumbing 
and Roy 2014; Ravichandran, Teufel, and Duncan 2015) which are the key components of 
women empowerment. Building self-confidence and leadership skills through participation in 
collective-based organizations are evident in self-employed women’s associations of India, 
contesting the existing patriarchal and hierarchical norms within society (Chen 2006).   
All the above determinants of women’s participation in dairy cooperatives are outlined in 
following framework (Figure 3-1).  It is important to note that household, community and 


















Figure 3-1 Factors influencing women’s participation in cooperatives and access to and 




Study design and data collection 
A qualitative explorative research approach was used in this study. The aim of qualitative 
research is to contextualize the findings in the interactive world in which they are generated 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2013). It is difficult to perceive the difficulties faced by farmer by 
staying far from the field or through spending few minutes with them to perform a survey. 
Therefore, it is important to be in the field to understand the behaviour and explore reasons 
behind their behaviour (Chambers 1983). Grounded theory procedures (Glaser and Strauss 
2009) were used to develop theories that provide explanations for individuals participating in 
the dairy cooperatives or control over dairy income and possible reasons for their behavior. 
Each study has a specific index of time, space, culture and situation. Theories generated are 
evaluated as “plausible accounts” (Charmaz 2006: 132) rather than as objectively verifiable. 
This study used few sensitized concepts (Bowen 2006) based on conceptual framework to 
develop open questions from where researcher started to discuss with individuals for their 
behaviour on participation in dairy cooperatives.  
3.3.8 Ethnographic stay for data collection 
As the study required in-depth information on participation of women in dairy cooperatives, 
the researcher used ethnographic methods for data collection. Here, the researcher used 
institutional ethnography (Smith 2005) to understand women’s and men’s standpoint for their 
participation in the dairy cooperative.  A deeper understanding of problems or constraints 
associated with women participation in the institutional process were explored in their day-to-
day life and assessed how these are embedded in the social relations. Ethnographers discover 
what people do before assigning meaning to their behavior and beliefs. This helps to generate 
the theory based on local contexts. The initial idea or concept, named formative theory, was 
developed through focus group discussion with producers, which was further investigated 
through the semi-structured interview while staying in the villages.  
Semi-structured interviews (n=153) with open-ended questions to facilitate further explorative 
discussions were used to collect data related to participation in dairy cooperatives. The 
household semi-structured interview consisted of a set of open questions which are compiled 
below:  




2. Who takes decision on breeding, feeding, treatment, purchase of animals and credit 
sourcing and why? 
3. Who receives the dairy income within household? Who decides for spending the dairy 
income? How the dairy income is spent? 
The above questions were directed to get detail information from each household about the 
relevant factors at household, community and organizational levels which influence the 
individual behaviour towards dairy cooperative participation and access to control over dairy 
income. The last question supported to get information on how the dairy income is being 
spent by men and women.  
Some of the participants were also observed for their activities and roles around dairy 
enterprise to explore their behaviour. Furthermore, the researcher participated in dairy 
cooperative monthly meeting (n=2) and events (best dairy cow n=1) related to dairy 
cooperatives. There were some challenges to interview women in presence of their husband as 
they were reluctant to answer some questions. The researcher avoided the interview when 
women are with their husband to avoid the bias in answers. Sometime leading questions were 
asked to explore the reasons for certain behaviour.  
3.3.9 Sampling strategy 
The study included different membership cooperatives such as women-only membership and 
mixed membership. This study assessed two dairy cooperatives in Telangana: 1) Telangana 
Women Dairy Cooperative (Tel–WomDC) with membership being limited to women: 2) 
Telangana Mixed Dairy Cooperative (Tel–MixDC) with mixed membership. In Bihar, two 
dairy cooperatives were included: 1) Bihar Mixed Dairy Cooperative (Bih–MixDC), mixed 
membership, 2) Bihar Women Dairy Cooperative (Bih–WomDC), women-only membership.  
In Bihar, the researcher first approached Bihar dairy cooperative head office in Patna to know 
area of their operation for milk collection. The officials of dairy cooperatives facilitated for 
selection of two villages. In Telangana the researcher interacted with head of market channel 
to select representative village. The selection of villages was based on the dominance of the 
milk marketing channel verified through dairy cooperative milk collection records. In each 
selected village, all producers sell their milk through only one dairy market channel 
mentioned below (Table 3-1). The producers were informed about the objective of the study 
and consent has been agreed for keeping confidence of producer name and other details. The 
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interview with each individual lasted for one hour to 90 minutes and sometimes there were 
repetition of interviews to validate the information and doubts. 
Criteria for selection of households for ethnographic interviews were based on size of land 
(small (<2 ha), medium (2-4 ha), and large (>4 ha)), number of dairy animals, quantity of 
milk sale and caste. With help of dairy cooperative secretary, special cases were included like 
widow women and women who talk bold, and benefitted from dairy cooperative etc. Initially, 
10% of households were selected based on the above criteria to achieve diversity in data. 
Sampling was stopped later when no new information was received. Table 3-1 shows the 
distribution of the study sample in Telangana and Bihar. From each household either men or 
women or both were interviewed. In total 153 households were included in this study.  
Table 3-1 Milk collection, membership and individual interviews in Telangana and 
Bihar dairy cooperatives 




No. of persons interviewed 
Men Women  Both 
Tel-Women Dairy cooperative 1200 250 23 23 1 
Tel-Mixed dairy cooperative 1000 200 18 18 0 
Bih-Women dairy cooperative 1500 250 6 24 7 
Bih-Mixed dairy cooperative 2000 300 14 16 3 
Total number of households   61 81 11 
 
3.3.10 Data entry and analysis 
To determine the level of men and women dairy producers’ participation in dairy cooperatives 
and control over dairy income, a descriptive analysis was carried out to generate percentages 
and means. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Chi-square were used to test for differences 
in means and proportions, respectively. Ethnographic interviews, minutes of meetings and 
observations were entered into Excel and Word. These files were transferred to ATLAS.ti 
(Scientific Software Development GmbH). These documents were coded initially with open 
coding. These open codes were further categorized based on similarities and differences based 
on guidance from conceptual framework. Important quotations from each household for the 
above categories were noted and also included in the results to illustrate the findings.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Levels of participation of women in dairy cooperative and income control 
In this section, results from all the four selected cooperatives from Telangana and Bihar will 
be presented.  According to membership rules, Telangana women dairy cooperative has made 
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it mandatory that all the cooperatives at village level to be women only. There are 21,000 
women members are registered from 105 villages. Telangana mixed dairy cooperatives do not 
have any rules for members, both women and men can become members at village level. 
Bihar dairy cooperatives have made mandatory rule that 30% of village dairy cooperatives to 
be women only and rest for mixed membership.  
Level of participation of women in dairy cooperative is reported in Table 3-2, which includes 
the details of membership, participation in training, meeting, voting and leadership roles ). It 
is interesting to note (number of registered women members in mixed member dairy 
cooperative. However, it was largely dependent on the area. For example, that there were 21% 
registered women members in Bihar mixed dairy cooperative whereas no women were 
members in Telangana mixed dairy cooperative. When women were asked for their opinion 
regarding membership especially from Telangana mixed dairy cooperative village, they said:  
“Even though women want to become member, dairy cooperative don’t have provision 
for the women to become members, they consider only men as member and this is 
being followed for last 30 years” (Case 16, women, Tel-MixDC) 
Table 3-2 Levels of participation of women in dairy cooperatives  




Men% Women%  Both% None% 
Nominal membership Tel-WomenDC 48 0 100 0 0 
 Tel-MixedDC 35 100 0 0 0 
 Bih-WomenDC 37 0 100 0 0 
 Bih-MixedDC 33 79 21 0 0 
Participation (Training) Tel-WomenDC 48 0 55 13 32 
 Tel-MixedDC 35 3 0 3 95 
 Bih-WomenDC 37 5 57 8 30 
 Bih-MixedDC 33 36 24 3 36 
Participation (voting and 
meeting) 
Tel-WomenDC 48 0 87 0 13 
Tel-MixedDC 35 28 0 0 72 
Bih-WomenDC 37 0 25 0 75 
Bih-MixedDC 33 36 44 0 18 
 
Regarding participation of dairy cooperative training, the outcomes of the study indicate that 
more women participated in women only cooperative of Telangana and Bihar (55%, 57%, 
respectively) than in mixed dairy cooperatives. Women from Telangana women dairy 
cooperative reported that there is flexibility of timings for the women to participate in 
trainings and meetings, as most of the meetings are conducted after 11am or 3 pm to allow 
women to finish their household work. It is interesting to note that among the mixed dairy 
cooperatives, 24% of women participated in Bihar mixed dairy cooperative but not in 
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Telangana. It was reported that women had to travel far to participate in meetings and also 
fixed timings were not helping either because women had more work at home.  
While considering active involvement of women in dairy cooperative meetings and election, 
highest participation of women (87%) was recorded from Telangana women dairy cooperative 
for election and meetings. On the other hand, only 25% women were reported to participate in 
meetings and voting from Bihar women dairy cooperative. But there is interesting finding that 
44% of women from Bihar mixed dairy cooperative reported that they participate in voting 
and meeting (They reported that women can participate in meetings) even though they are not 
members.  
In case of women participation in leadership roles, the study found female leadership in 
positions of secretary and chairman at village level in Telangana and Bihar women dairy 
cooperatives (Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-4). On the other hand, men were found in leadership 
roles in mixed dairy cooperatives in both states (Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-4). It was interesting 
to note that women were acting as shadow leaders especially in Bihar women dairy 
cooperative where their husbands were responsible for all decision making and payment roles. 
Many women reported that  
‘‘even though chairperson and secretary are women in this dairy cooperative, their 
husband does all decisions so other women don’t have a voice to express opinion’ 
(women from Bihar women dairy cooperative) 
On the other hand, women were found as leaders at all villages and union level and 
management level in Telangana women dairy cooperative.  
3.4.2 Women control over dairy income 
It will be interesting to see if women only membership directly benefits women control over 
dairy income. It is interesting finding that 87% of women from Telangana women dairy 
cooperative reported that they have control over the dairy income. On the other hand, only 
49% of women from Bihar women dairy cooperative had control over the dairy income within 
household level. Among the mixed dairy cooperatives, 27% of women had access to control 
over dairy income in Bihar, and only 6% of women in Telangana mixed dairy cooperative 
even though none were members and participated in any meetings or trainings.  Another 
interesting aspect to note in Telangana mixed dairy cooperative is that 30% members 
interviewed mentioned that women and men together within household control their dairy 
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income (Table 3-3). It is interesting women are jointly involved in control of dairy income even 
though there are not nominal membership in dairy cooperatives.  
Table 3-3 Women’s control over dairy income  
Type of dairy Cooperative Total  Men% Women% Both% 
Tel-WomenDC n=48 4 87 9 
Tel-MixedDC n=35 64 6 30 
Bih-WomenDC n=37 43 49 8 
Bih-MixedDC n=33 64 27 9 
 
3.4.3 Qualitative perception of respondents on factors influencing women’s 
participation in dairy cooperatives and control over dairy income 
Reasons stated by men and women why women face difficulties for participation in dairy 
cooperatives are illustrated in Table 3-4.  
Most important factors reported by respondents were grouped according to household, 
community and organizational factors. Most influencing factors for women to become 
member in dairy cooperative were women’s position within household (16%) to take decision 
which is based on her social status like household’s elder women, first daughter in-law, 
household head, educated etc. and cooperative membership rules like women only 
membership (15%) (Table 3-4). Among the access to resources, education (12%), experience 
and knowledge (10%) were reported to influence in next level. Land ownership was not 
reported as an influencing factor for women in dairy cooperative membership. Household 
work burden and lack of mobility were reported as hindrance for becoming members in dairy 
cooperative. One interesting quote from man about his wife’s nominal membership in dairy 
cooperative and distance of milk collection centre that  
“My wife is not a member in dairy cooperative, because the dairy collection centre is 
located 2 km away from this village and we have to cross the river which is not 
possible by her and she can’t travel to nearby town to attend any training, that is the 
reason I have become as member” (Case 17, Man, BihMixDC).  
Among the organizational factors good leadership, better input support, good governance, and 
membership rules were reported as important for women to become members (Table 3-4), This 
is evident in Bihar mixed dairy cooperative where few women said:  
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“We joined in dairy cooperative as members due to motivation of secretary, he always 
encourages women to participate in meetings and training program” (case 4,15,20, 
women, BihMixDC) 
Social norms like ‘cash to men and labour to women’ and ‘women are ATM’ were found to 
be frequently mentioned by men which indicates dominance of men over control of income. 
These quotes indicate that social norms of gender roles influencing for women membership in 
dairy cooperatives. Women reported that migration of men to other places for job (4%) 
facilitated women to become members in mixed cooperative.  
Regarding factors influencing women control over dairy income, household and community 
factors were reported the leading factors (Table 3-4). It is interesting to note that women’s 
position within household (20%) was reported as most influencing constraint for women’ 
participation in dairy cooperatives followed by education, knowledge and experience and 
dominance of men (17% all) within household. In many household, men are considered as 
household head and automatically considered as receiver of benefits from dairy cooperatives. 
In some households, women’s position to take decision within household is defined by their 
education level, health status and number of children. A detailed interaction with a woman 
whose husband is controlling dairy income revealed that she has not been respected within 
household by his mother-in-law and husband as she gave birth to 6 girls in search of boy kid. 
She perceives that women are submissive within household. When there are more kids, there 
is no chance for market activities. Education is considered an important factor because it is 
required for calculation of expenses, decision for feeding, breeding and purchase of animal. In 
some other households, the factors which were reported to decrease the women’s access to 
dairy income were lack of good health (10%), lack of other income sources (9%) and 
household work burden (5%). Land ownership was considered as least important factor for 
women participation dairy cooperative membership and control over dairy income (Table 3-4). 
Women opinioned that land is common to household, it does not matter who owns the land 






Table 3-4 Frequency of constraints  
Themes  Constraint for participation Constraint for control over 
income 
 frequency * Ranking frequency * Ranking 
Household level factors     
Women position within household 13  1 16  1 
Lack of education 10  3 14  2 
Lack of experience and knowledge 8  4 14  2 
Lack of mobility 7  5 - - 
Household work burden 6 6 4  7 
Lack of support from men/dominance of 
men 
5  7 14  2 
Lack of good health 3  8 7  6 
Lack of land ownership 1  9 1  10 
Lack of income  - - 8  5 
Community level factors     
Social norm: cash to men labour to women - - 10  3 
Lack of social capital-SHG, networking 1  9 9  4 
Migration of men facilitate women 3  8 7  7 
Caste - - 2  9 
Social norms: women act as ATM  - - 3  8 
Organizational % political factors      
Lack of policy support 3  8 - - 
Lack of good leadership 3  8 - - 
Lack of access to inputs and services 3  8 4  7 
Rules of membership 12  2 - - 
Governance challenges 5  7 7  6 
Total respondents 81  81  
*Multiple answers are possible by same person 
(Source: semi-structured household interview) 
Apart from household factors, social norms and community factors also influence the women 
control over income. There is common social norm such as cash to men and labour to women 
(12%), which affects women access to dairy income. Women expressed that social capital 
through self-help groups and membership influenced their access to dairy income (11%). 
Organizational factors were least influencing women access to income except governance 
challenges.  
3.4.4 Quantitative analysis of determinants of participation of women in dairy 
cooperatives: membership and control over dairy income 
While analysis of quantitative variables for household factors, it was found that the outcomes 
supported the perception of farmers. The statistical analysis confirms that household factors 
land size, number of dairy animals and quantity of milk does not influence women’s 
membership and control over dairy income. The correlation between number of trainings 
attended by women and their participation in membership and control over dairy income was 
statistically significant (Table 3-5). The data shows that on average 2.9 and 3 days of training of 
women influenced the membership and control over income within household. The number of 
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school years attended by women does not affect membership but it is highly associated with 
control over dairy income. The women who were found to control the dairy income had an 
average of 4.3 schooling years compared to 3.8 schooling years for men.  
The results showed that gender roles such as milking and delivering the milk to dairy 
collection centre also statistically influenced the membership and control over dairy income 
(Table 3-5). Other factors such as decision making within household for milk sale, treatment, 
breeding, feeding and purchase of animals (P<0.0001) also statistically influenced the 
membership and control over dairy income.  
Among the social factors, the statistical analysis confirms that women participation in Self-
Help Groups (SHG) influences the membership and control over dairy income (Table 3-5). 
Among the membership, 64% of women members were associated with SHGs and 81% of 
women who control dairy income were associated with SHG. Caste was important social 
factor, which has significant influence on both membership and control over dairy income. 
Interesting to note women from lower caste were participating more as well as controlling 
dairy income. Among lower caste, scheduled tribes and scheduled caste of 58 households, 
women were 69% in membership and 57% of women control dairy income. On the other 
hand, women from higher caste households (Forward caste) were less participative either in 
membership (34%) or in control over income (27%).   
Table 3-5 Determinants of women participation in dairy cooperative membership and 
control over income 
Independent variable Dependent variable 
 Who is cooperative membership? Who controls dairy income? 
Quantitative variable F-Value P<[F] F-Value P<[F] 
Land size 2.71 0.12 1.19 0.305 
Education (schooling years) 1.38 0.241 8.78 0.009 
No of training attended by women 46.75 0.0001 14.3 0.0001 
Milk yield/day 3.52 0.062 4.62 0.01 
No. of cows 0.27 0.601 1.9 0.153 
No. of buffaloes 0.26 0.605 1.83 0.163 
Qualitative variable χ²-value P < [ χ²] χ²-value P < [ χ²] 
Social membership (SHG, Farmer’s 
groups) 
155.7 0.0001 177.2 0.0001 
Organizational rules 271.6 0.0001 199.4 0.0001 
Caste 168.7 0.0001 174.0 0.0001 
Who milks 155.8 0.0001 16.67 0.0001 
Who delivers milk 169.2 0.0001 174.0 0.0001 
Who decides milk sale 154.7 0.0001 164.5 0.0001 
Who decides breeding 156.5 0.0001 164.1 0.0001 
Who decides treatment 155.7 0.0001 160.6 0.0001 
Who decides feeding 158.2 0.0001 169.1 0.0001 




Organizational factors such as membership rules for women only or mixed member criteria 
have influenced statistically both membership and control over dairy income (P<0.0001). 
Women only cooperative rules facilitated women to become member and access and control 
over dairy income.  
3.4.5 Influencing factors for decision making within households which affects 
participation  
This section details on who decides on which issues and the factors which influence decision 
making within household level. Results had shown that women were dominating in the 
decision making about quantity of milk to be sold outside and how much needed for 
household consumption. This trend was similar both in Bihar and Telangana (Table 3-6). 
Decisions on the credit sourcing is equally taken by both men and women at the household 
level in all village cooperatives. In the decision on feeding and selection of fodder crops, there 
is mixed observations in all the four types of cooperatives. There is domination of men in 
making decisions for breeding, treatment and purchase of animals (65-90%) in all four 
villages of Bihar and Telangana (Table 3-6).  Some important social norms mentioned by men 
and women for decision on breeding, treatment and purchase of animals are: 
Social norms: “household work is by women and outside work is by men”; “Heavy 
work by men”; “women don’t communicate with other men”; “knowledge to men, 
labour to men” 
 
Table 3-6 Decision-making power within household for dairy animal  
Decision indicators  Type of dairy cooperative Men% Women%  Both% 
Milk sale Tel-WomenDC 11 68 21 
 Tel-MixedDC 0 84 6 
 Bih-WomenDC 19 76 5 
 Bih-MixedDC 18 64 18 
Breeding Tel-WomenDC 79 6 15 
 Tel-MixedDC 78 6 17 
 Bih-WomenDC 81 11 8 
 Bih-MixedDC 67 18 15 
Feeding and fodder crops Tel-WomenDC 34 17 49 
 Tel-MixedDC 58 3 39 
 Bih-WomenDC 32 43 24 
 Bih-MixedDC 27 52 21 
Treatment of animal Tel-WomenDC 81 4 15 
 Tel-MixedDC 61 14 25 
 Bih-WomenDC 81 8 11 
 Bih-MixedDC 64 18 18 
Availing credit Tel-WomenDC 53 47 0 
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 Tel-MixedDC 54 46 0 
 Bih-WomenDC 54 43 3 
 Bih-MixedDC 36 45 18 
Purchase or selling animal Tel-WomenDC 87 0 13 
 Tel-MixedDC 100 0 0 
 Bih-WomenDC 92 0 8 
 Bih-MixedDC 76 15 9 
 
Apart from gender norms, some other factors were mentioned which influence the decision 
making are grouped in the following Table 3-7. Social and cultural restrictions such as women 
are not allowed to go outside and restriction on women communicating with unknown men 
were considered as strong influencing factors for women involvement in breeding and 
purchase of animals. Most of the service providers for breeding, treatment of animals and 
purchase of animals are men, which act as a strong barrier for women to be involved in these 
decisions (Table 3-7). Lack of knowledge and negotiations skills were reported as strong 
influencing factors for the purchase of animals. Men reported that women do not know how to 
assess animal and their price. Lack of training was reported as moderate factor for feeding, 
treatment and breeding. Some exceptions are seen in Bihar, low caste households where 
women reported that they take the decisions regarding breeding and treatment and there is no 
cultural or social barrier for outside movement.   
Table 3-7 Factors which influence decision making on livestock management 
Influencing factors Decision making on  
Breeding Purchase animal Treatment Feeding 
Lack of mobility √ √ √ √ 
Lack of knowledge (price and market) √ √√√ √√ √ 
Lack of education   √√ √√ 
Lack of communication skills  √   
Lack of socialization √ √√ √  
Mostly service provider are men √√√ √√√ √√√  
Distance  √ √  
Lack of exposure/awareness √ √  √ 
Household burden, no time  √ √ √ 
Lack of motivation/preference √ √   
Social and cultural restrictions 
(women not allowed outside work; 
Restriction to interact other men,  
breeding by men) 
√√√ √√√ √  
Safety reasons √√ √√ √√  
Lack of access to mobile/media √  √  
Lack of access to training √√ √ √√ √√ 
Lack of negotiation skill √ √√√ √  
√√√- Strong influence √√- Moderate influence √- low influence 
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3.4.6 Role of land ownership and education for participation of women in dairy 
cooperatives 
Both men and women mentioned that ownership of land did not influence the membership in 
dairy cooperatives and control over dairy income. However, few mentioned that it acts as an 
indirect influencing factor within household. Men mentioned that land ownership helps them 
to avail the credit from bank, reduces the feed cost for animals and influence the decision-
making power within household. However, it indirectly affects the women participation in 
dairy cooperatives (Figure 3-2). Whereas women expressed that there is low bargaining power 
within household decision when the ownership is with men. Furthermore, ownership also 
increases social respect, build confidence and help in credit sourcing. (Figure 3-3). 
 
Figure 3-2 Opinion of women on the role of land ownership for participation of women 
in dairy cooperatives  
(N=57) 
    
 
Figure 3-3 Opinion of men on Land ownership about participation of women in dairy 
cooperatives 
(N=69) 
On the other hand, men and women expressed how education affects the participation in dairy 
cooperatives. Results had shown that 28% of interviewed women said that education 
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influences their bargaining power within household and as well as decision making (Table 3-8). 
The next important aspect mentioned that education helps them to build practical knowledge, 
social respect, facilitates in accounting, training, increases confidence and improves 
communication skills. On the other hand, men opinioned that education most importantly 
helps them in decisions and as well as in animal management (24%). They said that educated 
persons can learn technical knowledge such as feed, disease aspects (21%), which is very 
important in dairy farming.  
Table 3-8 Influence of education on participation in dairy cooperatives 
Themes mentioned (education and cooperative participation)  Respondents  
men Women 
 Count Rank Count Rank 
low-bargaining-power 16 1 2 7 
influence-decision 16 1 8 1 
influence-membership 8 2 7 2 
practical-knowledge-important 8 2 5 5 
build-confidence 7 3 - - 
influence-benefits 7 3 3 6 
influence-training 6 4 1 8 
manage-milk money 6 4 5 5 
influence-communication 5 5 6 3 
influence-animal-management 5 5 8 1 
social-respect 5 5 - - 
improve-governance 4 6 1 8 
no-influence 4 6 2 7 
disease-feed-knowledge-important 3 7 7 2 
influence-mobility 2 9 1 8 
maintain-bank-accounts 1 9 2 4 
influence-leadership 1 9 - - 
information-sharing 1 9 - - 
Total respondents 58 - 34 - 
 
3.4.7 Impact of women participation in dairy cooperatives  
Household level: It is interesting to see gender analysis on how the dairy income is spent 
within household. There is statistical significance difference among women and men 
expenditure pattern, women spent more than men on household food expenses, health care of 
family members and education of children. Among the expenditure patterns from dairy 
income, priority of women was SHG savings (59%), payment of school fee (53%) and 
agricultural inputs (44%) (Table 3-9). When men control dairy income, they spent more than 
women in areas of agricultural inputs (65%), and less on savings and school fee (31%) and 
loan repayment (26%).  
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Community level: There was interesting feedback from women on benefits of cooperative 
participation. They expressed that participation not only increased income but also improved 
social capital, communication, knowledge on management of animals and increased 
leadership roles. There is change in the social norms that “cash for men and labour for 
women”; the labour work is shared by men when women attend meetings and training. There 
was observation in Telangana women dairy cooperative village that men cleaned sheds and 
took care of kids when women went for meeting or training outside village. Women were 
allowed by their husbands to handle cash due to increased knowledge and confidence among 
women. There is increased mobility of women outside village when they become members in 
dairy cooperatives, which is evident in Telangana and Bihar women dairy cooperative.  
Table 3-9 Spending of dairy income by women and men  
How dairy income is spent * Who controls the income Nos  χ²-value P-value 
Men   Women  Both  
Food expenses 14  24  4  157.14 0.0001 
Healthcare family 6  21  6  162.79 0.0001 
Agricultural inputs 40  31  8  161.20 0.0001 
School fee 19  37 15  166.73 0.0001 
Clothes 6  7  1  154.57 0.0001 
Asset building 6  17  6  160.07 0.0001 
Savings 19  41  14  167.62 0.0001 
Loan repayment for animal 16  25  6  155.58 0.0001 
Total respondents 62 70 21   
*Multiple answers were possible for expenditure pattern.  
 
3.5 Discussion  
3.5.1 Critical factors to enhance women’s participation 
The first and foremost determinant of participation is gender inequality. At present, the 
gender issues exist at different levels from household to community caused by different 
factors, which subsequently affect women participation in dairy cooperatives. This study 
indicated some major factors which contribute towards lower participation of women in dairy 
co-ops as compared to men include: 1) lack of institutional arrangements for women to 
participate like women only cooperatives; 2) underrepresentation of women in leadership 
roles and decision making in dairy cooperatives; 3) social and cultural norms; 4) lack of social 
capital; 5) lack of education and knowledge. This Current study has found varying degree of 
women participation at different levels such as nominal membership, participation in 
trainings, meetings, voting as well as leadership roles. However, on large scale, cooperatives 
fail to maintain gender equality, which contradicts the basic principle of cooperatives 
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“voluntary and open membership: open to all”. It is especially relevant for developing 
countries where greater gender inequality exists in all spheres of life (Nippierd 1999). In the 
following section, all the factors influencing women participation and control over dairy 
income in dairy cooperatives will be discussed one by one. 
Lack of institutional arrangements for women to participate: Currently, there are very 
few women only cooperatives, which directly facilitate the women to become member in 
cooperative and control over dairy income from participation. Women constitute half of the 
population in the world making them to participate in all development initiative is important 
for sustainable development. If there is high gender inequality within society then there will 
be no opportunity for the women to participate in cooperatives. Women-only set up could be 
one possible solution of this issue. However, this study found that there are other 
characteristics which encourage their participation in the cooperatives. For example, one 
interesting aspect with Telangana mixed dairy cooperative, even though women were not 
found as nominal membership in cooperatives but their involvement in meetings and voting 
and control of dairy income is evident. This indicates that women can benefit from dairy 
cooperatives even though she is not as nominal member. Most of the meeting were at village 
level where women taken part and the income were spent jointly within household. It is 
difficult to generalize because women participation in Bihar mixed dairy cooperative for 
training, meeting and voting were highly correlated with nominal membership.  
Some other factors which facilitated women participation were flexibility in timings of 
meeting and training, nearest training location and women extension agents or staffs for easy 
communication.  The mixed cooperatives are not very supportive and limit the role of women. 
However, there is interesting finding from Bihar mixed dairy cooperative that 24% of women 
were participated in training but none in Telangana mixed dairy cooperative. One possible 
explanation for high participation of women in trainings in Bihar mixed dairy cooperatives is 
encouraging environment. In Bihar, a male secretary who always encouraged and facilitated 
women to participate in all levels, and thus promoting shared governance (Gardiner 2006). 
Findings from this study support the hypothesis that proportion of women in active 
participation (training and decision making meetings) are proportionately associated with 
women in leadership positions (Nakazi et al. 2017).  
Women in leadership roles: In current organizational structure, women are not given 
leadership opportunities in mixed dairy cooperatives. The participation of women in 
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leadership and managerial roles are observed only when the cooperative is reserved for 
women from village to union level not just with membership at village level. Bihar women 
dairy cooperatives follow the shadow women managers (Birner 2010) and their role is 
insignificant. Their husbands are the main decision-makers which discourage other women to 
participate actively in cooperative women find it difficult to communicate with men due to 
cultural norms which restrict the women to discuss with outside men. Women as shadow 
manager issue is mainly due to the organizational governance structure implemented by 
government which follows top down approach only a few villages for women only 
cooperatives just for the sake of reservation and political lobbying. Secondary literature 
search indicated that there are only 3% women as board members in dairy cooperatives in 
India (Gupta 2000). 
Social and cultural norms: Secondary data sources indicate that there are only 18% women 
members in dairy cooperatives in India (NDDB 2015). The other reason of low participation 
of married women is household burden and non-supportive husbands, who do not allow their 
wives to participate in public spheres (Gotschi et al. 2009). Often women’s roles are limited 
to household work such as child care, elder care, cleaning work, feeding and care of sick 
animals, whereas men deals with the public relations (Agarwal 2001; Kaaria et al. 2016; 
Tanwir and Safdar 2013). Women face social and cultural constraints to communicate with 
dominant male service providers which limits their access to breeding, treatment and 
extension services. Same results were reported in other study that women participation is 
limited in breeding, animal health and feed purchase decisions (Pandey, Modi, and Sharma 
n.d.). This is more obvious in higher caste households (forward class and other backward 
class) than lower caste (Scheduled caste and Scheduled tribe). Poorer the families, higher the 
contribution of women labour in dairy animal management, which gives way for more 
decision making power as men migrate to other places for daily wages (George 1991). This 
subsequently leads to women from lower caste, the poorer households to have more economic 
autonomy and bargaining power within the households than higher caste women (Krishnan 
2005). But their participation in meetings, elections is very low due to governance issues 
where political lobbying by upper caste is very common. This is in line with the previous 
findings that upper caste households lobby with dairy development officials for gaining 
benefits (Basu and Chakraborty 2008). Women friendly policies can be evaluated when there 




Collective action to contest social norms: Collective actions and participation in market 
organizations help women to contest the social norms, which restrict their access to inputs and 
services (Agarwal 1997). The findings of current study are in line with previous literature that 
even though women are more likely to be associated with social groups than men, the 
proportion of women in leadership and managerial positions are limited (Agarwal 2001; 
Quisumbing, Rubin, et al. 2014; Rani and Yadeta 2016). This can be contested if the women 
are allowed in leadership and managerial roles. For example, it is evident from the outcomes 
of this study, in Telangana women only dairy cooperative women were more comfortable in 
asserting their rights and contest the social norms when discriminated. In an environment 
where cultural barriers make it difficult for men and women to work together , women-only 
groups may be the most practicable way to promote their complete participation  (Pandolfelli, 
Meinzen-Dick, and Dohrn 2008). A study of forest user groups in India and Nepal also 
strengthen this argument that increase in the proportion of women in leadership positions 
improves governance and resource sustainability (Agarwal 2009). 
Social capital: Women who have social capital through networks with friends and non-
relatives are found to have been more associated with organizational memberships. 
Furthermore, those nations which have more social trust among individuals have more 
organizational membership towards economic growth (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Social 
network and social participation are considered as important physical assets for women which 
provide them access to new technologies and build asset portfolio of women in the long run 
(Niketha et al. 2017; Quisumbing and Kumar 2011). Promotion of women based self-help 
groups are increasing in India to facilitate socio-economic improvement (Lahiri-Dutt and 
Samanta, 2006). These self-help groups and access to membership organizations serve as 
important grounds for women to build their leadership skills (Horowitz 2009). This finding 
contested the previous finding in Karnataka women-only dairy cooperative where less 
empowerment of women was observed and where the inclusion of women in governance 
structure in limited only to membership due to top down approach (Dohmwirth and Hanisch 
2017). However, this finding supports the previous argument that inclusion of women just as 
members in cooperative does not help their development without their inclusion in planning 




Education and knowledge: Another important factor reported in this study which influences 
women’s participation in dairy cooperatives is lack of education or knowledge. Women in this 
study perceived that education is important for bargaining power within the household as it 
builds knowledge and improves the confidence. Women from Haryana dairy cooperative also 
reported that education is important constraint for women in dairy cooperative (Yadav and 
Indu 2012). Education contributes towards gaining information and helps to participate  in 
labor market and provides alternate income sources (Seebens 2011). It subsequently improves 
position of women within household. Female seclusion is practiced in communities with low 
levels of literacy (Gotschi et al. 2009). Lack of education negatively influences women’s self-
confidence; uneducated women are generally not vocal in public. It is mainly because women 
have fear that their opinions will not be equally reflected, leading to poor participation of 
women in producer organizations, which is also reported in forestry groups in Bolivia, Kenya, 
Mexico and (Coleman and Mwangi 2013). Education level and entrepreneurial 
skills/experience were considered as elements of  women’s participation in agricultural 
cooperatives in Ethiopia (Bernard and Spielman 2009) as well as in Costa Rica (Wollni and 
Zeller 2007). Current study provided evidence that women who have attended many training 
sessions got control over dairy income despite being illiterate. This concludes that training 
and capacity building to enhance knowledge of women will influence their participation in 
dairy cooperatives and contest the barrier of illiteracy.  
Land ownership: More interesting finding in this study is that land ownership and size of the 
land was not considered as an important factor for gender participation for membership in 
dairy cooperatives and access and control over dairy income which contest the previous 
arguments that land ownership is important determinant for women participation in 
cooperatives. Previous literatures have reiterated that women are often omitted to join 
cooperatives in cases where land ownership is a pre-requisite for access to membership for 
example agricultural cooperatives (Agarwal 2001; Bernard and Spielman 2009; Meier zu 
Selhausen 2015; Pandolfelli, Meinzen-Dick, and Dohrn 2005). However, in case of dairy 
cooperatives land is not directly associated with participation. This is in line with previous 
literature that dairy cooperative membership is not influenced by who owns the land (Basu 
and Chakraborty 2008). This is because land is not considered as membership criterion in 
dairy cooperatives.  
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Based on the findings of above discussion, it can be concluded that gender inclusive 
governance structure from village level to management level facilitates better participation of 
women in membership, training, meeting, election and leadership roles.  Furthermore, gender 
inclusive policies are needed which will contribute towards easing the burden and capacity 
building of women for better productivity of animals in the absence of men.  
3.5.2 Impact of participation of women in dairy cooperatives 
Participation of women in market organizations bring various benefits for women 
empowerment and wellbeing of family (Basu and Chakraborty 2008; Dohmwirth and Hanisch 
2017; Kaaria et al. 2016). Agricultural cooperatives support women for collective bargaining 
power and improving the individual capacities to enhance their income (Woldu et al. 2013). 
However, this study found that nominal membership, as in case of Bihar women dairy 
cooperatives, does not benefit women (access and control over dairy income) significantly. 
Contrary to it, active participation of women at all the levels such as training, meeting and 
leadership role, resulted in more control over dairy income within household, and hence more 
benefits, as seen in Telangana women only dairy cooperative. This is in line with the previous 
finding that involuntary or forced membership of women in dairy cooperatives indicates weak 
bargaining power of women within the household, and leads to control over income by men. 
It is mainly because men fear that their position of breadwinner is lost (Dohmwirth and 
Hanisch 2017). Support of men within the household for participation of women in dairy 
cooperatives will give more access to dairy income which is evident in Telangana women 
dairy cooperative. Another interesting finding is that women have more access to income in 
women-only cooperatives than in mixed (either men or women) cooperatives.  
The present study conflicts with a previous study in Karnataka dairy cooperatives where men 
control the dairy income from women dairy cooperatives as the payment were given to men 
and women became members due to force (Dohmwirth and Hanisch 2017). Possible 
explanation for the difference in the present study is that payment rules are strict in Telangana 
women dairy cooperatives and the person who receives money tends to have more control 
over decisions on expenditures from that income. While considering the bargaining power 
and gender inequalities within the households, payment rules must be strict to benefit women.  
It is important to analyze how the dairy income in spent within the households to see impact 
of women participation in dairy cooperatives and for the wellbeing of households. Women 
who control the dairy income tend to spend more on savings, school fee, household nutrition, 
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food security and health care of family members. On the other hand, men tend to spend their 
dairy income for agricultural inputs, savings and repayment of loan. These findings are in line 
with previous literature which stated that participation of women in cooperatives benefits 
household members in terms of food security, education, healthcare, nutrition, housing and 
clothing (FAO 2011; Fischer and Qaim 2012b; Kebede 2011).  
This study provided evidence that participation of women in dairy cooperatives increased 
their communication, mobility and social capital. Social norms which limit the mobility of 
women can be contested through active participation in economic organizations like 
cooperatives (Agarwal 2001; Quisumbing et al. 2015) . Group membership is an important 
source of social capital which provides empowerment itself as a source of information and 
inputs. There is a likelihood for spillover of benefits or technologies even to non-member 
women if there is a strong social network within the village (Janssens 2010; Subedi 2014).  
Positive changes in gender relations due to women participation in dairy cooperatives were 
evident in this study, especially in Telangana women dairy cooperative, where men were 
found to support women for control over income and to spare household work to facilitate 
women to participate in dairy cooperatives. This is due to perceived benefits by men from 
dairy cooperatives and due to inclusion of men in meetings and trainings. Secondary data 
records indicated that the quantity of milk sold by Telangana women dairy cooperative 
increased five times in the last 10 years. There is a need for efforts to dismantle structural 
barriers of gender inequality within the household through better alliance with men to 
mobilize them for new organizational innovations for women engagements in economic 
movements (Conrwall, Harry, and Mbyyiselo 2011). 
3.6 Conclusion 
The most important gender issues in dairy cooperatives at present are poor level of 
participation of women and their underrepresentation in leadership roles and decision making. 
Using the ethnographic data collected from mixed and women-only dairy cooperatives in 
Bihar and Telangana, this paper contributes to existing literature for determinants of women’s 
participation in dairy cooperatives at different levels.   
First, the study assessed the levels of women’s participation in dairy cooperatives such as 
membership, meetings, trainings and leadership roles. After a thorough analysis, this study 
concludes that an active participation of women is possible when enabling environment and 
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gender inclusive governance structures are present at all levels, beginning from villages to 
higher management levels. When gender inequality and imbalance are very high within the 
households and at community levels, which prevent men and women to work together, gender 
inclusive policies, such as women-only set up, are good options for short term benefits; mixed 
cooperatives can be the long-term solution till the underlying gender issues are addressed. 
This women-only set up should not be limited to cooperative membership and leadership at 
village level, but it should be extended at management and union levels to create many 
women leaders to bring a positive change in policy and organizational culture so as to address 
women’s needs.  
Second, the study explored the determinants of women participation in membership and 
access to dairy income. Education and knowledge level play an important role within the 
household for the bargaining power and decision making of women which affects the level of 
participation of women in dairy cooperatives. Training and capacity building of both partners 
will improve the bargaining power of women and change the mindset of men to support 
women participation in cooperatives and training modules should be formulated to address 
gender issues. Social networking through self-help groups and participation in cooperatives 
plays an important role to build the confidence of women to contest the social norms which 
prevents their mobility and participation in economic activities.  
Third, the findings of this study indicate that women participation in cooperatives not only 
enhances women’s access to income and social capital but also improves wellbeing of the 
whole family. Overall, the findings imply that centrally planned reservation policies in 
cooperatives are being subjected to state interference and mask the need of women, and 
therefore, cooperatives should experience gender inclusive independent planning and 
implementation. Opinion and perceptions of the respondents to explain the factors influencing 
their participation in cooperatives require strong relationship and trust with the researcher 
which was possible through ethnographic survey employed in this study. Further, a study is 
required to compare the economic efficiency of women-only dairy cooperatives, mixed dairy 
cooperatives and informal market to inform the development partners and policies for areas of 
investment. In addition, this study must be extended in other livestock production systems, 
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4 Stimulating smallholder dairy market and livestock feed 
innovations through local innovation platforms in the 
Himalayan foothills of India 
4.1 Abstract 
Innovation platforms (IP) are increasingly used in agricultural development as a way to 
address complex issues which require diverse actors to work jointly to identify constraints and 
implement solutions. Assessment of their impact and identification of factors responsible for 
success are important if performance is to be optimized. This study assesses the impact on 
smallholder dairy production and marketing of a series of innovation platforms in 
Uttarakhand, Northern Himalayan region, India.  We studied the link between innovation 
platform mechanisms and impacts using systematic documentation of meetings and 
interventions along with a post-intervention impact assessment which compared treatment and 
control households. We found that the households participating in IPs showed increased dairy 
income, increased milk sales and improved breeding and feeding practices.  Factors 
influencing these impacts were the process of issue identification, diversity of actors 
participating and quality of follow-up on the agreed action plans.  




4.2 Introduction  
India is the largest milk producer in the world with an 18% share of world milk production 
and milk production has been growing at an annual rate of 4.2% for the last 2 decades (USDA 
2017). Dairy sector growth has been based on continuously rising demand from the domestic 
market due to increases in population, income growth and urbanization (Delgado 2005). Even 
though the share of agriculture in GDP is declining, the contribution of livestock to 
agricultural GDP has increased from 20% in 1988-89 to 26% in 2015-16 of which 70 % 
comes from the dairy sector (NDDB 2016). Based on these emerging opportunities in the 
dairy sector, there is considerable scope for the poorest sectors of the population to enhance 
their livelihood since 80 % of dairy animals in India are owned by households with less than 2 
ha of land (NSSO, GoI 2013)7. Dairying is the major source of rural employment especially 
for women. Income from dairying has an levelling effect on the distribution of income for all 
classes of farm households compared to distribution of income arising from crop production 
(Mandal et al. 2010). 
Dairy sector growth is not equally distributed across different states (Ohlan 2012a). Uttar 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh are the top 5 states accounting 
for more than half of the milk production in India. Eastern and hilly states are minor 
contributors to the dairy sector. Uttarakhand is one such hilly state with slow dairy growth of 
2.7%. Most of the dairy animals in this state are kept on mixed crop-livestock farms. Dairying 
is the second most important livelihood source after arable agriculture with nearly every 
household owning one or two dairy animals. There are two major constraints for dairy 
development in this region. Distance to market negatively influences the participation of dairy 
farmers in the market (Bardhan, Sharma, and Saxena 2012). 39% of villages are not directly 
connected to roads and people have difficulty walking 3-5 km to reach a metaled road due to 
challenging terrain (Mehta 1999). The other major growth constraint is low productivity 
caused by lack of access to high quality feed. Most dairy farmers in Uttarakhand follow a 
sedentary production system, stall feeding their animals with fodder collected from forest 
areas (60%) and grassland (3.7%) (Sati 2016). A previous study in Uttarakhand indicated a 
nutritional deficit of 19-27% to meet the standard nutrient requirements of dairy animals 





protein concentrations (Tiwary, Pandey, and Tiwari 2010). There is only a limited market for 
concentrate feed in this hilly region due to high transaction costs. The para-statal Uttarakhand 
Cooperative Dairy Society, also known by its brand-name Aanchal, is the only major formal 
milk marketing channel in this region, despite its limited productivity and inactive societies in 
many villages (Sati and Panwar 2017). Another general issue in this region is outmigration of 
men due to non-farm income opportunities outside the state (Mamgain and Reddy 2016). 
Most of the dairy activities are therefore carried out by women in this region (Bhoj et al. 
2014).  
Based on the success of the Operation Flood programme in Gujarat, dairy cooperatives were 
established in Uttarakhand in the 1990s by the State to promote farmers’ market access for 
sale of milk. Various technological interventions were introduced to enhance productivity 
including improved breeds of dairy cattle, artificial insemination, improved forages, 
concentrate feeding and animal health interventions such as vaccination and deworming. 
Despite the potential of these technological measures to enhance productivity, the adoption of 
these interventions has been very low in Uttarakhand (Rathod and Chander 2016) especially 
in hilly districts. Average milk volumes collected from cooperative members are around 0.3 
litres/ day in hilly districts, compared to 1.6 litres per day in the plain areas of Uttarakhand. In 
the hilly regions, fodder scarcity is a serious concern. Livestock feed scarcity is a common 
constraint in low and middle income countries and many attempts have been made to promote 
food-feed crops, fodder trees, improved grasses and legumes (Thornton 2010). However, 
adoption of these technologies has been limited due to a range of well-rehearsed factors 
(Franzel et al. 2014; Kumar, Singh, and Misra 2015; Suman, Kumar, and Kumar 2017; 
Sumberg 2004). Often “technology push” approaches have been employed which disregard 
indigenous sources of knowledge and farmer demand (Lundvall et al. 2002; World Bank 
2007). 
Some have argued that fodder scarcity has less to do with information shortage than with a 
scarcity of “capacity to innovate” (Hall, Sulaiman, and Bezkorowajnyj 2007). Innovation 
capacity development can be addressed through development approaches which acknowledge 
the wider innovation system where innovation is seen as emerging from a network of public 
and private organizations, enterprises, and individuals whose interactions produce, diffuse and 
utilize knowledge which brings economic and social benefits (Lundvall et al. 2002; Spielman 
et al. 2008; World Bank 2007). 
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One means of building capacity to innovate is through the establishment of connections 
between key actors in a network to facilitate dialogue and change. Approaches to build such 
connections and networks include innovation platforms (IP) (Ayele et al. 2012; Homann-Kee 
Tui et al. 2013; Kilelu, Klerkx, and Leeuwis 2013a), public-private partnerships (Nissen, 
Evald, and Clarke 2014), multi-stakeholder platforms or collaborations (Reypens, Lievens, 
and Blazevic 2016; Warner 2006) or value chain collaborations (Ros-Tonen et al. 2015). 
Because innovation platforms do not require any formalized participation of public or private 
institutions, are focused on stimulating innovations and can consider both production and 
market aspects, this approach was followed to address market and productivity issues in 
Uttarakhand’s dairy sector in the research for development project investigated by this study. 
There have been many qualitative case studies to evaluate the impact of innovation platforms. 
These studies have found that innovation platforms can successfully facilitate institutional 
change (Hall et al. 2003; Nederlof and Mariana 2011), strengthen market relationships 
(Davies et al. 2017; Sparrow and Traoré 2017), increase capacity for collective action (Davies 
et al. 2017) and promote technology adoption (Pamuk, Bulte, and Adekunle 2014a). 
However, many of these studies were focused on limited elements of the approach; either on 
the impact side or aspects of IP facilitation and few if any have systematically assessed the 
impact of IPs on organizational and technical innovation and on measures of productivity. We 
hypothesize that the impact of IPs depends to a considerable extent on the processes involved 
in conducting these IPs. Impact can be achieved in innovation platforms through various 
measures which include negotiation, provision of resources or information, research, lobbying 
and advocacy (Duncan et al. 2013). The resulting impacts can also be manifold; some may be 
measurable, such as increased income and adoption of technologies, while some may be hard 
to measure, such as increased innovation capacity, increased communication and 
collaboration. In this study, we set out to identify the impacts of IPs on stakeholder behaviour 
and livelihood outcomes, to investigate the related processes within the IPs and, subsequently, 
to better understand how the effectiveness of IPs might be improved. The objective of this 
paper is to assess the impacts of the local innovation platforms at household and 
organizational level and the processes involved in IPs that led to these impacts. The research 
questions we addressed were: 




• What are the key processes of establishing and facilitating IPs that lead to positive 
impacts?      
4.3 Methodology 
The “MilkIT8” project was a research for development project funded by the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development between Nov 2011 and Dec 2014. The aim of the project 
was to contribute to improved dairy supported livelihoods in India and Tanzania through 
intensification of small holder production focusing on feed enhancement through the value 
chain and innovation approaches. In India, the project was implemented in the hill state of 
Uttarakhand and managed by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) with 
implementation by two NGOs namely the Institute of Himalayan Environment Research and 
Education (INHERE) and the Central Himalayan Rural Action Group (CHIRAG). Selection 
of sites was designed to align with implementation districts of the Integrated Livelihood 
Support Programme (ILSP), a large IFAD loan programme of IFAD which was starting at the 
same time as MilkIT.  Of the long list of districts selected for ILSP, Almora and Bageshwar 
districts were selected for MilkIT based on the extent of dairy activity and the experience and 
local integration of potential implementation partners. 
4.3.1 Description of study sites 
Uttarakhand, the Indian state in the Himalayas selected for this research, is characterized by 
subsistence-oriented mixed agriculture with dairy farming. Hardy local breeds and locally 
available feeds, such as hay and tree leaves collected from hill-sides, form the basis of 
resilient, yet low-productivity dairy production focused on home consumption. However, 
improved infrastructure and road connectivity in recent years has created opportunities for 
these farmers to link to larger markets and thus the potential to generate income from dairy 
farming (Sharma et al. 2007). 
The study sites of Almora and Bageshwar districts are in the Kumaon division of East 
Uttarakhand with an average altitude of 1600 and 1000 meters respectively above sea level, a 
dry period from March to June, a rainy season from July to September and winter season from 
October to February.  The average annual rainfall in these districts is 1014mm in Almora and 
1331 mm in Bageshwar, forest cover accounts for 73% of which 30% is maintained by the 
 
8 Full title: Enhancing Dairy-based Livelihoods in India and the United Republic of Tanzania through Feed Innovation and Value Chain 
Development Approaches (MilkIT) 
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community also known as Van Panchayat9 forest. Fodder collection from these community 
forests is the main source of feed for livestock in this hilly region. Both these districts have 
some arable land (10-20%) and a small areas of grass land (<5%) (Sati 2016)  
Agriculture is the main form of livelihood in this hilly region and is dominated by subsistence 
cereal farming with low productivity (Sati 2005). Outmigration of men to nearby cities is very 
common to support family expenses (Mamgain and Reddy 2016). The dairy sector in these 
districts assumes greater importance because of limited livelihood options for rural 
households. Cattle constitute the major share of the livestock population in the state (44.6%) 
and milk accounts for about 77 % of total value of output from the livestock sector. Among 
the hill districts of Uttarakhand, Almora has the largest share of large ruminants, with 10.1% 
of the cattle and buffalo population, while 4.7% are being kept in Bageshwar. In both 
districts, adoption of crossbreeding is very slow. In Almora, only 4.3% of the cattle 
population is crossbred while in Bageshwar the figure is 0.5% (Patoo, Shinde, and Tufani 
2011). Many of the villages in these districts are far from paved roads making it difficult to 
access markets for selling milk. This has led to the formal urban markets being captured by 
private players from plain areas.    
4.3.2 Establishment of IPs  
In each district, one block10 was selected for project interventions, based on the existence of 
dairy production and marketing as well as of established development institutions for project 
implementation. Sult block was selected in Almora, and Bageshwar block in Bageshwar 
district. A village cluster approach was followed to select intervention and control sites for IP 
establishment. The definition of "village" is difficult in this area because farm households are 
dispersed, within small settlements. These settlements were recorded in a village census and 
then grouped (where appropriate) into mini-clusters (2-4 neighbouring settlements which can 
easily collaborate). Where possible, these mini-clusters were then grouped into mid-clusters 
(2-4 mini-clusters into one mid-cluster), representing a suitable activity area for a field 
facilitator and the potential basis of a livestock feed innovation platform. Selection of these 
mid-clusters for project interventions was based on road accessibility, number of dairy 
animals, self-help groups, interest in marketing milk and availability of feed.  
 
9 Van Panchayat forests were formed in early 20th century, and allow the villagers to harvest important forest products like grass, tree leafs, 
leaf litter, timber and wood. They have a constitution for operational rules for the use and management of forest products.  
10 Block is the sub division of a district for administrative and development purposes. 
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In each of the two blocks, 4 mid-clusters were formed with 2 being designated for IP activity 
(1 with good road access and 1 with medium road access) and 2 as control areas. The total 
number of households represented in these selected mid-clusters was 1244 from 21 villages. 
Feed innovation platforms were established in each mid-cluster selected for interventions. A 
milk marketing platform was formed in each block with contributions from the two mid-
cluster feed innovation platforms (Table 4-1). The IP activity and control mid-clusters were in 
close proximity as depicted in Figure 4-1. An inventory mapping exercise was undertaken to 
identify the stakeholders involved in the dairy value chain in these two districts to ensure their 
inclusion in IP activities.  
The main “treatment” in this project was the application of the IP approach. The main types 
of innovations agreed within the innovation platforms were dairy marketing arrangements and 
livestock feeding innovations. The control households did not receive any benefits from any 
other development programs except the standard government interventions which were 
similar in IP treatment and control groups.  
Table 4-1 Details of villages selected for Innovation Platform activities in the study area, 
Uttarakhand 
District Name of Market IP (Block) Name of Feed IP (mid-cluster)  No. of villages Households 
Bageshwar Bageshwar Saing 4 379 
Joshigaon 6 243 
Almora Sult Saknara 6 379 
Barkinda 5 243 
Total 21 1244 




Figure 4-1 MilkIT project village mid-clusters, Uttarakhand  
Names of mid-clusters: 1-Barkinda; 2-Saknara; 3-Gahnaheet; 4-Nailwalpali; 5-Sainj; 6-Joshigaon; 7-
Chouganchina; 8-Khabra) 
 
4.3.3 Design to evaluate the IPs 
In this study, we evaluated IPs as an intervention strategy at two levels:  
• IP functioning and process  
• Outputs and outcomes at value chain and household level 
IP functioning and processes were evaluated based on key indicators developed by the project 
team including chronology of activities, inclusiveness and diversity of members who 
participated, prioritization of issues, qualitative organizational or technical changes over time 
and a log of follow-up actions. These indicators were assessed based on data collected at IP-
meetings and through follow-up documentation.  
The impacts of IP activities at household and value chain level were measured using 
indicators such as changes in marketing strategies, rate of adoption of technical innovations, 
increase in dairy productivity and benefits, changes in household food consumption patterns 
and changes in institutional engagement. These were collected through an impact assessment 
survey explained below.  
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4.3.4 IP-meeting and follow-up documentation 
Three types of meetings were organized. Firstly, core meetings were held every 3 months for 
both dairy value chain and feed IPs involving a wide range of stakeholders including 
producers and non-producers. Between these core meetings, follow-up meetings were held on 
an ad hoc basis in the villages as required. The third type of meeting was the individual 
meeting where MilkIT staff met with a specific individual or institution. In addition to these 
meetings, exposure visits and trainings were organized based on needs emerging from the IP-
meeting discussions.  
The innovation platform activities were summarized through systematic documentation after 
each IP-meeting. Data were collected in four categories: meeting identification, details of 
issues discussed, researcher observations and participant details. Meeting identification 
included the type of meeting, venue, who was invited to the meeting, who facilitated the 
meeting and the duration of the meeting. Details of issues discussed captured the topics 
addressed, agreed actions and who agreed to take responsibility for agreed actions. In this 
way, the team captured the follow-up of agreed actions before the next meeting and updated 
IP participants at the beginning of the next meeting.  Researcher observations documented the 
process followed, changes from the last meeting and what worked well in the meeting 
discussions. Finally, participant details captured the various characteristics of all participating 
actors, including gender and contact information.  The document was updated after each 
meeting by the project team, and any changes in the village or at the institutional level were 
also captured and documented. The documentation was carried out from January 2013 to 
November 2014.  
4.3.5 Impact assessment survey 
Before the project started, two surveys were conducted. Firstly, a baseline survey was 
implemented in all households in both control and intervention villages including 1244 
households. Data were collected on variables covering dairy animal population, production 
details and marketing linkages. Secondly, focus group discussions were conducted through 
the use of the Feed Assessment Tool (FEAST) (Duncan et al. 2012) in 6 control settlements 
and 6 IP settlements to collect data on existing feeding practices and availability of feed 
which helped to inform the strategies of the IPs.  
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At the end of the project, a post intervention household survey was conducted in 192 
households spread across the 48 settlements. To avoid selection bias, settlements were first 
selected randomly among the IP treatment and control mid-clusters. A sample of 6 settlements 
was selected from each of the 4 mid-clusters so that a total of 24 settlements from treatment 
and 24 settlements from control villages was selected (Table 4-2). Four households from each 
settlement were selected randomly with 2 females and 2 males acting as respondents. The 
respondents from the control villages were asked whether they had attended any of the IP-
meetings conducted. This was to assess any spill-over effects11 of the innovation platform 
activities. The details of the household sampling are given in Table 4-2. 
The post-intervention household survey was conducted from September to November 2014. 
The respondents were asked to respond on aspects of dairy production and income details, 
livestock owned, feeding procedures, breeding and health management, market arrangements 
for selling milk as well as crop and fodder details. Information on cropping patterns, income 
from dairy, improved practices of feeding, breed management, marketing of milk and changes 
in the consumption patterns was collected based on recall for the previous 12 months.   
Table 4-2 Sampling of households for the impact assessment survey in Sult and 
Bageshwar 
District Block Name of mid-cluster Type of mid-cluster No of settlements No of households 
Bageshwar Bageshwar Joshigaon IP 6 24 
Sainj IP 6 24 
  Khabra Control 6 24 
  Chouganchina Control 6 24 
Almora Sult  Barkinda IP 6 24 
Saknara IP 6 24 
Nailwalpali Control 6 24 
Gahnaheet Control 6 24 
Total 48 192 
 
4.3.6 Data analysis 
The IP-meeting and follow-up documentation was analysed by simple descriptive tests. These 
were used to summarize the issues discussed, the diversity of actors participating, follow-up 
of the agreed actions and the timeline of interventions implemented.  
For the impact assessment on productivity and livelihood benefits, the households from 
baseline survey were selected and matched with the post-intervention survey households for 
 
11 Control households participating in IP-meetings 
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further analysis to assess changes in key variables. Since there were differences between 
treatment and control mid-clusters which pre-dated the application of the IP-meetings, the 
study compared changes over time between the IP treatment group and the control group. 
Thus, the interaction of treatment and time was used to identify the impact of IP-meetings.  
The first statistical model considered milk yield as the response variable and time and 
treatment as explanatory variables to test for productivity effects. The design factors ‘district’, 
‘mid-cluster’ and ‘settlement’ were included, as they were assumed to contribute to the 
variation in the response variable. Farms where milk yields of zero were recoded both in 2012 
and 2014 were excluded from the analysis. The model was as follows: 
, (1) 
where  is the milk yield of the n-th farm in the m-th settlement in the l-th mid-cluster, 
in the i-th district, at the k-th time point with the j-th treatment,  is the overall intercept,  is 
the effect of the i-th district,  is the effect of the j-th treatment,  is the effect of the k-th 
time point,  is the interaction of district and treatment,  is the interaction of 
district and time,  is the interaction of treatment and time,  is the interaction of 
district, treatment and time,  is the effect of the l-th mid-cluster within the i-th district at 
time k,  is the effect of the m-th settlement within the l-th mid-cluster and i-th district 
at time k,  are the residual error terms associated with . 
, , and  were considered random effects. Heterogeneous time-specific 
variances and correlations were allowed for the two subsequent measurements in time on an 
individual mid-cluster, settlement and farm by using the unstructured variance-covariance 
structure. In addition, error covariance parameters were estimated separately for each 
treatment to adjust for heterogeneity of variance detected in residual plots. Hence, the 
following covariance-parameters were estimated: variances ,  , , 
, , ,  and correlations , ,  and 
. Model assumptions, homogeneity of variance and normal distribution of residuals 
were assessed by the inspection of plots of ‘studentized residuals’. Scatterplots of residuals 
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versus predicted values and quantile-quantile-plots were used to assess homoscedasticity and 
normal distribution, respectively. The response variable was transformed by taking the fourth 
root as residual plots showed heterogeneity of variance and a right skewed distribution of 
residuals. 
However, a certain spill-over effect of IP-meeting participation was observed, i.e. some 
households from control villages also participated in IP-meetings to some extent. Therefore, 
the approach in model (1), in which treatment was defined by village, was potentially 
unsuitable to discover an influence of involvement in IP-meetings on milk yield. Thus, the 
categorical treatment variable based on village classification was replaced by the frequency of 
actual IP-meeting participation, which had been recorded for each household. The differences 
in milk yield between the two time-points ( ) were regressed on IP-meeting participation 
frequency. To correct the analysis for initial milk yields, the milk yields at the first time-point 
were included in the model as a covariate. A model of the following form resulted: 
, (2) 
where  is the difference of milk yields at the end of the experiment in 2014 ( ) and 
milk yield at the beginning of the experiment in 2012 ( ) of the n-th farm, in the m-th 
settlement, in the l-th mid-cluster and the i-th district,  is the common intercept,  is the 
deviation from a common intercept of the i-th district,  and  are the common slopes of a 
regression on the initial milk yield  and IP-meeting participation frequency ,  and 
 are the deviations from the common slopes of the regressions on  and  for the i-
th district,  is the common slope for a regression on the cross product of  and ,  
are the deviations from the common slope of the regression on the cross product for the i-th 
district, , and  are the random intercept for the mid-clusters and settlements, , , 
 are the mid-cluster-specific random slopes for  and  and their cross-product, 
, ,  are the mid-cluster-specific random slopes for  and  and 
their cross-product,  are the residual error terms associated with . 
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, , , , , , , and  were considered as random effects 
with mean zero and variances , , , , , , ,  and . Correlations 
between random intercepts and slopes on the level of mid-clusters and settlements were 
allowed to make sure that parameter estimates are invariant to rescaling of the regressors 
(Piepho and Ogutu 2002). Residual analysis was carried out as explained in model (1).  
Models (1) and (2) were fitted using the MIXED procedure of SAS software version 9.4. 
Model parameters were estimated by restricted maximum likelihood method (REML) (Littell 
et al. 2006). Random effects were tested for significance by likelihood ratio tests before the 
inspection of fixed effects. Non-significant random effects were removed from the model. 
Fixed effects were tested using sequential Wald-type F-tests. Denominator degrees of 
freedom in F-tests and standard errors for parameter estimates were adjusted using the method 
of Kenward and Roger (Kenward and Roger 1997). Non-significant terms were removed from 
the model. The factor levels of significant qualitative factors in model (1) were compared by 
using pairwise t-tests. Throughout the entire statistical analysis, a significance level of 5% 
was used. 
Simple descriptive analysis was performed for adoption of technological innovations such as 
feeding troughs, fodder choppers and breeding improvements before and after interventions, 
post-intervention data were compared between control and IP treatment households and then 
compared with baseline data which were derived from the focus group discussions conducted 
using the FEAST approach.  
 
4.4 Results 
This section presents an overview of innovation platform (IP) functioning and efficiency and 
impact of IP’s on institutional and technological innovations at value chain and household 
level during the study period of 24 months (Dec 2012 to November 2014) in both Sult and 
Bageshwar. Most of the differences were at block level rather than at mid-cluster level, so 
many of results are presented at block level while a few details are also given for mid-cluster 
level. The process of IP-meetings and interventions are presented first, followed by the impact 
of the IP approach.  
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4.4.1 Prioritizing issues in IPs 
4.4.1.1 Initial prioritization 
The initial key issue limiting dairy development in this hilly region identified during the IP 
process were the high marketing cost of dairy production due to scattered settlements and a 
shortage of feed. The Feed Assessment Tool (FEAST) which includes participatory 
qualitative discussion and quantitative household survey (Duncan et al. 2012) helped to 
identify the feed related issues and helped to see the feed constraints in a broader livelihood 
context. 
Initial core meetings at block level helped to prioritize the issues for the IP to act upon. The 
following table highlights the type of meetings held in Sult and Bageshwar (Table 4-3). 
Follow-up meetings at mid-cluster and village level for feed and market related interventions 
were more frequent in Bageshwar than in Sult, as were training and institutional meetings.  
Table 4-3:Summary of type of Innovation Platform meeting  
Type of IP-meeting Sult block  
(No. of meetings) 
Bageshwar block 
(No. of meetings) 
Market (IP core) 4 3 
Feed (IP core) 2 2 
Follow-up (market & feed) 53 149 
Training/exposure  1 3 
Institutional meeting 2 5 
Total 62 162 
Source: Ravichandran et al. (2016:154) 
 
The issues most frequently discussed in initial meetings in both blocks by the farmers and 
other actors were market-related constraints including inaccessibility of villages to markets 
and the low milk price paid by the existing government dairy cooperatives. After the 
establishment of the market linkages to sell milk, other issues arose, such as feed and breed 
issues. Once IPs were established, feed related issues were dominant topics of discussion 
(Figure 4-2). Issues other than the dairy development such as self-help group (SHG) based 




Figure 4-2:  Details of issues discussed in initial IP-meetings  
4.4.1.2 Changes in priority issues at IP-meetings over time 
Comparing the priority of issues discussed in Sult and Bageshwar across the two-year period, 
the Sult IPs covered many issues in the first year, but feed and market related priorities were 
dominant (Figure 4-3). Health and breeding issues were also prominent. Farmers were 
concerned with government schemes such as subsidies because of the dry climate as 
mentioned under convergence issue in the figure. After the first year of IP establishment, IP 
members in Sult reduced their engagement in IP-meetings. This was due to an issue with 
Aanchal which delayed payment for milk. This demotivated many farmers and affected their 
willingness to participate in IP-meetings due to lack of confidence with IP agreed actions.  
On the other hand, in Bageshwar, the IP covered issues evenly throughout the two years and 
feed and market related issues remained the main priority (Figure 4-3). Market issues were 
taken up continuously for 15 months which led to the formation of a SHG-based dairy 
cooperative, the establishment of rules of engaging with this dairy cooperative and the 
promotion of support services. Health and breeding issues were also prioritized for 
intervention, for example by initiating the training of Artificial Insemination (AI) workers and 





Figure 4-3 Temporal distribution of issues discussed in IP-meetings  
a) Sult and b) Bageshwar 
4.4.1.3 Follow-up of IP action plans 
At the start of each IP-meeting, the follow-up actions formulated at previous meetings were 
evaluated. Follow-up of issues were analysed at mid-cluster level in Sult and Bageshwar 
(Figure 4-4). Issues were followed up more systematically in Bageshwar than in Sult. Within 
Sult, some mid-cluster level differences were observed: in Barkinda mid-cluster, follow-up 
was less comprehensive than in Saknara mid-cluster, even though there were more meetings 
in Barkinda. On the other hand, Sainj mid-cluster IP members were especially good in 
regularly following up issues and implementing the agreed action plans (Figure 4-4). The 
impact of follow-up is reflected in the impact of interventions and is presented in more detail 





Figure 4-4: Follow-up of issues in IP mid-clusters  
 
4.4.2 Participation in the IPs 
4.4.2.1 Gender analysis of dairy producers participating 
The IP-meeting records were analysed in both Sult and Bageshwar to determine who attended 
the IP-meetings. Women dominated attendance at the IP-meetings: in Sult, 72% of all 
participants were women, while in Bageshwar the corresponding figure was 81% (Figure 
4-5), including some women attending more than once. More men participated in Sult (410) 
than in Bageshwar (244). 
 




4.4.2.2 Diversity of non-producers in IP-meetings 
At the beginning of the project, a stakeholder mapping exercise was carried out to identify the 
key stakeholders associated with dairy development in the study districts and at state level. 
Before the IP-meeting phase, the stakeholders were invited through formal invitation letters 
and through direct communication. The diversity of non-producer actors participating in IP-
meetings was higher in Bageshwar than in Sult (Figure 4-6). Government officials were 
dominant in both blocks and these included Aanchal12, banks, the Integrated Livelihood 
Support Programme (ILSP) by IFAD, the Agricultural Department, the Animal Husbandry 
Department, Krishi Vigyan Kendra (KVK)13 and the National Bank for Rural Development 
(NABARD). Initially, no private sector actors attended in either district although one private 
trader participated after 18 months of the IP-meeting intervention to discuss procurement of 
milk with farmers. Aanchal (the government-based dairy cooperative) actively participated in 
Sult over many meetings, whereas Aanchal did not participate in Bageshwar after the first two 
meetings once producers started their own SHG-based dairy marketing unit at district level to 
sell their milk, as the issues they experienced with Aanchal were never addressed. There was 
evidence of banking actors in Bageshwar but not in Sult due to the distance of villages from 
the head offices. An agricultural research and extension centre (KVK) is located in 
Bageshwar so its representatives participated in IP-meetings. NABARD, a national 
development bank, took the initiative to fund dairy farmers in Bageshwar after the first IP-
meeting and also participated regularly in village meetings to identify beneficiaries. The 
impact of this participation is reflected in the Bageshwar interventions such as purchase of 
crossbred cows with high milk yield as explained below in the impact section. 
 
12 Aanchal is the government-operated dairy cooperative society in Uttarakhand 
13 Krishi Vigyan Kendra are agricultural extension centres created by ICAR (Indian Council for Agricultural Research) and its affiliated 





Figure 4-6  Number of times individuals from different organizations participated in IP-
meetings  
(Dec 2012-Nov 2014) 
4.4.2.3 Participation of dairy producers from control and IP mid-clusters 
IP-meeting participant records indicate that several producers from control mid-clusters also 
participated in the IP-meetings (Table 4-4). This was also reflected in the post-intervention 
household survey which traced participation in IP-meetings.  
Table 4-4: Participation of producers from control and IP mid-clusters in IP-meetings 
Name of mid-cluster Type of mid-cluster No of times/producers participating in IP-meetings 
Total Women Men % Women 
Joshigaon IP 583 444 139 76 
Sainj IP 507 427 80 84 
Barkinda IP 651 470 181 72 
Saknara IP 747 517 230 69 
Nailwalpali Control 99 56 43 57 
Khabra Control 28 25 3 89 
Gehnaheet Control 47 29 18 62 
 
4.4.3 Chronology of innovations and capacity building promoted by Innovation 
Platforms  
A timeline of when the various innovations were introduced by the innovation platforms in 
Sult and Bageshwar is shown in Figure 4-7. These innovations fall into two categories, 
namely technical and institutional/organizational. In addition, the capacity building exercises 
such as training and exposure visits which arose from the IP discussions are presented.  
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During the first 6-month period, institutional innovations in the broad area of establishing 
improved access to milk markets quickly emerged. These included linking farmers to dairy 
cooperatives in Sult and the formation of the Jeganath Dairy cooperative by a Self-Help 
Group (SHG) in Bageshwar for sale of excess milk. During this period, capacity building 
activities included the exposure of farmers the cooperative approach and the training of 
project staff on the IP approach, on dairy management, and on technical issues around feed, 
breed and veterinary management.  
Other organizational innovations followed. For example, the national agricultural 
development bank, NABARD, developed a group-based credit scheme to promote improved 
dairy cattle breeds. Banks were generally requiring land as collateral for agricultural loans. 
Thus, women and marginal farmers were not able to borrow money because they lacked land 
titles. This issue was discussed at a platform meeting. To minimize the risk of payment failure 
and to strengthen farmer confidence, the banks and NABARD set up a new loan arrangement, 
following a model used by self-help or producer groups, in which the collective guarantee to 
repay the loan is accepted as collateral. Thus, any member of the SHG could take a loan of up 
to INR 100,000 (USD 1,600) to buy two cross-bred dairy cattle as long as the group assumed 
the responsibility of ensuring that the loan would be appropriately serviced. 
Technical innovations such as new feed options were seasonal to the rabi and kharif 
seasons14. For example, dual-purpose wheat and barley varieties were introduced in the rabi 
season, during which period the IPs also evaluated temperate grasses, while fodder crops such 
as Napier grass, sita grass and millets were tested in the kharif season (Figure 4-7). After 
market linkages were established through cooperatives and SHGs, investments in key 
technical innovations were the main focus during the period June to December 2013 (Figure 
4-7). For example, it was during this period that farmers began purchasing cross-bred cows. 
Two issues raised by women in the innovation platform meetings were the difficulties in 
collecting fodder from the forests and the considerable wastage of fodder due to feeding on 
the ground. Although the government had provided heavy duty chaff cutters which would 
have reduced feed waste, these were lying idle since women were physically unable to operate 
them. Simple, light-weight fodder choppers were sourced from outside the state which were 
easy for women to operate. Combined with the introduction of feeding troughs, fodder 
 
14 The Indian cropping calendar is classified into two main growing seasons: kharif (monsoon) and rabi. The kharif season lasts from July to 
October and the rabi season from October to March 
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choppers reduced fodder wastage by 11% (T Ravichandran et al. 2016), reducing the labour 
requirements for collecting feed.  
After only a year, considerable amounts of excess milk were being produced in Bageshwar, 
mainly due to the introduction of high-yielding cross-bred cows. Private milk traders showed 
their interest in buying the milk, which was procured from the farmers through the Jeganath 
Dairy cooperative. The cooperative also established a link with a private feed company to 
source concentrate feed in bulk at a reduced rate, allowing farmers to adequately feed their 
animals without threatening their returns. Towards the end of the IP treatment intervention 
period of 24 months, a district level innovation platform was formed, and the scaling of 
interventions was initiated. The capacity building activities continued for both farmers and the 
facilitators throughout the IP activities and were generally linked to the technical and 
























Figure 4-7: Timeline of the innovations and capacity building activities established by 
the innovation platforms  
(Jan 2013- July 2014)  
Source: IP-meeting documentation 
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4.4.4 Impact of introducing IPs 
As seen in the above results, we found that the IP process was generally more effective in 
Bageshwar than in Sult. This was reflected in a range of metrics, including gender 
inclusiveness, diversity of non-producer actors, prioritization of issues and follow-up of 
actions. This section presents the impacts of the innovation platforms on the adoption of 
technological innovations, milk yield and market linkages.  
4.4.4.1 Impact of IPs on productivity: Effect of IP treatment and IP-meeting frequency in 
milk yield 
One of our main research questions was whether the attendance of IP-meetings would 
increase milk yields to improve livelihoods through the technical innovations promoted 
during these meetings. When model (1) was fitted to the milk yield data the interaction of 
time (before and after intervention) and treatment (IP or control) was found to be non-
significant (DF = 48.7, F = 0.13, p = 0.7165), suggesting that participating in IPs had not 
increased milk yields in IP-households compared to control households. The only significant 
effects were the main effect of time (DF = 45.5, F = 49.52, p < 0.0001) and district (DF = 
53.7, F = 6.59, p = 0.0131). Average milk yields increased between survey rounds from 1.03 
l/day in 2012 to 2.5l/day in 2014 (data not shown), without this increase being attributable to 
the IP treatment. Milk yields in Bageshwar were higher on average (2.02 l/day) compared to 
Sult (1.42 l/day). 
However, it should be considered that the IP treatment and control mid-clusters were located 
close to each other (Figure 4-1). Although the IP-meeting documentation shows a 
considerably higher participation in IP-meetings from the intervention households (Table 
4-4), certain spill-over effects were present. To overcome this spill-over effect, model (2) was 
used to study the relationship of difference in milk yield with the actual IP-meeting 
participation frequency, independent from whether households came from treatment or 
control mid-clusters. The categorical variable which denotes if a household was part of the IP-
treatment or control mid-cluster was replaced by the participation frequency which was used 
as a regressor. Additionally, the initial milk yield from 2012 was included as covariate.  
Random intercept and slopes were not found not significant in a likelihood ratio test (degrees 
of freedom = 11, Test statistic = 0.02, p ≈ 1). Hence, further analysis was based on a linear 




Table 4-5: Sequential Wald-type-F-tests for fixed effects of model (2) fitted to differences 
in milk yield  
from 2012 to 2014 (∆y_ilm) per farm 
Effect1 Meaning Numerator 
DF 
Denominator DF F-value p-value 
 District effect 1 168 2.90 0.0902 
 Slope for initial milk yield (imy) 1 169 119.05 < 0.0001 
 Slope for IP-participation (IP) 1 169 11.81 0.0007 
 District-specific slope for imy 1 165 0.146 0.7085 
 District-specific slope for IP 1 166 0.42 0.4211 
 Slope for cross-product (IP x imy) 1 167 1.66 0.2001 
 District-specific slope for IP x imy 1 164 0.34 0.5595 
1Random effects , , , , , , , were found not significant in a likelihood ratio test 
and were therefore removed from the model before testing fixed effects. 
 
 
No district specific slope was significant, nor were the district specific intercepts or the 
common slope of the cross-product (Table 4-5). However, the common slope for IP-
participation frequency was significant (Table 4-5, DF = 169, F = 0.0007). The estimate for the 
slope was positive (0.1447 with standard error 0.04212), indicating a significant increase of 
milk yields with increasing participation in IP-meetings (Figure 4-8a). 
Furthermore, the slope of initial milk yield was significant (Table 4-5, DF = 169, F = 119.05, p 
< 0.0001). The estimate for the slope was negative (-1.0562 with standard error 0.09680), 
indicating a negative relationship of milk yield and initial milk yield (Figure 4-8b). Hence, 
households with lower initial milk yield in 2012 showed the largest increases in milk yield in 
2014. On the other hand, households with already high milk yield in 2012 had relatively 
similar yields in 2014. Moreover, 23% of farms showed a negative  indicating a 
reduction in milk yield from 2012 to 2014, which most involved farms with the highest milk 
yields in 2012. 
A final remark on the regression in model (2): a regression with two regressors results in a 
three dimensional ‘response surface’. In this case it has the shape of a flat plane, as no cross-
product terms were significant. Figure 4-8 presents two transects through the response 
surface. Figure 4-8 a) is a transect parallel to the axis of IP-participation and Figure 4-8b) is a 
transect parallel to the axis of initial milk yield. Participation frequencies in Figure 4-8a) 
show a strong right skewed distribution with few very high participation frequencies and 
many low frequencies. Extreme values in a regressor can have a strong influence on the 
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estimation of the slope. The so called ‘leverage’ is a measure of the influence each single 
observation has on the estimation of the slope. In model (2) a strong positive relationship of 
IP-participation and leverage was found, raising the suspicion that the positive relationship of 
increase in milk yield and IP-participation is caused by few very influential observations. For 
verification, parameters of model (2) were re-estimated from a dataset where all observations 
with a leverage larger than twice the average leverage were excluded (Richter and Piepho 
2017). The common slopes for IP-participation and initial milk yield remained significant, but 
in addition also the slope on the cross-product turned significant (data not shown). Hence, 
results appear to be relatively consistent, despite the skewness of the IP-participation. 
 
 
Figure 4-8 Regression analysis for association of differences in milk yield between  
Time period: 2012 and 2014: a) IP-meeting participation and b) initial milk yield in 2012 
4.4.4.2 Adoption of technology innovations 
The baseline FGD FEAST study and the baseline household survey indicated that the IP mid-
cluster households were already more advanced than the control mid-cluster households in 
terms of technology adoption, including the use of feed troughs, ownership of cross-bred 
cows and uptake of government benefits (Table 4-6).  
Two descriptive comparisons were made post-intervention: the comparison between control 
and IP mid-cluster households after intervention and the comparison of intervention 
households before and after interventions. The post-intervention household survey explored 
 126 
 
the effects of IP interventions on adoption of feed and breed technologies. Households from 
IP mid-clusters showed greater use of improved practices than control mid-clusters in post 
intervention which includes feed trough use, artificial insemination, cross-bred animals, 
concentrate feeding and market linkage improvement (Table 4-6).  
When we compare the households from the IP group before and after the interventions, there 
is an improvement in all technological and institutional indicators (Table 4-6). However, there 
is also marked improvement in control group households also before and after interventions in 
artificial insemination, concentrate feeding and crossbred cows.  
4.4.4.3 Increased market and institutional linkages  
We found considerable differences in the extent of institutional linkages between control and 
IP mid-cluster households. Households from IP mid-clusters were found to have changed 
their marketing arrangements and to have taken up membership of either government-based 
cooperatives or SHG based dairy cooperative groups far more than control households (Table 
4-6). The impact of these institutional changes is reflected in changes in the volume of milk 
sales, the share of milk sold and dairy incomes. IP mid-cluster households sold more milk and 
had higher dairy incomes than control households after interventions (Table 4-6).  
In addition, changes in the control households were also observed, especially in cooperative 
membership, sale of milk and savings from milk sale. There is slight increase in cooperative 
membership in control households, but this has not led to considerable changes in market 
channels. The savings from milk sales increased threefold compared to the pre-intervention 
period. This is in line with the previous findings on increased milk yield from control 




Table 4-6 Adoption of technologies, institutional innovations and market linkage 
between control and intervention clusters before and after interventions 
Variable 
Survey 




Control IP Control IP 
n (size of sample group/hh) 12 (142) 12 (167) a 96 96 
Adoption of technologies     
Feed trough use (%) 3 12 5 55 
Chopping fodder (%) 0 1 12 20 
Concentrate feeding (%) 60 70 75 95 
Artificial insemination (%) 10 15 19 38 
Owning Crossbred cow (%) 1 5 5 21 
Days fed improved fodder 5 10 6 52 
Institutional innovations     
Cooperative membership (%) 2 10 8 51 
Change dairy market channel (%) 0 2 1 14 
Access to public dairy schemes (%) 1 5 1 40 
Milk transactions     
Total milk sold/day mean (L/hh) 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 
Share of milk sale (%) 5 10 13 19 
Savings from milk sale mean (INR/year) 800 1200 2466 4311 
a There were 12 FGD in each control and IP area, values in parenthesis are total number of farmers participating 
in FGD 
 
4.5 Discussion  
The objective of the study was two-fold: Firstly, to determine the impacts of the IPs on 
productivity, technology adoption and institutional changes and secondly, to identify the IP 
processes that supported these impacts. This study showed that implementation of IPs led to 
rapid change in the institutional arrangements around market linkages. Subsequently, farmers 
showed strong interest in the new market arrangements and price decisions. This was also 
possible due to collective action because of homogeneousness and purpose of the group 
(Olson 1971). When the IP is working towards the market linkages there are faster results 
when all parties experience benefits (Tenywa et al. 2011). This finding supports previous 
arguments that IPs should focus on institutional innovations along with technological 
innovations (Schut et al. 2018). The market acted as a motivation for farmers to spend in feed 
innovations and to purchase high yielding dairy animals because they had the confidence to 
be able to sell their milk at competitive prices. Initial participation of farmers in IPs may be 
motivated by their need for knowledge, skills and by curiosity. Long-term participation 
requires economic and material incentives (Mulema 2012). This study indicates that indirect 
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benefits of participation such as economic benefits and livelihood enhancement, encourages 
other farmers to also participate in IP dialogues.  
The outcomes in the Bageshwar IP were more evident than in Sult, especially regarding 
increases in milk yield, milk sales and follow-up of issues. In Bageshwar more crossbred 
cows were introduced due to IP interventions leading to higher milk yields. An important 
underlying factor was the more diverse range of stakeholders participating in Bageshwar than 
in Sult which led to a stronger institutional model. It may be argued that this was supported by 
easier market access compared to Sult. Discussions of issues in IP-meetings were very wide-
ranging and continuous throughout the project. Previous studies have also found that co-
evolution of innovations happens more readily when platforms are highly dynamic and 
distributed in composition rather than being static and drawing from a narrow stakeholder 
base (Boogaard et al. 2013; Kilelu, Klerkx, and Leeuwis 2013b; Nederlof and Mariana 2011). 
Stakeholder groups are more likely to be involved and support the solutions when they are 
part of the decision making process (Neef and Neubert 2011) which is evident in this study 
through the financial institutions which were fast to act in the IP. Another important factor for 
better outcomes in Bageshwar was the presence of SHGs in Bageshwar which also supported 
non-participating household producers through the diffusion of information and technologies. 
A similar finding can be seen in a previous study (Pamuk, Bulte, and Adekunle 2014b) where 
the adoption of crop management practices was different in different IPs depending on the 
previous social capital in that area. Social capital helps to build knowledge diffusion (Semeon 
et al. 2013).   
Our results indicate that increases in milk yield and technology and institutional change 
occurred not only in selected mid-cluster households but also in households from control mid-
clusters. This was also related to their participation in IP-meetings, which shows that 
participation in IPs enhanced their network with participating stakeholders. This in turn 
helped them to adopt crossbred cows supported by financial institutions. They also benefited 
from the new institutional arrangements for the sale of milk. As the control mid-clusters were 
in close proximity to the IP mid-clusters, peer to peer diffusion of innovations was key for 
scaling (Hendrickx et al. 2015). A positive finding was that innovative processes and benefits 
attract producers from nearby communities, and this has important implications for using IPs 
to bring about change at scale. From a methodological point of view, we found that selection 
of communities that are proximate to each other diluted the treatment effect when analysing 
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impacts due to spill-over effects.  Future studies aimed at quantifying the impact of IPs should 
take account of the need for geographical separation of control and treatment communities. 
On the issue of scaling, our work suggests that simple technical innovations such as feed 
troughs, choppers, improved fodder and crossbred cows can be directly scaled up by the 
participating stakeholders. On the other hand, scaling the organizational innovations is more 
dependent on effective innovation platforms as these innovations are more complex in nature 
(Duncan et al. 2015; Hendrickx et al. 2015) and require consensus among many stakeholders 
which in turn is based on dialogue and negotiation.     
Women are often excluded or poorly represented in value chain projects especially in 
producer organizations  (Kaaria et al. 2016). Because the participation of women in this 
project was so strong, production constraints including fodder wastage and lack of access to 
milk markets, were specifically addressed, which would not have been possible if the IPs had 
been dominated by men. It is important to note that understanding the issues of women and 
men beforehand is important so that IPs can help to derive relevant solutions (Mulema et al. 
2015; T Ravichandran et al. 2016).  
4.6 Conclusion 
The innovation platform approach was chosen to deal with the complex issue of market 
imperfection and low productivity among small holder dairy farmers in Uttarakhand, India. 
This study aimed to determine how IPs contribute to impacts at various levels. The main 
contribution of this paper is to provide robust evidence that IPs not only help with technology 
innovation but also facilitate improved institutional arrangements to allow market innovation. 
Improved marketing arrangements were quickly achieved because farmers and other 
stakeholders had clear incentives to initiate these changes. These institutional changes 
attracted new farmers into the IP approach even though they were not initially members of the 
innovation platforms. Strong participation of women in the IPs ensured that gender-related 
constraints were identified and development actors initiated actions to address these issues 
which would not have been possible otherwise. This study concludes that the specific 
innovations or interventions emerging from IPs are determined by local site characteristics, 
diversity of IP participants, quality of discussions and continuity in following up on the 
agreed action plans. Although the study had limitations including the short time-scale of 
investigation and the effects of spill-overs caused by the proximity of target communities, the 
data provide rare quantitative evidence for IP effectiveness at household and community level 
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associated with both productivity and market improvements and provide a base upon which to 
build future work on IP effectiveness. 
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5 Discussion of main findings and policy implications 
Good policies and sound institutional arrangements are important stepping stones to achieve 
inclusive growth, where all sections of communities get benefits (Alvaredo et al. 2018). 
However, there are many issues such as poor governance and gender inequality linked with 
these institutional arrangements especially in developing countries. Dairy production in 
developing countries has huge potential to reduce poverty as there is high demand for dairy 
products. It is mainly because dairy animals are dominantly owned by smallholders. 
However, the role of dairy production in addressing the aforementioned issues depends on 
local circumstances, for example, in some countries there is high growth but it is not 
inclusive. Therefore, this thesis aimed at contributing to a better understanding on how to 
unlock the potential of dairy development to support inclusive growth and poverty reduction. 
Based on the comparative analysis conducted in chapters 2 to 4, and using a conceptual 
framework (Figure 1-2) for guidance, the general discussion is focused on the following key 
areas : (1) What are the institutional arrangements which influence inclusive market 
integration and productivity enhancement? (2)  What are the governance structures and 
processes which facilitate the representation of women and the marginalized in institutional 
arrangements for dairy market development? (3) What is the role of an innovation platform 
approach in achieving inclusive market growth and productivity enhancement? In the second 
part of this chapter limitations of the research work and policy implications are discussed.  
5.1 Which institutional arrangements influence inclusive outcomes? 
From chapter 2 and 3, a summary of  the main findings for inclusive outcome of market 
integration and productivity enhancements through different institutional arrangements in 
Bihar and Telangana are outlined in Table 5-1 and Table 5-2. In Telangana, women only dairy 
cooperative arrangements were more inclusive for women and marginalized for market 
integration and productivity enhancement than mixed dairy cooperatives. In the Telangana 
mixed dairy cooperative, women and low caste people were not given a chance for 
membership, leadership roles or training opportunities. Women from mixed dairy 
cooperatives did not have access to dairy income nor control of it (Table 5-1).  On the other 
hand, women only dairy cooperatives in Bihar were inclusive for women and low caste only 
in membership, access to income, and training aspects (Table 5-2). Leadership roles and 
access to inputs and services were accessed by men due to shadow managerial roles of 
 136 
 
women. Whereas mixed dairy cooperatives in Bihar were not fully inclusive for women. 
However, compared to the mixed dairy cooperative of Telangana, women and low castes 
benefited from market integration, productivity enhancement, input and training support. 
Exclusion of women and the marginalized is more evident in Private dairy companies in 
Telangana for membership and access to services. Moreover, private dairy companies are 
more concentrated on processing milk rather than productivity enhancement services. 
Informal markets in Bihar were more inclusive for market integration but lack support for 
productivity increase.  
5.2 Gender inclusive institutional arrangements 
It is important to consider the impact of women’s participation in economic organizations 
such as cooperatives. Because participation of women in market institutional arrangements 
not only brings economic benefits but also builds other aspects such as an increase in self-
confidence, better negotiation skills, improved gender relations within households and taking 
part in household decisions (Burchi and Vicari 2014; Ferguson and Kepe 2011; Majurin 
2012). These benefits are often ignored by the economic studies.  
In this study, gender bias is very evident in all market institutional arrangements except 
women only dairy cooperatives in Telangana. These findings are in line with previous studies 
about village panchayat raj systems and dairy cooperatives where gender bias was reported 
for leadership roles (Birner 2010; Gupta 2000). Under-representation of women in 
agricultural cooperative membership and leadership is evident in other countries also such as 
East Africa, where land is a key issue for membership in agricultural cooperatives (Majurin 
2012).  
What institutional arrangements facilitate the representation of women? Women’s 
participation in dairy cooperatives was encouraged through reservation quotas where only 
women are members in dairy cooperatives. But there are different outcomes for gender 
inclusion in Telangana and Bihar. In Telangana, the women’s dairy cooperative is more 
gender inclusive in all aspects from village to union level than the Bihar women dairy 
cooperative. Key differences are the implementation of policies which are top down and 
controlled by the state in Bihar, whereas in Telangana implementation of the women only 
cooperative is self-driven and there is no interference by the state in its implementation. One 
important finding of this study reveals that reservation quotas for women in dairy 
memberships will not always guarantee benefits for women especially in the case of 
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leadership roles and access to control of dairy income. However, the study has reported that 
access to membership will facilitate participation in trainings, decision making meetings and 
leadership roles.  
Another important outcome of participation in market institutional arrangement is 
productivity enhancement. Access to inputs and services through formal organizations such as 
cooperatives is important for productivity enhancement for women and marginalized farmers. 
This finding is also in line with previous literature that collective action arrangements 
sometimes exclude the poorest and marginalized (Bernard and Spielman 2009; Quisumbing 
and Pandolfelli 2010). Recent research on the impact of dairy cooperatives in Andhra Pradesh 
also supported that small and marginal farmers were not benefited from dairy cooperatives for 
breed improvement and high income growth (Squicciarini et al. 2017). Apart from 
cooperatives, other institutional arrangements such as private dairy company and informal 
markets are not supported for inputs and services. They deal only with the marketing of milk. 
This study concludes that private investment for processing milk will not guarantee 
productivity enhancement. However, this conclusion should not be generalized because the 
private institutional model in this study covers only a small area and is also context specific. 
There is evidence that innovation platforms in Sult and Bageshwar were inclusive socially 
and for both genders as there were more women participants than men in IP meetings and 
most of the farmers were marginalized. Most of the constraints addressed in IP meetings were 
women based issues.  This approach is beneficial specifically to deal with complex issues for 
dairy development such as high transaction cost, low productivity, unorganized market, 
unorganized stakeholders etc. The aim of the IP approach was to increase productivity and 
market integration, however the approach also achieved inclusive outcomes. IPs have 
revealed that productivity enhancement such as increased milk yield was observed in the 
households who have participated in IP meetings. Institutional innovations for market 
development were attractive to producers from control mid-clusters too which resulted in 




Table 5-1 Outcome of market institutional arrangements in Telangana for market 
integration and productivity enhancement 




Private dairy company 
Market integration    
Membership Gender inclusive, 100 % of 
members were women. 
Inclusive to marginalized 
Gender bias, 100 % of 
members were men. 
Inclusive to 
marginalized 
Gender bias,100 % of 
members were men, not 
inclusive to 
marginalized/poor 
Leadership roles Gender inclusive from 
village to union level. 
Inclusive to marginalized 
Not inclusive for 
women and lower 
caste. Mostly are men 
from higher caste 
Only men from high 
caste are in leadership 
roles 
Active involvement (meeting, 
voting, decision making) 
Gender inclusive, 87 % of 
women involved, no bias in 
class and caste for voting 
and meeting 
Gender bias, no women 
are involved, and lower 
caste excluded from 
decision making 
Members are not 
involved in any decision 
making 
Access to & control of dairy income Gender inclusive, 87% of 
women have access to and 
control of income from 
dairy cooperative 
Only 6% of women 
have access to dairy 
income 
Most income is 
controlled by men 
Productivity enhancement    
Input and service support (credit, 
health, feed and breeding services) 
Gender inclusive as most of 
these services are accessed 
by women, mild bias for 
poorest and lower caste to 
access to inputs 
Gender bias, all the 
inputs and services are 
only for men. Bias 
towards poorest/lower 
caste for subsidy of 
inputs 
Credit services and feed 
support is given to land 
resource farmers and 
men 
Capacity building/ training for 
productivity increase 
55% of women attended 
training programme. No 
bias towards marginalized 
No women attended 
any training. Lower 
caste households never 
attended training 
No training, only 
exposure to dairy 
company for rich male 
farmers 
 
Table 5-2 Outcome of market institutional arrangements in Bihar for market 
integration and productivity enhancement 





Market integration    
Membership Gender inclusive, 100% of 
members were women. 
Inclusive to marginalized 
Gender bias, only 21% 
of members were 
women. Inclusive to 
marginalized 
No membership but 
inclusive to women and 
marginalized 
Leadership roles Shadow managers of 
women in village level. 
Low caste people are not 
given chance, forced 
selection 
Not inclusive for women 
and lower caste. Mostly 
men from higher caste 
No leadership roles 
Active involvement (meeting, 
voting, decision making) 
Only 24% of women 
involved, members from 
low castes not allowed to 
cast vote 
44 % of women 
involved in meeting and 
decision making, 
members from low caste 
are allowed  
Members are free to 
decide 
Access to & control of dairy income 49% of women have access 
to and control of income 
from dairy cooperative 
Only 27% of women 
have access to dairy 
income 
Most income is 




Outcome indicators Women only dairy 
cooperative 
Mixed dairy cooperative Informal market 
Productivity enhancement    
Input and service support (credit, 
health, feed and breeding services) 
Not gender inclusive as 
most of these services are 
accessed by men due to 
shadow management of 
women in leadership, bias 
for lower caste to access 
subsidy 
Most of the inputs and 
services are accessed by 
men. Bias towards lower 
caste to access subsidy 
(credit, feed)  
No input support 
available 
Capacity building/training for 
productivity increase 
57% of women attended 
training programme mostly 
from high caste, few 
women from lower caste 
attended 
27% women attended 
training. Lower caste 
also attended training 
but very few 
No training  
 
5.3 Factors which influence the inclusive outcome for dairy development 
In the above section we have seen that there is variation in different institutional arrangements 
for inclusive dairy development. In this section we discuss what are the factors which 
influence these outcomes for inclusive dairy development.  The factors are divided into two 
groups: 1) institutional structures; 2) governance processes.  
5.3.1 What institutional structures influence the outcome? 
Decentralized institutional structure and decision making: It is interesting to note that the 
governance structures within cooperative set ups in the women only dairy cooperative in 
Telangana and market innovations in the innovation platform approach in Uttarakhand were 
autonomous in function. However, they received support from the state for the infrastructure, 
processing and input. The producers in autonomous cooperatives have freedom to participate 
fully in membership and leadership roles which were not followed in state controlled 
cooperatives such as the Bihar dairy cooperatives. The state and cooperatives have conflicting 
goals: the state prescribes centrally determined activities to be carried out by cooperatives, but 
these may give different results in different locations depending on local contexts. This will 
lead to low levels of member participation and discourage non-members to join. There is 
more political interference in decision making and selection of local leaders to run the 
cooperatives. State interference in cooperatives slows down the growth and decreases member 
enthusiasm to participate in decision making (Das et al. 2006). This is the main reason for the 
failure of dairy cooperatives in some states. State support is essential for cooperatives only for 
the infrastructure and supportive policies. Based on this, it is concluded that state support is 
needed for dairy cooperatives for infrastructure and policies but state interference in decision 
making within cooperative governance structure will impede inclusive growth.      
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Gender inclusive governance structure: another important factor which played a key role in 
the success of the women only dairy cooperative in Telangana is gender integration in the 
governance structures from village level to management, including monitoring staff. As 
women are carrying out labour work for dairy production at the household level, their 
participation in decision making as members and leaders is important. It will lead towards 
women’s empowerment in the long run. Communication between women in the hierarchy of 
cooperatives is easy if there are women at all levels. Gender inclusive governance structures 
will facilitate gender friendly training and capacity building activities which was evident in 
the women only dairy cooperative in Telangana. Therefore, it is important to address all the 
gender issues which hinder dairy development. This is evident in the innovation platform case 
study where market and technology issues relevant to women were raised by women. We can 
provide evidence from earlier literature for the importance of reducing the gender gap and its 
role in productivity enhancement. Reducing the gender gap would increase yields by 20-30% 
which could reduce global hunger by 12-17% (FAO 2011; World Bank 2017). This study 
concludes that gender integration should adopt a bottom up approach with a strong focus on 
human and social capital development rather than reservation policies for membership in 
cooperatives.  
Institutional outcome is specific to local context: There are three types of institutional 
arrangements according to geographical context in this study: one type is covering a small 
area of 25-30 kilometers in Telangana, the other one is in Bihar where the dairy cooperatives 
operational area is about 500 km and third one is the innovation platform in Uttarakhand 
where a small geographical area of 20 km covers only a few villages. The women’s dairy 
cooperative in Telangana performed better than the women’s dairy cooperative in Bihar. The 
concept of efficiency in cooperatives depends upon the degree of member’s participation in 
the cooperative’s operations (Lamming 1980). When the cooperatives are bigger it is difficult 
to maintain the high efficiency of cooperative management. Furthermore, institutional success 
in any area depends on local socio-economic factors. In Bihar gender inequality within 
households is high and strict social norms are followed more than in Telangana which 
prevents women from participating and obtaining benefits even though cooperative 
membership is reserved for women. From the Innovation platform, it is evident that 
stakeholders can contribute to institutional development and technology adoption if the target 
communities are location specific and limited in numbers. This concludes that inclusive 
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outcomes can be the result if there is a decentralized institutional arrangement that is adjusted 
according to different socio-economic conditions and limited area of operations.  
5.3.2 What are the governance processes which influence the outcome? 
Good leadership: leadership and governance are crucial for common outcomes of  
institutional arrangement (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995). Common outcomes also determine 
individual’s benefit so in turn leadership and governance also influence individual’s 
outcomes. It is important to mention in this study that the impact of formal market 
institutional arrangements on dairy income and productivity enhancement depends upon the 
good leadership and shared governance within village or union, or federation level. Main 
leadership roles which determine the governance of dairy cooperatives in this study are 
secretary and chairperson at village level and managing director and chairperson at union or 
federation level.  This is evident in this study where secretary played key roles in the mixed 
dairy cooperative in Bihar. The cchairperson and managing director of the women’s dairy 
cooperative in Telangana was also important. It is interesting to note that there is gender bias 
in leadership roles in all institutional arrangements except the women dairy cooperative in 
Telangana. Women often face constraints of being recognized and accepted as legitimate 
leaders (Eagly and Karau 2002).  Power relations within a community automatically facilitate 
resource rich men for leadership roles (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995) and leadership roles 
may also be a by product of exploitative social domination (Hooper, Kaplan, and Boone 
2010). Another important qualitative aspect of leadership for inclusive outcome is education 
or knowledge about leadership roles which facilitate better decision making process. This is 
the reason for the shadow management in the Bihar women’s dairy cooperative where their 
husbands act as leaders. The same was observed with village panchayat leaders as well 
(Birner 2010). An iimportant leadership aspect to note in the innovation platform based 
market institutional arrangements in Bageshwar is shared leadership by different members, 
which resulted in a better follow up of planned actions.     
Local democratic practices: The Telangana women’s dairy cooperative has shown the 
democratic principles through electoral selection of leaders and participation of members in 
decision making meetings. These are defined by literature as representative and participatory 
democracy (Kaswan 2014).  Representative democracy explicit the representation of members 
which is considered as nominal if there is lack of active participation, but participatory 
governance is the active involvement of members in governance level. Active involvement of 
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members gives the rights for monitoring the performance of leaders. Monitoring rights of 
members is highly related to the social performance of cooperatives (Kyazze, Nkote, and 
Wakaisuka-Isingoma 2017). From Chapter 2 and 3 we can see that the Telangana women 
cooperative followed periodic elections and regular meetings, so members had a chance to 
raise their issues. This is not followed in other cooperative models in Bihar and Telangana 
where leaders were not elected by voting for three decades past and there is no monitoring 
system to follow these democratic practices due to state control. It is important to see the 
instinstitutional arrangements and assess whether they follow democratic community 
development which is theorized by William Thompson to achieve equality (Kaswan 2014). 
This governance of democratic principles is followed differently in the cooperatives 
depending on their size and location. Local institutions are more representative, more 
accountable and more proximate to the people than the remote national institutions and those 
which is evident in this study. The innovation platform meeting in Sult and Bageshwar 
(Chapter 4) also provided evidence that the democratic participation of members facilitated 
the members to raise their issues and benefitted with higher productivity and market linkage. 
This study concludes that cooperative outcome for inclusive growth can be achieved if 
democratic principles are followed at all levels including village level to management level of 
institutional arrangements so all members of society can participate equally for decision 
making.   
Gender inclusive practices: Active participation of women is important for inclusive dairy 
development. Several authors have documented that women’s participation in user groups 
improves the governance structures (Agarwal 2001; Coleman and Mwangi 2013). This study 
has provided interesting evidence that women in nominal memberships alone does not bring 
benefit in the area of control over dairy income. Active levels of participation for women is 
needed in training, decision making and voting. There are several factors which influence 
women’s participation. Active participation of women is observed when gender friendly 
practices are followed in the institutional arrangements. This study provided evidence that the 
women only dairy cooperative in Telangana and innovation platform meetings followed 
gender friendly practices such as meetings in village level so women can attend, flexible 
timings for meeting and training etc. Women reported that capacity building through training 
and participation in periodic meetings increased their confidence and bargaining power within 
the household and changed gender relations in a positive way. Women also participate in 
decision making (breeding, nutrition and animal health) which were previously dominated by 
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men. It is interesting to note that the leadership quality of women in the women only dairy 
cooperative in Telangana is visible, women were trained at all levels from village to 
management levels which is not observed in the Bihar women dairy cooperative. This 
concludes that training and capacity building is important for women to achieve good 
governance.  
Socio economic conditions of farmers are well known to influence outcomes, especially 
market participation and productivity (Kaaria et al. 2016). This study provided evidence that 
education or knowledge of women influence her confidence in household decision making 
and positively correlated with dairy cooperative membership and control over dairy income. 
This part adds evidence to earlier literature that training and capacity building enhance 
knowledge and builds women’s empowerment (Kabeer 2001; Meier zu Selhausen 2015) 
This study provided an interesting opinion of women on land ownership related to market 
participation of women. Women perceived that land is common within household level even 
though the ownership title is held by men. Women concluded that the availability of land is 
important for dairy productivity but an not important criteria for dairy market participation. 
Even landless women also participate in the dairy market due to access to common resources. 
However it is important for women to be aware of their rights for land and asset ownership 
which indirectly influences decision making, mobility and bargaining within the household 
level (Dekker 2013; Klugman et al. 2014; Pena, Maiques, and Castillo 2008).  
This study provided evidence that women who are already members of self-help groups also 
participate in dairy cooperative membership and have better access to dairy income. 
Preliminary social capital through self-help groups would enhance the member’s cohesiveness 
and solidarity (Das 2011; Westermann, Ashby, and Pretty 2005), which led towards improved 
governance. It was also evident in the women’s dairy cooperative in Telangana, the mixed 
dairy cooperative in Bihar and the self-help groups representation in the innovation platforms 
in the Uttarakhand projects. This study concludes that improving education, knowledge and 
social capital of women will help in the long run for increasing confidence to participate in 
economic organizations.   
Policies and frame conditions: Cooperatives need a supportive policy framework to be 
sustainable in developing countries to create a large and vibrant cooperative sector (Mwanja 
et al. 2014). Supporting institutions and policies are important for the success of institutional 
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arrangements. Monopolistic institutional arrangements will lead to poor governance which is 
evident in Bihar where only government-based cooperatives are operative. Producers are only 
depending on this institutional arrangement to sell their milk which reduces their voice and 
decision making. On the other hand, multiple innovative policies are in place in Telangana 
which facilitate competitive governance and decentralized institutional arrangements such as 
mutually aided cooperatives and producer companies where there is the least state control. 
These competitive institutional arrangements improve the governance process and give the 
maximum price for milk, provide input support and services which enhances the productivity.  
5.4 Does participation of women in formal market institutions bring positive benefits? 
This study provided examples of positive changes in gender relations due to women’s 
participation in dairy cooperatives in membership and leadership roles. Control over dairy 
income is the most important aspect relevant for the economic empowerment of women. 
Economic empowerment can influence changes in decision making within households which 
is evident in this study. This will contest the social norm of restriction of women’s mobility to 
public spaces.  
Some findings did emerge from this study on whether women’s membership and leadership 
roles have led to gender-responsive plans which include policies and infrastructure to solve 
their issues. This is evident in the innovation platform approach where action plans were 
based on issues faced by women in that region. A review of the literature led to the conclusion 
that gender responsive plans and policies are dependent on institutional structures and 
political opportunities to enable women’s voices to be influential (Domingo et al. 2013).  This 
study provided evidence on expenditure patterns from dairy income that showed that women 
spend more for household food security, child education, savings and on household member’s 
health than men. This supports the hypothesis that investment for women’s economic and 
social empowerment will benefit household and family welfare in the long run. However, 
previous literature in Nigeria reported that changes in economic relations through women 
having access to microfinance led to domestic violence within household level (Wrigley-
Asante 2012).  In contrast, in the Telangana women’s dairy cooperative, men have changed 
their opinion about women’s control over dairy income due to the positive impact within 
households even though the understanding has taken some years to accrue.  
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5.5 Study limitations and future area of research 
The study objective was to find out and compare the institutional arrangements for inclusive 
dairy market growth, so the study took samples of only those producers who sell milk to any 
one type of institutional arrangements. The study has not included men and women who 
didn’t participate in the dairy market for selling their milk, or farmers without any animals or 
milk to sell. The inclusion of this category of farmers could have provided an explanation as 
to why they do not posses dairy animals and what measures needed to be taken.  
The study has taken most of the existing market institutional models in the selected sampling 
area in a state or district. However, some institutional models were not present, for example 
the informal dairy market in Telangana and private dairy companies and producer companies 
in Bihar. Expansion of the sampling area to include all institutional models was not done due 
to budget and resource constraints. However, the institutional arrangements selected in 
Telangana and Bihar represented the existing institutional structures in those states.  
The generalization of the impact of institutional arrangements should be done carefully by 
considering local socio-economic conditions. However, the findings of governance issues and 
gender constraints are similar for all the institutional arrangements in both Telangana and 
Bihar. Even though the study explored the opinions and reasons for the issues in institutional 
arrangements in the dairy market through qualitative methods, these findings are based on 
individual experiences and opinions.   
The qquantitative assessment of households and individuals for income and productivity 
impact in Telangana and Bihar could have complimented the findings more strongly. The 
innovation platform impact assessment study is partly fulfilling this limitation even though 
there is a lack of detailed data before and after interventions for generalization. However, a 
post intervention survey supported the generalization.   
5.6 Policy implications and recommendations 
The findings emerging from this study can be structured around key areas to ensure gender 
equality and social inclusion in institutional arrangements for inclusive dairy market growth. 
1. Social and gender inclusion analysis: Social and gender analysis is important while 
promoting any institutional arrangements for agricultural market establishment. This 
helps to get insights on gender roles and responsibilities and who owns which 
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production system, thus helps to make strategies for inclusion of all communities 
including women and poor.   
2. Ensure that institutional arrangements for the market are context specific: Innovative 
institutional approaches that are not grounded in a particular local context and for 
particular group of people (men and women) will be ineffective. Understanding the 
local context is very important when designing any new institutional arrangement. Ex 
ante assessment of impacts will be helpful to assess whether the particular 
arrangement supports inclusive growth.  
3. Gender inclusive institutional structures at all levels: It is recommended to promote 
the active involvement of women from village to federation or union level. 
4. Promote representation of women in leadership roles: The focus should be on 
capacity building and training to enhance their knowledge through a bottom up 
approach. This will support active involvement of women in dairy cooperatives and 
also control over dairy income.   
5. Promote a multi-dimensional approach for women’s empowerment: Improve 
participation of women in decision making and leadership roles. Complimentary 
activities are needed, like promoting social capital through self-help groups, capacity 
development, contesting social norms and promoting legal gains.  
6. Promotion of women for equal access to control over dairy income: It can be achieved 
through direct transfers into their accounts.  
7. Enhance active involvement of women in training and decision making meetings: It 
can be done through target based training at flexible venues, use of digital media and 
flexible timings to ensure participation in meetings. Meeting documentation and 
compliance records for monitoring inclusive and meaningful participation are 
recommended.  
8. Restrict state involvement: The state involvement should be limited to infrastructure 
development, input support, monitoring progress and supportive policies. 
9. State should provide support to informal dairy markets: It can be carried out through 
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